Moral intutionalism and the law inscribed on our hearts

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 1999 by Mathewson, Mark D

But what characterizes the moral intuitionism I am suggesting that allows it to withstand recent attacks that have appeared to make moral intuitionism epistemologically incredible?22 Again, following Audi, I believe a plausible account of moral intuitionism may be construed as moderately foundationalist, moderately rationalist, and internalist-thus a moderate moral intuitionism.

First, this moral intuitionism is foundationalist, but only moderately so. Foundationalism-the view that knowledge may be rooted in first principles whose justification does not depend on inference from other cases of knowledge-in its classical form has been the locus of much criticism due to the problems associated with such knowledge being infallible, indefeasible and incorrigible. 23 Unfortunately, the apparent failure of classical foundationalism leads many to conclude the failure of foundationalism generally. Recent epistemologists have, I believe, demonstrated that moderate forms of foundationalism are not susceptible to the same criticisms leveled against classical varieties. 24

Moderate foundationalism applied to moral intuitionism gives us noninferential knowledge of moral principles or judgments that need not be infallible, indefeasible or incorrigible. Audi astutely observes that,

Once it is seen that the primary role of intuition is to give us direct, that is, noninferential, knowledge or justified belief of the truth, rather than of the selfevidence, of moral propositions (especially certain moral principles), there is less reason to think that moral beliefs resting on an intuitive grasp of principles must be considered indefeasibly justified. 25 Surprisingly, to many, a moral intuitionism that is moderately foundationalist may (perhaps even should) include time and reflection. 26 Intuitive knowledge can be (though need not be) a conclusion formed through rational inquiry and yet not be inferential.27 Thus, a distinction exists between kinds of selfevident propositions. Some are immediately self-evident (grasped apart from any reflection) and others are mediately self-evident (grasped through the mediation of reflection) .28 Reflection, in such instances, plays a clarifying role that is not itself the basis for the intuition. 2' Armed with this distinction, Audi states that,

Once we distinguish between the immediately and the mediately self-evident, and appreciate that a self-evident proposition need not be obvious or even compelling, we can see clearly that an intuitionist-indeed, even a rationalist one like Ross-may be a fallibilist about the sense of self-evidence. He can thus make room for error even in thoughtful judgments to the effect that a proposition is, or is not, self-evident. He might grant, then, that a non-self-evident (or even false) proposition may seem to someone to be self-evident. Moreover, not every self-evident proposition need be "intuitive," just as not every proposition believed on the basis of intuition need be self-evident. If there are self-evident moral truths, the sense that one has grasped such a truth can be illusory, and at least the majority can be expected to be in the mediate category. 30