Moral intutionalism and the law inscribed on our hearts

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 1999 by Mathewson, Mark D

Furthermore, moral knowledge gained by intuition may be revised and refined on the basis of evidence. 31 Moral knowledge gained through intuition, then, need not be infallible, indefeasible and incorrigible.

Beyond the possibility of moral knowledge being fallible, defeasible and corrigible, what other practical results might be found? A moderately foundationalist moral intuitionism does not entail that a person will "see" a particular self-evident truth. For various reasons (some to be discussed later) one may intuit a moral principle that another just does not "see." Likewise, one may intuit a moral principle that another comes to know inferentially. Moreover, the possibility exists that intuitions may misfire and we may be wrong about what we have intuited. In other words, just because some moral principles or judgments are intuitable does not entail they (1) will be intuited, (2) will be intuited by each person, (3) can only be known by intuition, or (4) are successfully intuited. Analogously, the same may be said for our perceptual faculties. Just because some facts about the physical world are perceivable does not entail they (1) will be perceived, (2) will be perceived by each person, (3) can only be known through perception, or (4) are successfully perceived.

Second, moderate moral intuitionism is rationalist, but, again, only in a moderate form. The intuitive knowledge of (self-evident) moral principles or judgments is a priori. Yet, experience may play a role in the acquisition of relevant information that may be used for reflection, revision and refinement. Audi claims that,

Rationalists may grant, however, that experience is crucial for acquiring the relevant concepts; it is knowledge of their relations that they account for nonempirically. A rationalist may also hold to any of several views on the priority of general over particular moral knowledge....

[One of these views] combines virtues of both the generalist and the particularist positions: one must see something in the particular in order to know that it is an injustice; and to know the truth of a generalization one must see how it might apply to particulars. Further, we can refine our general moral knowledge in the light of concrete cases and modify our understanding our understanding of concrete cases in the light of our general knowledge. This interactionist view seems to me the most plausible; and it is consistent both with rationalism and with the view that experience is a genetic, as opposed to epistemic, requirement of a priori knowledge. 32

A moderate rationalism applied to moral intuitionism fits nicely with the moderate foundationalism previously expressed. It does not entail infallibility, indefeasibility, incorrigibility, arbitrariness, etc. Audi sums up the situation well:

A priori knowledge of moral principles need not be mysterious, nor its proponents dogmatic or epistemologically infallibilist; moral properties can be seen to play important roles in description, explanation, and inference without being either reduced to natural ones or consigned to the status of epiphenomena; self-evident moral principles need not be immediately obvious or, on the other hand, arbitrary or merely historically conditioned products of culture; moral principles, even if they can be known without prior premises about rationality, can be supported by plausible principles of practical reasoning; and the diversity of moral obligations can be accounted for, in a variety of ways, in a unifying framework.33