Moral intutionalism and the law inscribed on our hearts

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 1999 by Mathewson, Mark D

Second, from Rom 2:14-15 and the irreducibility of moral properties to natural ones (i.e. morality is not explicable solely in physical terms-it is ultimately nonphysical), the knowledge of the internal law is a priori.'o Though I have rejected an innate knowledge of the internal law, this does not commit me to some sort of Lockean empiricism. One need not affirm innate knowledge to hold a rationalistic epistemology. A moderate moral intuitionism affirms a moderate rationalism even while not acknowledging innate knowledge. Moral intuitions are the a priori deliverances of an innate rational faculty. A moderate moral intuitionism recognizes the problems of either constructing an empiricist epistemology or affirming the notion of innate ideas while simultaneously recognizing the importance of empirical experience in the acquisition of knowledge and the apparent necessity of a rationalistic approach to epistemology.

Third, the condemnatory context of Romans 1-2 requires we make a distinction between a rational faculty necessary for moral knowledge that justifies judgment and punishment and non-rational natural processes that cannot be said to give us moral knowledge or justify judgment and punishment. A moderate moral intuitionism proposes intuition as that rational faculty whereas capacities such as instinct, impulse and propensity are of the non-rational variety. Some may argue that (&t@ in Rom 2:14 is translated as instinct and that the same term is used in Jude 10 to refer to the unreasoning appetites of animals. Therefore, maybe a rational faculty is not in mind. But, the use of (p6atq in both Rom 2:14 and Jude 10 shows that the context of each passage must govern the meaning of this term and not a mere word study. The term (p6cyt@ insinuates something very different in each passage-in Rom 2:14 to a rational activity for which one is responsible and in Jude 10 to a non-rational activity that is subhuman. Intuition, as a rational faculty, is not rendered implausible as an explication of Rom 2:1415 by the use of the term ovoic.

Fourth, a moderate moral intuitionism (partially) explains our experience of different levels of moral knowledge in persons. Since an intuitionist position of this kind denies an innate moral law and an innate knowledge of that law, all persons need not possess the same knowledge or amount of knowledge of basic moral principles. A moderate moral intuitionism leaves open the question of the exact content of each person's intuited moral knowledge.

Fifth, a moderate moral intuitionism corresponds nicely with a whole person view of the image of God." Rational capacities have long been recognized as an aspect of the imago Dei even if some have falsely defined it exclusively in those terms. Most certainly we image God in our cognitive abilities including our faculty of intuition. 42 Though we need not attribute intuitive ability to God, he nevertheless is a rational being who grasps and knows truth. We image God in that we (and presumably angels) among all other creatures are the only rational beings who can do the same. How, or by what process, we grasp and know the truth is largely irrelevant to our imaging God. 13 1 find it more acceptable in light of the imago Dei that God does not do our thinking and knowing for us (i.e. fixing in us from birth a knowledge of the moral law). Instead, as his reflectors and representatives, we are given the faculties to think and know for ourselves. We image God when we engage our intuitive faculty to grasp and know moral truth. We do so even more when we are successful.