A tale of two roads: Homiletics and biblical authority

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Sep 2000 by Allen, David L

Evangelical Donald Bloesch has also affirmed a Barthian position: "A careful examination of early Protestant orthodoxy . . . reveals that the distinction between the word of God and the words of the Bible was quite common."20 He says quite pointedly in his response article to Elmer Colyer, "I refuse to identify the Bible with divine revelation."21

Stanley Grenz affirmed the identical position in his Theology for the Community of God. He remarks that Ramm has offered a service in raising Barth's banner within evangelicalism and says, "We cannot simply equate the revelation of God with the Bible."22 Grenz outlines a threefold connection of revelation with the Bible. First, following Barth's language, the Bible is revelation in a "derivative" sense. Second, the Bible is "functional" revelation. Third, the Bible is "mediate" revelation in that it mediates to us the proper understanding of God's essence.23 Thus, for Grenz, the Bible is derivatively, functionally, and mediately revelation, but it is not ontologically revelation.

Evangelicals are often accused by their non-evangelical counterparts-- and sometimes by those within their own camp-of reducing the text of Scripture to pure propositions. For example, Henry Knight's A Future for Truth: Evangelical Theology in a Postmodern World offers a one-sided critique of what he calls "propositionalism."24 Knight writes as though Henry, Nash, and Packer had no conception of revelation beyond the kind of propositionalism which he denigrates. Note also Donald McKim's The Bible in Theology and Preaching, especially chapters six and seven.25 Chapter Six is entitled "Nee-Orthodox Theology: Scripture as Witness" and discusses Barth's position on Scripture as "witness." Chapter Seven, entitled "NeoEvangelical Theology: Scripture as Message" is interesting for two reasons: first, McKim does not discuss the wing of evangelicalism that identifies Scripture as the Word of God; and second, he reveals the fact that he himself is actually more at home with the Barthian nee-orthodox position in that the chapter uses the word "message" only eleven times but "witness" as many as thirteen times. McKim cannot get away from the nee-orthodox shibboleth "witness." I fail to see much difference in the "nee-orthodox" position of his Chapter Six and the (moderate to left-wing) "nee-evangelical" position of his Chapter Seven.

For Barth, Bloesch, Ramm, Grenz, McKim, and others, the "reduction" is a result of a false identification of the Word of God with the Word written-- Scripture. In reality, it is they who labor under a false linguistic dichotomy, which is at the heart of the Barthian failure to identify Scripture with the Word, speech, and revelation of God. Much of this concern for identifying Scripture with the Word of God could be allayed if we adopt J. L. Austin and John Searle's "speech act" approach to language. Speech act theory has a built-in safeguard against reducing textual meaning to nothing more than propositional content. Language as speech acts has propositional content but also illocutionary and perlocutionary force. Scripture contains more than mere propositional revelation, but it certainly does not contain less. The work of Vanhoozer, particularly his Is There a Meaning in this Text?, applies successfully Austin and Searle's linguistic insights in speech act theory to textual interpretation.26 The resultant theological and hermeneutical approach to texts avoids the Barthian dichotomy on the one hand and so-called "propositionalism" on the other. This approach bodes well for homiletical theory that wants to maintain Biblical authority but also recognize the multi-dimensionality of language.