Hellenistic or Hebrew? Open theism and reformed theological method

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Jun 2002 by Horton, Michael S

Yahweh is therefore not a solitary monad preoccupied with himself, a Buddha-like figure who closes his eyes to the world in order to contemplate his own bliss. But he is also not a creature contained in and circumscribed by the reality that he has created apart from himself. Not surprisingly, the classical prohibition of univocal access to God's being is motivated by the Creator-creature distinction, while open theists have serious difficulties with this epistemological boundary, even though they affirm the ontological distinction.49

2. Analogy. Analogy is ideally suited to the biblical understanding of the God-world relationship. While equivocity is a mark of hyper-transcendence and its concomitant skepticism, univocity is a mark of hyper-immanence and its concomitant rationalism. An equivocal approach to religious language champions difference at the expense of similarity, while a univocal approach offers a reverse sacrifice. But analogies assume both difference and similarity. It is therefore less reductive than either univocal rationalism or equivocal irrationalism. It is not just that some Scriptures (that represent God as repenting) are treated as analogical or anthropomorphic, while others (that represent God as never-changing) are treated as univocal. All of this language is analogical, the result of God's self-condescension and accommodation. Human beings, "when they indulge their curiosity, enter into a labyrinth," Calvin warned.50 Far safer, then, to let God descend to us.51

In an ironic move for those who accuse Calvin and the tradition generally of being held hostage to reason, Pinnock and Sanders complain that such strong affirmations of divine incomprehensibility and mystery can only lead to skepticism. Scripture declares, "To whom will you liken me and make me equal, and compare me, as though we were alike?" (Isa 46:5; 55:89; Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; Hos 11:9). But such texts, Sanders says, "are often understood as biblical warrant for the disparagement of anthropomorphism."52 But does that really meet its mark? How is one disparaging anthropomorphism simply by treating it as anthropomorphic? Is it not those who demand that anthropomorphism and analogy be translated into univocal predicates who are scandalized by the former? From our perspective, Scripture is no less analogical when it says that God does not repent than when it represents him as doing just that.

Despite his incomprehensibility, God wills to enter into a relationship with his creatures. The covenant is the context in which that becomes possible. Let us turn for a moment to examples of this covenantal (analogical) discourse, particularly as touching on this debate. We will treat classes or types rather than offering exegesis of specific passages.

The obvious examples have to do with God relenting and repenting. Both, open theists contend, demonstrate that God is not immutable, independent or omniscient-at least as these terms have been historically understood. We know the passages, but what do we do in such instances? Occurring as they do in the dramatic narrative of God's covenant dealings with his people, we know that we are not in the realm of God's hiddenness, "God-in-Himself," the eternal decree of the immanent Trinity. Rather, we are in the realm of God's revelation, "God-for-Us," the historical outworking of that eternal plan. On one hand, we are to take seriously the dynamic relationship of covenant partners (1 Sam 15:11), yet without translating them into univocal descriptions that lead us to conclude that God does in fact change his mind (v. 29). The same is true in Mal 3:6: "For I am the LORD, I do not change; therefore you are not consumed, 0 sons of Jacob."