function of divine self-limitation in open theism: Great wall or picket fence?, The

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Jun 2002 by Highfield, Ron

2. The failure of divine self-limitation.

a. Do all negations limit God? John Sanders's brief section, "The Concept of Divine Self-Limitation," in The God Who Risks, is one of the few theoretical discussions of DSL in the literature of open theism. We will follow his thoughts closely in what follows.63 Sanders begins by anticipating a standard objection, that is, that open theism offers us a "limited God."64 He points out that open theism is not alone in speaking of God in the language of limitation. The Christian tradition has always spoken of God as "limited" in some ways. The Bible itself and tradition have noted many things God "cannot" do. God cannot lie, die, or sin, for example. Indeed, Sanders asserts, try as hard as they may, not even the most fastidious traditionalist can avoid "some sort of divine limitation":

If it is impossible for God to create beings over which he does not exercise specific sovereignty, then God is limited. If God must control every detail of human life in order to achieve his goals, then God is limited. If God cannot create personal agents who may act independently of the divine will, then God is limited. If it is not possible for God to create beings who can surprise and possibly disappoint him, then God is limited. If an omnipotent God cannot create a world in which the future actions of free creatures is unknown, then God is limited. If it is impossible for God to make himself contingent on the decisions of creatures, then God is limited. Consequently, both sides of the sovereignty debate employ the concept of divine limitation, whether they admit it or not. 65

Sanders's preemptive argument is straightforward: if the Bible, tradition, and even open theism's contemporary opponents cannot avoid attributing limitations to God, there is no prima facie objection to open theism's practice of doing so. Sanders's argument suffers from a serious flaw, however. He fails to distinguish between negative language that imposes a limit and negative language that removes a limit. Traditional theology used negative (apophatic) language to negate the limitations and defects of creatures to avoid attributing them to God.66 To say "God cannot die" does not limit God. It expresses, rather, God's unlimited nature with respect to death. The negative word "cannot" negates the limit represented by the word "die." Mortal beings do not have more being or more possibilities because they are mortal; they have less. When traditional theology says "God cannot lie," it is not limiting God's possibilities for speech, thereby cutting God off from a whole range of other possibilities. It is negating a moral defect that is intertwined with all sorts of inadequacies and impotencies. The statement, "God cannot lie," asserts, among other things, that God is free from any internal self-contradiction or external needs that might tempt God to lie. Liars do not experience reality more deeply, but less, because of their lies. This use of the language of limitation does not limit God at all but marks the "boundary" between God's being and nothingness.