function of divine self-limitation in open theism: Great wall or picket fence?, The

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Jun 2002 by Highfield, Ron

b. Does the sheer existence of creatures limit God? Sanders proposes four ways in which God may limit himself. Though Sanders presents these ways as "ideas that have been put forward," by others, I believe we can take them as on the whole approved by him. They are:

(1) The very existence of a creation of any kind "implies a limitation on God, since God is no longer the only being that exists." God now has a relationship to creation and "being in relation to" is a sort of dependence.

(2) The creation of human beings "implies limitation, since God is not the humans and God is dependent on them in order to be in divine-human relation." God would not be Creator without creation.

(3) God limits himself by making choices among various possibilities. He cannot do some things without leaving others undone. For example, God cannot create a universe that has both libertarian freedom and the property of being under God's complete control.

(4) "God cannot exercise meticulous providence and grant human beings libertarian freedom."71

Sanders's first two types of DSL can be collapsed into one, since both discuss a limitation God brings upon himself by allowing the sheer existence of other beings. Why would the sheer existence of a creature "alongside" God limit God?72 Let us answer this question by asking and answering another. Why would the existence of another eternal being-material or spiritual"alongside" God limit God? The Church fathers dealt with this question extensively in their struggle against polytheism and different forms of metaphysical dualism or pluralism. If there were an eternal Other "alongside" God, God would not be the source of all things, all-powerful, ultimate, omnipresent, and so on.73 Grasping the totality of good, being, beauty, truth, and power would require us to combine God's portion and the Other's portion. So, the All (God plus the Other) would be greater than God alone. God would be truly and eternally limited by the existence of this eternal Other! Open theists agree with the Church fathers here. Pinnock criticizes process theology precisely for proposing an eternal realm alongside God. This will not do, says Pinnock, for then "God would be like a Greek god who was in the grip of a more ultimate metaphysical ground."74

Open theists stumble, however, when they address the original question, "Why would the sheer existence of a creature 'alongside' God limit God?" According to open theists, once the created other exists, and as long as it exists, God finds himself limited in ways similar to the ways he would be limited if metaphysical dualism were true. God must vacate "space" to make room for creatures. 75 He must cease action to allow creatures scope for their own action. He must give up control, so creatures can exercise their freedom. Created beings, too, have their own power, being, good, and beauty. In open theism-as in metaphysical dualism-the totality of power, being, good, and beauty is calculated by combining God's portion and the world's portion. The conclusion is irresistible, though open theists may be loath to draw it: since there is a world "alongside" God, and as long as there is such a world, God plus the world is greater than God alone.76