Openness and inerrancy: Can they be compatible?

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 2002 by Nicholls, Jason A

Indeed, here it might help to highlight Wellum's own concession. For at the end of the day, he himself realizes he must concede that an open view does not necessarily undermine the doctrine of inerrancy-that is, he acknowledges that it is indeed logically possible for an open theist to affirm inerrancy. But in view of Wellum's noted desire for guarantees, it seems odd that he ends up judging open theism unevangelical and even "unbiblical" because, as he puts it, its compatibility with inerrancy "seems" to him "highly improbable."37 Would not Wellum want indisputable guaranteed proof showing that open theism logically undermines the doctrine of inerrancy before declaring it unbiblical? For the sake of both prudence and consistency, this burden of proof should be required both ways.38 My last line of response to Wellum applies equally to the other aforementioned critiques, and so we leave it for the next section.

While I would take issue with each of the preceding analyses at various points, I am nevertheless convinced that all of these critiques are helpful insofar as they shed light on an important dimension in openness theology-- the relationship between human freedom and God's ability to realize his providential purposes. Indeed, it does not take long to recognize that the critics of open theism generally follow a consistent (though I would argue disappointing) pattern. They incorrectly assume that the openness God can have no knowledge of the future at all; hence, by logical implication, they in turn denounce what they perceive as its detrimental impact on God's ability to realize his providential purposes. For if God does not know the outcome of the future, the argument goes, and if he cannot at any time override our freedom lest its integrity be destroyed, then how can he guarantee the outcome of any of his plans or hope to guide the course of human history? And to put this specifically to the inerrancy question, how is the Bible itself-- insofar as it makes predictions that might be thwarted by human decisions-- not also at risk of being proved wrong? This is not to mention, moreover, the related issue raised by Wellum regarding the initial composition of inerrant Scripture-written by agents endowed with libertarian freedom. In the minds of some critics, these questions are too difficult to answer satisfactorily; hence, they are convinced that this necessarily renders an openness position incompatible with the doctrine of inerrancy. Before offering a rebuttal below, I want to again emphasize that this common line of critique helpfully illuminates what appears to be the central concern that many have with the open view. For while Calvinists and Arminians may indeed differ on the extent of God's providential purposes-whether they are specific or general-- both agree that the Bible presents a God who realizes at least some purposes. But the question stands as to whether a proponent of the openness view can affirm this-that is, can the God of open theism accomplish even his ultimate purposes-and can open theism, therefore, continue to be upheld as a position compatible with inerrancy and, thus, remain a viable evangelical alternative? I am convinced that it can.