OLD PRINCETON APOLOGETICS: COMMON SENSE OR REFORMED?, THE

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 2003 by McConnel, Tim

If one is to argue that the philosophy of Scottish Common Sense Realism directly influenced the Old Princeton apologetics, it is necessary first to establish what that philosophy taught, and then to consider at what points it is apparent in the apologetics.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE REALISM

Scottish Common Sense Realism largely arose as a reaction to Hume's scepticism. The first, and greatest, proponent of this approach was Thomas Reid ( 1710-1796).10 His views were transplanted to the colonies by John Witherspoon in 1768, when Witherspoon assumed the presidency of the College of New Jersey in Princeton. The influence of this philosophy at that institution would continue through the presidency of its last great exponent, the Scotsman James McCosh (1811-1894). Through the influence of the college, the common sense philosophy also predominated at Princeton Theological Seminary. However, it also should be noted that this philosophy became dominant in all sectors of antebellum American life, and even continues to be influential in many ways to the present.11

Scottish Common Sense Realism had several distinguishing characteristics. It stressed the importance of induction, in keeping with its desire to be "scientific," to bring order to "mental philosophy" in the way that Bacon and Newton had brought order to "natural philosophy."12 It rejected the theory of "ideas" which interposed between the knowing subject and the object known.13 It sought to found its reasoning upon self-evident first principles, for both necessary and contingent truths. It regarded "common sense" as having authority, because it had metaphysical significance from the constitution of human reason.

"Common Sense" is a somewhat slippery term, inasmuch as it possesses several possible meanings, according to the context. Common use of the term refers to one who has average intelligence or practical wisdom, or that it is the universal belief or persuasion of ordinary people.14 Reid obviously meant more than this in most places. He gave this term to the human faculty that deals with first principles, by which he meant self-evident principles. For example, he wrote, "If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd."15 Reid was not the first to make use of the term in his philosophy. Berkeley, the British idealist, had himself claimed to be defending common sense against the philosophers!16 "Common Sense" was also used by Reid and his followers as synonymous with reasoning, especially in its inductive function.17

Reid argued that there are numerous self-evident "first principles" which, themselves being unprovable, are the basis for all other thought and knowledge. He distinguished between the first principles of necessary and contingent truths. The former were largely restricted to grammatical, logical, and mathematical issues, but also included some basic beliefs of taste and morals, as well as some "metaphysical" principles. In the last category Reid included such items as causality, the existence of minds and bodies, and the "major premise" for the argument from design.18 The first principles of contingent truth, on the other hand, dealt with knowledge we gain through our senses. These included such things as the reliability of memory, personal identity, and the existence of other living, thinking humans. None of these could be proved, and in fact, many had been questioned by philosophers; but no one could fail to act upon such beliefs.19 For Reid, the nature of belief differs between necessary truths and contingent truths. The former could be demonstrated from the appropriate "first principles" or axioms, and were therefore certain; but the latter could only be "probable," which probability could vary widely from slight to extremely high. The difference lay in the different kinds of evidence which underlay the judgment of truth. Reid considered all knowledge to be belief based on evidence.20 Evidence could be of various types, such as sense, memory, consciousness, testimony, axioms, and reasoning. He disclaimed any underlying unity to the different types, except, "They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call certainty, others in various degrees according to circumstances."21 Reid made final recourse at numerous places to "nature" or God as the final guarantor of the "first principles," of the adequacy and accuracy of the human mind to gain knowledge. Thus, while by the nature of the case the self-evident first principles cannot be proved, they can be relied upon as trustworthy.22