MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE IN REFORMATION ARMINIANISM AND OPEN THEISM, THE

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Sep 2004 by Studebaker, Steven M

15 Laurence W. Wood argues that the Boethian view of eternity is a preferable solution to this problem than the common appeal to divine timelessness (Wood, "Does God Know the Future? Can God Be Mistaken?: A Reply to Richard Swinburne," The Asbury Theological Journal 56/2 and 57/ 1 [fall 2001 and spring 2002] 5-47).

16 Picirilli, "Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future" 262-64 and 266-77 and "An Arminian Response to Sanders" 471 and 478. Wood also maintains that in the Boethian view God's knowledge follows "real events" (Wood, "A Reply to Swinburne" 8-10).

17 Picirilli, "An Arminian Response to Sanders" 475.

18 Ibid. 471 and Picirilli, "Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future" 262. Futurity is, strictly speaking, only applicable to temporal beings. For the timeless God, there is no future or past; God eternally or timelessly knows all the events that comprise the temporal history of the world.

19 At this point Picirilli is inconsistent on his theory of the mode of divine knowledge. On the one hand, God's foreknowledge is intuitive; that is, it is not discursive. According to intuitive foreknowledge, "God simply 'sees' all that will ever be, and this includes the contingencies that might be one way or another" (Picirilli, "An Arminian Response to Sanders" 471). On the other hand, he maintains that God's knowledge is analogous to human knowing, according to which there is a sequence between event and knowledge of the event. Although for human knowledge the chronology is ontological and temporal, for divine knowledge there is only an ontological order (Picirilli, "An Arminian Response to Sanders" 474-75).

20 Others also note this, see William Hasker, "Foreknowledge and Necessity," in God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom (ed. John M. Fischer; Stanford Series in Philosophy; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989) 226 and Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Contours of Christian Philosophy; ed. C. Stephen Evans; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1991) 100.

21 Pinnock, Most Moved Mover 106 and Sanders, The God Who Risks 198-99 and "Why Simple Foreknowledge" 26-27.

22 Gregory A. Boyd, "The Open-Theism View," in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001) 13-28; Jason A. Nicholls, "Openness and Inerrancy: Can They be Compatible?" JETS 45 (2002) 629-49; and John Sanders, The God Who Risks 75, 130-31, 133, and 173.

23 Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000) 23-24 and 32-33; Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective" 148; Pinnock, "There is Room for Us: A Reply to Bruce Ware," JETS 45 (2002) 216; and Sanders, The God Who Risks 198-99 and "Why Simple Foreknowledge" 26-27. Although open theism's denial that God knows future libertarian choices is sometimes presented as a modification of the traditional doctrine of omniscience, it more accurately stems from their belief that future libertarian choices are not proper objects of knowledge (Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective" 148 and Pinnock, "God Limits His Knowledge," in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom [ed. David and Randall Basinger; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1986] 149-50 and 157). For instance, William Hasker defines omniscience as "at any time God knows all propositions such that God's knowing them at that time is logically possible" ("A Philosophical Perspective" 136). His definition is one that most Calvinists and Arminians could accept, for after all, Calvinists and Arminians do not maintain that God knows the logically impossible. Moreover, many Calvinists agree with open theists that future libertarian choices are not proper objects of knowledge and in this respect consider open theists consistent Arminians. For example, John S. Feinberg argues that the open thcist theory of present knowledge is the most effective in resolving the tension between libertarian freedom and divine omniscience in contrast to the theories of Boethius, Ockham, simple foreknowledge, and middle knowledge (Feinberg, No One like Him: The Doctrine of God [The Foundations of Evangelical Theology; ed. John S. Feinberg; Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001] 759-60 and 775). Stephen J. Wellum also notes open theism's "logically consistent" resolution of the divine foreknowledge-human freedom dilemma (Wellum, "Divine Sovereignty-Omniscience, Inerrancy, and Open Theism: An Evaluation," JETS 45 [2002] 263). In addition, Wayne Grudem remarks that open theism is the "most consistent Arminian position," albeit that it is nevertheless inconsistent with Scripture and deleterious for Christian spirituality (Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994] 348). In contrast, traditional Arminians accept that future libertarian choices are proper objects of knowledge. Thus, the difference is not the concept of omniscience per se, but the legitimate scope of knowledge.