COMPATIBILITY OF CALVINISM AND MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, THE

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Sep 2004 by Laing, John D

I. INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of middle knowledge has seen a revival of interest in the last twenty years, primarily among philosophers of religion.1 However, it has recently enjoyed much attention in theological circles as well. More and more Calvinist thinkers are attempting to incorporate middle knowledge into their systems of thought. In this paper, I hope to evaluate the prospects of this endeavor. That is, I hope to determine whether or not a compatibilist view of freedom (as opposed to a libertarian view of freedom) can be reconciled with the doctrine of middle knowledge.

In order to prosecute this agenda, I will begin with a brief look at the basic differences between libertarianism and compatibilism and follow with a brief discussion of the doctrine of middle knowledge. I will then move to an examination of how it may be incorporated into a Calvinistic model of divine providence, using Terrance Tiessen's Calvinistic Middle Knowledge Account as representative of the effort to wed the two systems of thought.

Libertarian freedom is generally thought to include a freedom of choice that is self-determined and not caused by events outside the control of the agent. Thus, given a choice between competing alternatives, the individual can choose either way, and once a choice has been made, it is asserted that the agent could have chosen otherwise. Compatibilist freedom is generally thought to include a freedom of choice that is self-determined but may, in some instances (or in all instances), be causally determined by events outside the control of the agent. As Feinberg has put it, "an action is free even if causally determined so long as the causes are nonconstraining," by which he means that the causes can be sufficient to bring about an action, but not contrary to the individual's will, desires, or wishes.2 Of course, the meaning of self-determination in each view is somewhat different. In libertarianism, it means both that the choice was made by the individual and that it was not caused by anything outside the individual. By contrast, compatibilism uses the language of self-determination to mean that the choice was made by the individual in accordance with his or her will, desires, or wishes, but there are sufficient causes for the action, and those causes are either external or internal to the individual. The nature of such causes will be discussed in our evaluation of the Calvinist Middle Knowledge approach.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE

The doctrine of middle knowledge was, for lack of better terminology, invented or discovered by Jesuit theologian Luis Molina during the CounterReformation period as an answer to the difficult question of how divine foreknowledge and providence can be reconciled with human freedom. Molina adhered to the traditional epistemological categories handed down by Aquinas, natural and free knowledge,3 but he added a third type of knowledge which he called scientia media, or middle knowledge.

Natural knowledge refers to that part of God's knowledge which he knows by his very nature. Included here is God's knowledge of all metaphysically necessary truths and all possible truths.4 Thus, natural knowledge, properly conceived, is that part of God's knowledge which could not have been different from what it is. It follows from this that the content of God's natural knowledge is independent of his will; God has no control over the truth of the propositions he knows by natural knowledge. Since God has no power over these truths, they may be thought of as logically prior to any act of will on God's part; natural knowledge is prevolitional.5

Free knowledge refers to that part of God's knowledge which he knows by his creative act of will. Included here are truths which refer to what actually exists (or will exist). Since free knowledge comes from God's creative act of will, it follows that the content of that knowledge is contingent. It includes only metaphysically contingent truths, or truths that could have been prevented by God, if he had chosen to create different situations, different creatures, or to not create at all. Thus, free knowledge can be characterized as dependent upon or logically posterior to God's will.

To these two distinctions in divine knowledge, Molina added a third which he believed incorporated facets of each. This he called scientia media, or middle knowledge. According to the theory, middle knowledge is similar to natural knowledge in that it is prevolitional, or prior to God's choice to create, and therefore its truth is independent of God's determining will. Likewise, it is similar to free knowledge in that the truths that are known are contingent (not necessary) because they are dependent on creaturely will.

The doctrine of middle knowledge proposes that God has knowledge not only of metaphysically necessary states of affairs via natural knowledge, and of what he intends to do via free knowledge, but also of what free creatures would do if they were created. Thus, the content of God's middle knowledge can be seen as a virtually infinite number of propositions of the form, "If person P were in situation S, then P would freely perform action A." It should be noted that the actual existence of P or the occurrence of S or A is not necessary for God to have this knowledge.