CONTRA HASKER: WHY SIMPLE FOREKNOWLEDGE IS STILL USEFUL

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Sep 2009 by Hunt, David P

It is a dogma of open theism that the parts of the future the openist God does not know - namely, future contingents (including the future actions of libertarianly free agents) - would be providentially useless to God even if he did know them. It is easy to see why this dogma is important to open theists. If adding such knowledge to God's cognitive repertoire would by itself yield no providential benefits, it is easier to resist the charge that open theism is theologically deficient in rejecting such knowledge. At least it is easier to resist the charge when leveled by fellow Arminians. Calvinists, of course, will have their own reasons for regarding open theism as theologically defective. But the only way for fellow Arminians to enhance God's providential control, if simple foreknowledge will not do the trick, is to embrace Molinism, with its doctrine of divine middle knowledge.1 Since middle knowledge is controversial on a number of grounds, the Molinist alternative will strike many Arminians as unacceptable. Such Arminians (the explanation continues) might as well become open theists; at least they should stop thinking that there is much at stake theologically between their position and that of the openists.

So it is easy to see why open theists would like it to be true that simple foreknowledge is providentially useless. What has always been harder to see is why one should think that it is true. At best, open theists have identified some prima facie puzzles for God's use of simple foreknowledge. But there are prima facie puzzles for many traditional theological positions. Why think that these puzzles are sufficiently serious to jeopardize commitment to simple foreknowledge?

There is even some prima facie reason to think that these puzzles are merely prima facie. After all, much of our own efforts to exercise "providential control" over our lives is directed toward anticipating what others will do. How much food should I buy for the party? That depends on how many people will show up. If only I knew! I will add an RSVP to the invitation, but we all know how well those work.2 In the end, I will have to act in light of my best guess. But what if I do not have to guess, because I know? Would that not be better? And would not God, too, be better off if he could proceed with his immeasurably more important projects guided by knowledge of a contingent future rather than mere guesswork?

Open theists, it would seem, have some explaining to do. An article by John Sanders is typical of the sort of explanation that is offered.3 It begins with a confused (and confusing) characterization of simple foreknowledge, which Sanders then applies to seven areas in which simple foreknowledge might be expected to enhance God's providential position. In each case Sanders suggests that there is a problem, but it is not always clear just what the problem is, and the cursory treatment allotted to each means that Sanders does not come close to showing that the problems are unsolvable and that we should therefore reject a doctrine that has been affirmed by every important Christian theologian before the nineteenth century.4

It was my critique of Sanders's article that inspired William Hasker's response in this Journal.5 Hasker's approach is to present an a priori argument for why I cannot possibly be right, followed by rebuttals to various responses I might make to this argument. I will look at Hasker's argument in a moment. But first I want to call attention to my central strategy, which Hasker passes over without mention.

Since the open theists are putting forward a universal claim - that simple foreknowledge provides God with no providential advantage at all it is susceptible to refutation by a single counterexample. This is in fact how I proceeded. The lynchpin of my argument was a counterexample, developed at length and with great care. It involved a version of rock-paper-scissors played between God and Satan. In this version God first declares rock, paper, or scissors, but only mentally, without revealing it; Satan then makes a libertarian free decision to declare rock, paper, or scissors; finally, God reveals what he declared. I claimed that the open theist God, who lacks simple foreknowledge, might well lose this game: victory is not guaranteed. (No open theist would dispute this claim.) But it is equally clear that a God endowed with simple foreknowledge can always make the right declaration of rock, paper, or scissors, based on his foreknowledge of what Satan will freely declare. So if God's objective is to win this game against Satan, simple foreknowledge gives him a clear providential advantage. The open theists' universal claim to the contrary is false.

A couple of comments are in order before moving to the argument in Hasker's essay. First, my rock-paper-scissors case is admittedly artificial (and apocryphal!). But it is clear, and that is the point. If this is a case in which a God equipped with simple foreknowledge has a providential advantage over a God with past and present knowledge alone, then (1) the open theists must withdraw their claim that there are no such cases; and (2) it is now an open question how many less artificial scenarios might also embody the providential utility of simple foreknowledge, because open theists can no longer hide behind the sweeping generalization that there are no cases whatsoever. Second, in response to a counterexample such as the one I offered in my article, it is not enough just to repeat the argument the counterexample is designed to refute; one must show what is wrong with the counterexample. This Hasker does not do (since he ignores the counterexample altogether). But if my counterexample is successful, it follows that there must be something wrong with Hasker's argument.