Facts, Values, and Morality

Facts, Values, and Mora/tty. By Richard B. Brandt. Cambridge, UK: Cara :University Press, 1996. vii + 319 pp. .:$59.95 (cloth); $18.95 (paper)

Facts, Values and Morality is not for the faint of mind. It demands a patient and careful reader, but rewards such diligence with a sophisticated, sound argument. Brandt's previous expositions of utilitarianism come to fruition in this comprehensive, constructive account. The book assumes readers conversant with utilitarian positions; those who seek an introduction to this philosophical ethical theory should look elsewhere.

Of particular interest is Brandt's use of memory to provide for the criticism of desire. When an agent represents the total consequences of an action as vividly as possible in order to gauge what object or experience available for choice is most attractive, she brings previous associations to bear on the process. Such conditioning accounts for the widespread though not necessarily universal desires for approbation, self-esteem, understanding and novelty, as well as Brandt's motivational theory of morality. Further, it allows Brandt to address native empathy and altruism as a requisite feature for the maximization of the really good for all sentient beings.

Brandt's volume makes an important contribution to utilitarian theory by mediating act-and-rule utilitarianism with conscience-utilitarianism. Conscience-utilitarianism is a directive for thinking by which one identifies the "moral codes it would be best to have prevalent and taught, all costs and benefits considered, and therefore able to be recommended in view of what people nonmorally want or care about if their desires have been carefully appraised" (p. 155). For Brandt, conscience consists in motivations not to do certain things, and dispositions to feel guilty/indignant when one/another does such things, as well as to believe that these attitudes can be justified. Accordingly, Brandt specifies what kinds of moral statements can be justified (on grounds of information, universalizability and consistency) and specifies an optimal social morality through the inculcation of certain motivations.

Brandt addresses stock objections to utilitarianism, dealing creatively with questions of distributive justice and whether persons are obligated to perform works of supererogation through his discussions of charitable giving and criminal law. But Brandt's argument remains open to criticism based on the anthropology entailed in utilitarian theories. For instance, Brandt defines rationality in terms of a deliberative theory; a rational choice is one that an agent would make "if he were vividly aware of all nonmoral facts the vivid representation of which to himself might tend to change his aversion or dispositions to act" (p. 297). Surely this is a thin account of rationality, one which makes it difficult for Brandt to deal with the meta-ethical question of why (disadvantaged) persons should be moral. And those who want to assert the reality of moral values apart from preference will likewise be troubled. Brandt suggests that the psychological process of acquiring moral attitudes to specific act-types constitutes evidence against moral realism. It is not obvious, however, why psychological conditioning negates the veracity of moral values. Still, Brandt's argument does offer resources with which to address these anthropological and axiological matters more satisfactorily than alternative utilitarian positions. Indeed, the book deserves serious attention from anyone inclined towards or against utilitarianism.

DARLENE FOZARD WEAVER

Georgetown University

Washington, DC

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