Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria

Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 1999 by Udogu, E Ike

Falola, Toyin. Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria. Gainesville, FM: University of Florida Press, 1996. 215 pp.

No Development Plan can be more than a deliberate attempt at achievement based upon things as they can then be seen and... it is never an end in itself, but merely a stage in a long process of development which the limitlessness of time, to put it at its most depressing level, will complete whatever may be the vagaries in the short span of human memories (p. 155).

The above citation encapsulates or captures one of the major thrusts of this book. Indeed, it is against this background that the entire edifice of this seven chapters book may be truly conceptualize and perhaps appreciated.

The author narrates the topsy turvy nature and antinomies of development planning during the British colonial rule in the early 20th century through independence in 1960. He laments the limited literature on colonial planning even though its very character and structure could determine the extent to which a nation-state could develop and modernize (p. xx).

In fact, there is a paradox in the whole process of colonial rule in Africa - it is a contradiction which stems from the policies of the colonial powers. For instance, France practiced a policy of assimilation whereby the colonies were considered a party of France. In the British case, it was indirect rule. Britain sent colonial "monarchies" to represent London. In the case of the former, theoretically, independence was out of the question, while in the latter, there was no time table as to when Britain would grant the colonies their sovereignty. After all, the colonies were meant to further British interest - a thesis supported by Joseph Chamberlain's doctrine "of investing in the colonies for the benefit of Britain" (p. 9).

Chapter one addresses the limited investment capacity in Nigeria in the 1940s. Even though the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) of 1940 supported the notion of economic planning in Nigeria, the outcomes, to say the least, were inadequate to tackle the existing problems. To begin with governors Hugh Clifford and Donald Cameron did not show themselves to be interested in development. Moreover, since trade and transport business were lucrative, it was not considered necessary to invest in the area of heavy industries deemed important for the development of the country. Suffice it to say that the fundamental strategy of the British policy was the doctrine of autarky or individual self-sufficiency. This implied that a colony should be able to produce enough goods to take care of its internal administration. The British tax payer did not wish to be burden with demands of the colonies. But it was increasingly clear in the Nigerian situation that this was not to be so. To sustain the administrative cost, Nigeria had to seek external loans (in contravention to the principle of individual self-sufficiency), and spent a substantial amount of its income on debt service (p. 17). This suggests that Nigeria's debt crisis today is a pre-independence phenomenon. The author argues that probably the most important dimension of the CDWA was that it laid the "superstructure" for modern planning in Nigeria (p. 25), [in spite of some of its pitfalls].

Chapter two addresses what was to be done following the abrogation of the doctrine of individual self-sufficiency. Indeed, as governor Bourdillon noted: "History will regard the death of the doctrine of individual self-sufficiency as one of the most important landmarks in the whole story of the Colonial Empire " (p. 23). This is probably true especially for the colonial peoples and London itself. Indeed, if the colonies were unable to fend for themselves economically, Britain, the colonial power would have to, and the burden on the British people was considered to be too heavy to bear. Arguably, this reality expedited the process of decolonization in Africa and elsewhere.

In chapters three and four, Falola addresses Nigeria's first "Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare" which was launched in 1946. This plan examined numerous internal issues that needed to be tackled - promotion of local industries and food production, employment of WWII veterans, et cetera (p. 48). Since this plan would be expensive Britain, inter alia, suggested economic belt tightening for her colonies (p. 51), even in the face of internal and local criticisms of the programs as inadequate to meet the needs of Nigerians (pp. 56-70). Within the context of this plan, chapter five examines a cornucopia of programs implemented - stimulation of local industries, expansion of infrastructure, provision of electricity, improvement of communications, improvement of towns and villages, provision of centers for training primary school teachers, construction of University College of Ibadan, and so on (pp. 77-88). Unfortunately for a country as large as Nigeria, their effect on the population were minuscule (p. 91). The program's lack of efficacy, contends Falola, was exacerbated by the fact that towns, villages, and regions began to compete with one another for scarce resources [sometimes with antagonistic consequences in the regional rivalries that ensued] (pp. 91-92). He contends that these problems reveal the limitations of planning implemented by individuals that were "alien" and lacked a true understanding of the country's real problems (p. 95).