challenges to Pakistan's domestic security, The

Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 2002 by Hilali, A Z

On 12 October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif's government in a bloodless coup and the general proclaimed himself Pakistan's "chief executive". According to political observers, Nawaz Sharif sowed the seeds of his own downfall by maladroit handling of Pakistan's illconsidered incursion by Islamic militants, aided and abetted by Pakistan's army, into India-held areas of Kashmir around the town of Kargil.55 The confrontation seemed to be spiralling out of control between these two nuclear-capable nations until President Bill Clinton used his influence and the Pakistan army pulled back. India unwisely proclaimed a great victory, the Pakistani army fumed and Nawaz Sharif became the subject of fierce public criticism at home. Domestically Sharif was unpopular not only for his unending attempts at grabbing power, but also for his disdainful attitude towards almost each and every national institution. He neither understood nor respected nor learned to live with institutions of a modern state. He became the most powerful prime minister in the history of Pakistan because he had a two-thirds majority, further consolidated after the repeal of the 8th amendment. He subjugated the parliament that was the source of his authority through the 14th Amendment. He removed the President (Farooq Leghari) and the Chief Jiustice (Sajjad Ali Shah), and virtually transformed the federal structure of government to a unitary form by total usurpation of provincial autonomy. But instead of working for better governance, improvement of economy and rule of law, Nawaz Sharif produced the worst form of cronyism and hunger of power. Major political parties and renewed politicians united under a one point agenda - removal of Nawaz Sharif's government. Moreover, Nawaz's rule left no option but for the military to take over the reins of power, because of Pakistan's steady slide toward bankruptcy, lawlessness and chaos. On the other hand, the United States, the European Union and the Commonwealth increased pressure on General Musharaf to set a time frame for the restoration of democracy. The message of the west was very clear, that military coups are not the solution to Pakistan's chronic problems of poverty, debt and corruption and the country stands in need of institution-building rather than spectacular steps which may look good in the short term' but are not sustainable for the long term. However, on 12 May 2000 the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of Musharraf's takeover but gave him three years from the day of the coup (12 October 1999) to complete his task of rescuing Pakistan from economic and political implosion and hold elections. Moreover, in future, if the country enters into chaos, the generals may again be forced to play a role, because the military remains a powerful factor in Pakistani politics.

WEAK DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Democracy was the driving force behind the creation of Pakistan because in 1946 the Muslims of the subcontinent used their ballot power to establish an independent and sovereign country. But soon after the inception of Pakistan, the democratic process was killed by unconstitutional forces. The eclipse of the democratic process - first under an imperfect parliamentary system and later under successive military regimes - is the basic factor in Pakistan's failure to develop political institutions. Pakistan's democratic institutions are sick and wounded and non-democratic forces (civil-military bureaucracy) remain powerful, as an indispensable instrument at the disposal of the state. In fact, the civil-military elite has skilfully used its organisational superiority and coercive capacity to restrict, suppress and abort the growth and development of institutions in Pakistan.