Embracing the polar bear?--Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s

Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 2002 by Deng, Peng

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s many dramatic and complex changes have taken place in world politics. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, a new world order has emerged. The United States has become undoubtedly the only superpower in the world and the West looks strong and even cohesive. At the same time, however, the world also seems to be more multi-polaric than ever before. One of such potent changes is the development of the partnership between China and Russia. In the past decade or so, the two former allies-turned-intorivals have overcome numerous obstacles in their efforts to reach mutual understanding and have developed a relatively amicable relationship. In the 1990s, Chinese president Jiang Zeming and Russian president Boris Yeltsin held seven summit meetings. At the summits and other high-level meetings leaders of the two countries resolved their major differences, settled border disputes, and concluded deals covering fields ranging from commerce to cultural exchanges. As a result, trade volumes between the two countries multiplied, old areas of cooperation expanded, and new areas of cooperation opened.

Improving relations with Russia stems from the overall strategy of the Chinese government in the 1990s. It also results from the complex interplay of the changing global balance of power and the two countries' evolving domestic situations. At any rate, a good relationship with Russia has become a crucial component of China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The formation of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership since the mid-1990s has great geopolitical significance and, even though the current partnership is a far cry from the SinoSoviet alliance in the 1950s, it has nevertheless received much attention from many pundits and politicians in the West for its perceived or real potential to become a full-fledged political and military alliance.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The history of the bilateral relationship between China and Russia between the 18506 and 19706 was characterized by an imbalance of power in favor of Russia. The Tsarist government of Russia, in its eastward push toward the Pacific, spearheaded the imperialist scramble for concessions from the hapless Manchu dynasty. The Soviet government, for ideological and strategic reasons, became deeply involved in China's domestic affairs in the past century, first through the Comintern in the 19206 and 30s, then via formal diplomatic relationship with the Nationalist government throughout World War II. In the last phase of World War II in August, 1945, the Russian troops entered China's Manchuria where they defeated Japan's Guandong Army and, in the ensuing years, the Soviet government laid back but watched closely the development of the Chinese civil war.

In the early 1950s, the newly established People's Republic of China adopted a lean-to-side foreign policy, making it an ally of the Soviet Union. Such a policy was determined by the rapidly polarizing world politics and Mao Zedong's binary view of the world. At the Second Plenum of the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, convened shortly before the CCP's military victory, Mao laid down three cardinal principles of the foreign policy of the People's Republic. They were: 1.) lingqi luzhao (build a new kitchen) i.e., to set up brand new diplomatic relations or refusing to recognize any diplomatic relations established by the KMT government; 2.) dashao ganjing wuzi zai qingke (invite guests only after a thorough cleaning), i.e., to seek recognition from Western governments only after the ties with the Soviet Union and other anti-West nations were reinforced 3.) yibian dao, (lean-to-one-side), i.e. to establish diplomatic ties with the USSR on the basis of mutual respect and mutual interest.1 Formulated at a time when the Chinese Communists had been convinced of the hostility of the United States, these principles were later reinforced by a series of events. The Korean War between 1950 and 1953, in particular, hardened the anti-Western position of the Chinese Communists and cemented the Sino-Soviet alliance. By pushing the UN forces from the SinoKorean border to the 38th parallel, China won a costly victory: Whatever hope of a normal relationship with the US was dashed away and national unification with Taiwan was indefinitely postponed by the decision of President Truman to deploy the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. While Chinese leaders came to see Washington as the Chinese revolution's archenemy, the US government thereafter laboriously pursued a policy to contain the Chinese revolution.

When reviewing the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 19506, one can easily notice the following factors. First, the alliance was an unequal relationship in favor of the Soviet Union. The dependence on Soviet economic, military, and even diplomatic assistance made China a junior partner of the USSR in world affairs. Second, it was a strained alliance: Under the surface of solidarity, there was much tension often arising from Chinese resentment toward the condescending manner of Soviet leaders. During his visit to the USSR between December 1949 and January 1950, Mao expected warmth and generosity from his Russian comrades. Instead, he found Stalin playing hardball diplomacy with him and he had to respond in kind. In his own words, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Alliance Treaty was the "product of quarrels." Third, although the Soviets provided much-needed assistance to the Chinese, it soon proved inadequate for the ambitious program of the Chinese leaders. Fourth, the Chinese seemed to view their relations with the Soviet Union as a manifestation of proletarian internationalism and consequently had unrealistic expectations on Moscow's commitment to this alliance, In comparison, the Russians were more straightforward and businesslike in the bilateral relations. As a result, miscommunication occurred frequently between Moscow and Beijing. Finally, Soviet Russia and China had different national interests and their leaders had different perceptions of where these interests lay. Soviet leaders tried very hard to bring the new China into their orbit, whereas Chinese leaders, suspicious of the Russians' intention, resisted the Russian attempt, first secretly, then openly.2 In 1958, for example, Mao turned down a Russian offer to organize a Russo-China submarine fleet and a telecommunication center for fear of losing sovereignty.