Embracing the polar bear?--Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s

Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 2002 by Deng, Peng

2. Do not become the leader (bu long tou), i.e., do not assume leadership of the third world countries;

3. Do not engage in confrontations (bu duikang), i.e., do not seek confrontation with the West;

4. Do not make enemies (bu shudi), such as by intervening in internal affairs of Eastern European countries despite the political changes in them.

The two transcends are the following:

1. To transcend ideological considerations (chao yue yishi xingtai yinsu);

2. To transcend specific events (chao tuo).

Given the difficult circumstances of the time, this policy contained much foresight. It enabled the Chinese government to rebuild diplomatic relations while healing domestic wounds.4 It was a perfect example of the strategic principle of taoguang yanghui (lying low or conceal one's ability).

Ironically, while the Chinese government survived the devastation of Tiananmen, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc disintegrated almost overnight. The end of the Cold War caused dramatic changes in international politics. Chinese leaders came to believe that, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the danger of a major war significantly diminished. Economic development replaced ideological rivalry and arms race as the focal point of all nations. Peace became the main theme in world affairs even though regional conflicts, civil wars, and other sources of instability continued to exist. More than ever before, coexistence between states with different political and social systems was accepted as the key to a more livable world and a more just international order. On the other hand, the unchecked power of the United States in the post-Cold War era also disturbed the Chinese leaders who believed that a single-polar world is not in the best interest of mankind.

To secure an international environment favorable to domestic stability, the Chinese government persistently pursued a good-neighbor policy with its Asian neighbors. In 1990, it normalized the relationship with Indonesia and established diplomatic relations with Singapore. In 1991, Beijing reassumed diplomatic relations with Hanoi after Vietnam had withdrawn its troops from Cambodia. China walked a fine line between two Koreas, promoting trade with Seoul without relinquishing its commitment to Pyongyang. In all China's new diplomatic initiatives, there was the old note that was the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence formulated by the Bandung Conference in 1955. Proposed by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, these principles were mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Aside from the good-neighbor policy, strategic partnership became conspicuous in Beijing's diplomatic diction. In the 1990s, Beijing established "strategic partnerships" not only with Russia and the United States, but also with other permanent members of the UN Security Council. In such relationships, China sought equal status, reciprocal trade, dialogue, and cooperation. Characteristically, all these partnerships were not against a third party. The underlying theme of all these partnerships was international cooperation. Yet each was defined by a unique combination of factors and based on the needs of both sides. Through these partnerships, China sought to play a more active role in world affairs.