Embracing the polar bear?--Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s

Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 2002 by Deng, Peng

Developments in Russia and China in the 1990s, however, went against the calculation of Russian leaders and reformers. The much-touted "shock treatment," instead of revitalizing the Russian economy, deepened its crisis and made Russia the largest shrinking economy in the world. While beleaguered by numerous problems from within, Russia lost grips on its satellites and was in fact pushed to the periphery of European and world affairs. When the Russians most needed outside help to salvage its economy, the West withheld the promised loans on grounds that money from the IMF was siphoned into the private accounts of Russian officials in Western banks. The consequences were grave. For a decade, continuing economic woes and accompanying moral degeneration nearly shattered many Russians' faith in their government. Whatever truth behind the withdrawal of financial assistance, many Russian reformers felt betrayed by their Western allies. This led some Russian leaders to reconsider Russia's geographical belonging and cultural identity, especially its relations with Asian countries. In 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev said: "The realization of Russian interests not through confrontation but through cooperation with the outside world allowed us in many respects to rediscover for ourselves a whole number of Asian states. This relates to China, our great Eastern neighbor."9

The Chinese government, on the other hand, seemed to have survived the 1989 crisis and, starting in 1992, renewed its drive for economic reform after temporary confusion. Until 1997 when a financial crisis struck its Asian neighbors, China's economy grew steadily at an annual rate of 7 to 9 percent. The stark contrast between the Chinese boom and Russian slump proved quite humbling for many Russian elite. In Moscow, a growing number of people began to give credit to their Chinese neighbors. Russian admirers of China's reform included the Popular Patriotic Union headed by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and scholars at the Institute of the Far East (IDV) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. These people came to see China as a country that successfully preserved the socialist system against the pressure from the West. Aleksandr Yakovlev, who had criticized the "adventurous foreign policy" of the post-Mao Chinese government, pointed out that after the collapse of the Soviet Union China became the "principal integral part of the socialist pole in the international community." In global geopolitics, Russian strategists found a struggle between the industrialized north and the underdeveloped south. In this struggle, Russia, after being pushed to the periphery of global affairs, should ally with Asian countries. By the same token, China, an Asian country heading toward a world power in the 21st century, was "Russia's natural ally."10 These people recognized the universal significance of the Chinese experience and urged the Russian people and their government to readjust their approach to reform after the Chinese model. At the same time, instead of viewing China as an enemy of Russia, the Russian strategists insisted that a good relationship with China held the key to Russia's economic and political rejuvenation. They argued that there was no danger of any Chinese territorial expansion because the border demarcation had already been determined, and both sides were interested in better bilateral relations and stability in the border regions.11