Gulf of Tonkin incident revisited

Wings of Gold, Fall 1998 by Johnson, Gregory

On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the destroyer, USS Maddox, in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Navy contends Maddox was in international waters and was fired upon without provocation. On August 4, another alleged attack struck Maddox and the USS C. Turner Joy.

These incidents spurred Congress to enact the Tonkin Gulf Resolution which literally gave President Lyndon Johnson the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. The resolution ignited a decade-long struggle that eventually divided this country and forever changed the course of American history. Speculation continues as to whether the incidents were staged, real or nonexistent, in order to further President Johnson's political agenda. Another Johnson, then LCOL James E. Johnson, USMC, a Naval Aviator, was serving as an advisor to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the Military Assistance Command (MACV) at the time and provides his perspective on the incident.

He said, "It happened at a time when it needed to happen. Whether it was a fluke encounter between a DeSoto (Navy intelligence gathering) patrol ship and North Vietnamese Swatass (high speed torpedo boat), or whether there were other mitigating factors remains a question."

Then a 44-year old officer, Johnson said, "I was never aware of any plan to provoke or draw the North into a military encounter with U.S. forces and I was in a pretty good position to know if that was the case. Others contend there was never any contact between the De Soto patrols and the North Vietnam torpedo boats. But the facts do not bear that out."

Johnson feels the incident owes itself to a non-related covert operation conducted by South Vietnamese forces above the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

"A third, covert party involved in an operation at the time of the alleged incident," said Johnson, "is speculation on my part but highly probable in terms of creating a situation which led to the encounter."

Buried deep in the organizational structure of MACV was the Special Operations Group (SOG). Johnson was its chief of operations. Well before the Tonkin incident, SOG had conducted covert ops inland and along the beaches of North Vietnam, as well as on some off-shore islands.

SOG was created in early 1964 as a joint military operation (OP PLAN-34A). It had an RVN military counterpart. Its mission was to plan and conduct covert operations above the DMZ in North Vietnam. All operations were executed by South Vietnamese volunteers and non U.S. foreign mercenaries. No Americans operated outside South Vietnam during this period. Operations by U.S. troops north of the DMZ did not occur until after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. SOG was composed of CIA, NSA, and U.S. military officials. In the summer of 1964, SOG changed its name to Studies and Observation Group, to cast off the covert connotations evoked by "special operations" and to diminish media attention.

The tools of 34-A were many. Black and white radio stations were located in various places from Saigon to the DMZ (white -- in Saigon with a range that could reach into North Vietnam; black -- in the mountains just south of the DMZ). High speed South Vietnamese boats (Nasties), and smaller personnel boats (Swifts) were positioned on the bay-side of Monkey Mountain and DaNang. South Vietnamese commando and other volunteers operated these boats. They were trained by Navy SEAL and USMC recon teams. There were also a number of C123 aircraft (later replaced by C-130s) to support inland operations. They were flown by special RVN and Nationalist Chinese (Taiwan) air force crews. They were trained by USAF, USN, and USMC aviators. The airborne troops who operated from these aircraft were RVN volunteers trained by U.S. Army Airborne personnel. Most of the ground training was conducted at a camp about 20 miles west of Saigon. By current standards, the South Vietnamese warfighters were very highly paid, so there was no shortage of volunteers.

With these forces, many teams were inserted into North Vietnam. The teams kept the Allies posted on troop movements, troop concentrations, and facilities. They also conducted disruptive operations whenever practical. "Q" signals (three-letter morse code "burst" signals transmitted by covert teams at designated times to headquarters) were received daily. Occasionally, a team would be compromised and would not be heard from again. New teams were subsequently inserted at another point in the general vicinity of the missing group.

Not one team inserted above the DMZ ever returned to South Vietnam during Johnson's 13-month SOG tour. Several times during re-supply missions, aircraft were hit right at the drop zone point, indicating the North Vietnamese knew they were coming. Most of the aircrews, however, were able to make it back to South Vietnam.

Johnson related that RVN patrol boats and amphibious forces had been working the North Vietnam coastal areas, hitting radar stations, bridges, water reservoirs and power plants. They also picked up village leaders and interviewed them on an island off DaNang. These people were treated well and returned to their villages after a few days. They did, however, have difficulty explaining to their peers how they got radios, candy, cigarettes, and shoes when they returned!