Intruder Tactics Mid-60's

Wings of Gold, Summer 2004 by Owens, Rupe

Introduction of a new aircraft weapon system is a difficult process. There is never a user's manual with established doctrine, tactics and procedures for the new addition to the Fleet Air Arm. Every new aircraft is different and its operation necessitates a large dose of Naval Aviation experience, judgement and tenacity to achieve the development goals. The introduction of the A -6A was true to this form. Ten A-4 Skyhawk pilots and 10 bombardier/navigators from the A-3 community teamed together at VA-42 in March 1963 to initiate the Intruder replacement squadron training syllabus.

The first fleet squadron, VA-75, completed the RAG syllabus in mid-1964 and prepared for a routine deployment to the Mediterranean aboard Independence. During work-ups, the deployment venue changed to something more exciting - Vietnam combat operations! VA-85 followed on schedule to deploy aboard Kitty Hawk in late 1965. The third fleet squadron to complete RAG training, VA-65, deployed aboard Constellation in May 1966. There were growing pains.

After two A-6A combat deploy merits to West Pac and the ongoing air action in Vietnam, Navy officials were not completely impressed with the Intruder's performance. Due to the new A-6A electronic systems and the lack of an experience base, squadrons were under pressure to meet combat strike requirements. Various staff officers did not have the benefit of prior experience with an aircraft of this capability for proper employment. In any case, the official word passed along to VA-65 was the A-6A must improve its operational performance and demonstrate the ability to meet advertised mission requirements.

In short, the third deployment must prove the aircraft's ability to carry out the all-weather mission.

Navy and Grumman officials agreed to recycle the V A-65 A-6A aircraft through the Grumman Calverton production facility before the squadron's deployment to WestPac in May 1966. This action would fine-tune the A-6A's Digital Integrated Attack Navigation Equipment (DIANE) system to acceptance quality and, coincidentally, front-load the all-weather strike performance capability of the squadron by ensuring the systems were at optimum technical performance level.

There was one other important consideration: the Tigers of VA-65 deployed with more experienced A-6A people than the first two squadrons, drawing heavily from the flight instructors and maintenance personnel responsible for establishing the A-6 RAG (Replacement Air Group - forerunner of today's FRS (Fleet Replacement Squadrons)). This overall experience base enabled development of procedures and tactics from a higher position on the learning curve than the first two squadrons possessed upon entering combat. Plus, VA-65 had the benefit of their experiences to help us in our preparation for combat operations.

During the spring of 1966, a sister-squadron, VA-85, convinced targeting officials of the aircraft's combat capabilities when operated at night or during instrument conditions. The VA-85 Buckeyes enjoyed successful prosecution of selected night opportunities by inflicting serious damage to alpha strike quality targets.

Routine all-weather attack execution employed either single aircraft missions or "bomber-stream" tactics. The bomber stream resulted in a more serious AAA threat to the accompanying aircraft later over the target rather than the leader. Many wingmen belittled this tactic as inappropriate and unnecessarily dangerous. The squadrons continued to search for tactics that could mitigate enemy target defenses. These discussions pointed toward a simultaneous multi-plane minimum altitude strike as the most likely candidate for an effectiveness.

VA-65 aircrews believed a lower attack altitude provided a more difficult environment for the enemy's missile controllers and the direction finding equipment for radar directed AAA guns. A lower ingress altitude delayed the defense's warning. Coupled with the high attack airspeeds, the time available to shoot, within the enemy weapon's range, was limited. Additionally, we believed the SA-2 missile used by the North Vietnamese had reduced capability against low flyer threats.

In order to achieve our optimum attack solution, a method to avoid damage from one's bomb fragments when using minimum altitude delivery options was required. Naval Weapons Center (NWC) China Lake published several studies on low-altitude level delivery of general-purpose bombs. These confirmed a delivery aircraft, below certain altitudes, was susceptible to bomb fragment damage when flying directly over the target after bomb release. Clearly, the aircraft flight path required altering in order to avoid bomb fragment damage.

According to VX-5 and NWC studies, bomb fragments align primarily along the line of release. Fewer fragments blasted to the sides and rear of the explosion, arriving in these locations after traveling vertically as well as horizontally to reach these positions. In other words, there is a time of arrival for particular bomb fragments.