A second look at the proposed uniform bankruptcy exemptions: Tennessee as an example

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Spring 1998 by Brown, William Houston, Ponoroff, Lawrence

17. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 10, app. D (comprehensive table of state exemptions).

18. U.S. CONST. art. I. & 8. cl. 4. See. e.g.. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankrupt

cy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22 (1983) (discussing the constitutional issues presented by a lack of uniformity in bankruptcy exemptions). 19. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 20. See, e.g., Storer v. French (In re Storer), 58 F.3d 1125 (6th Cir. 1995); Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982).

21. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 170 (1973). Congress established that Commission by Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.

22. BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 2-3. 23. Id. at 121. 24. Id

25. See, e.g., Frank R. Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REv. 445, 485 (1960) (concluding that there is no compelling need to "impress a federal mold on the exemptions recognizable in bankruptcy"). But see Ponoroff, supra note 5, at 241-43 (discussing the changes in conditions since Professor Kennedy's article, which argued against continued deference to state exemptions laws in bankruptcy).

26. See Brown, supra note 5, at 181; see also, e.g., William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 769, 802-03 (1980) (describing the differences in state and bankruptcy exemption functions).

27. Ponoroff, supra note 5, at 240 n.91 (citing THE FEDERAL,isT, NoS. 45, 46 at 324-36 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961), for evidence that the debate between the extent of federal control and states' rights is as old as the nation). 28. See BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 122. 29. Id. ("A comparison of state homestead exemptions and the relative cost of living reveals that state homestead exemptions do not reflect a relative cost of living assessment.").

30. See TENN. CODE ANN. 26-2-301(a) (1980 & Supp. 1997).

31. See MISS. CODE ANN. 85-3-21 (1972). 32. See ARK. CONST. art. IX, 4.

33. See ALA. CODE 6-10-2 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. 44-13-1 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 427.060 (Michie 1992).

34. See Brown, supra note 5, at 169; Ponoroff, supra note 5, at 224; see also, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 26, at 801 ("This fresh start objective is basic to the bankruptcy law of the United States and is dependent upon two key federal policies: the discharge policy and the exemption policy.").

35. See FLA. CONST. art. X, 4; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 50, 51. 36. BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 123. 37. Id at 124.

38. Brown, supra note 5, at 199.

39. Compare In re Schwarb, ISO B.R. 470, 473 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that 522(b) allows the court to disallow the debtor's right to claim property as exempt where it is shown that the conversion of a nonexempt asset into an exempt asset was done with the intent of placing the asset out of the reach of creditors), with In re Barker, 168 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (concluding that there is nothing within 522 that allows the bankruptcy court to deny an exemption claim on the basis that the property was converted from a nonexempt asset to an exempt asset with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors). 40. 194 B.R. 818 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996). 41. 184 B.R. 935 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).