A framework for analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on federal court jurisdiction in immigration cases

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Winter 1999 by Chemerinsky, Erwin

For example, in the earliest case on the issue, Sheldon v. Sill,51 the Court upheld a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that prohibited diversity jurisdiction from being created by the assignment of a debt.52 Under this principle, when there has been an assignment, a federal court may take the case under its diversity jurisdiction only if the case properly could have been brought to federal court prior to the assignment. Article III, which authorizes diversity jurisdiction, creates no such limitation precluding jurisdiction based on assignment.

The issue in Sheldon v. Sill was whether Congress could restrict diversity jurisdiction in this manner. Sheldon, a Michigan resident, owed money to Hastings, also a Michigan resident, on a bond and a mortgage. Hastings assigned the debt owed him to Sill, a New York resident. Pursuant to this assignment, Sill sued Sheldon in federal court to recover the sum due. Sheldon moved to dismiss because, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts could not hear cases where diversity was created by an assignment. But Sill contended that because Article III authorizes diversity jurisdiction and does not contain a limitation for diversity gained by assignment, this section of the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional.53

The Supreme Court upheld the Judiciary Act's restriction on diversity jurisdiction. The Court declared: "Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."54 The Court continued in even broader language: "The political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress and Congress is not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every subject, in every form which the Constitution might warrant."55

The Supreme Court has adopted this position in a number of other decisions. In Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,56 the Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded a federal court from enjoining a simultaneous state court proceeding for breach of contract. In upholding this limit on federal court power, the Court stated:

Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.57

In Lauf v. E. G. Shinner cfc Co.,58 the Court considered the constitutionality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limited the ability of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes and prevented federal courts from enforcing contracts whereby employees agreed not to join a union. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the federal courts were hostile to the labor movement and often enjoined labor protests. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that states could not prohibit employers from requiring employees to agree to refrain from joining a union as a condition of employment.59 The Norris-LaGuardia Act sought to protect labor by limiting the power of the federal courts.