Civil Rights--Allah v. Al-Hafeez: Section 1997e(e) of The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A recovery limitation on frivolous or legitimate claims?

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Summer 2002 by Richbourg, Ashby F

and William W. Ennis (Ennis), the chaplain of the Frackville institution, violated his right to religious freedom and that he was entitled to injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.3

2000).

Allah sued under 42 U.S.C. sec 1983, which creates a species of tort liability against any person who deprives others of their constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities.9 Section 1983 stems from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was enacted after the Civil War in an effort to protect the constitutional rights of the newly emancipated slaves in southern states. 10 The statute, however, does more than fulfill its Civil War objective; it protects the constitutional rights of all who are victims of states' abuse of power.11 Section 1983 seeks to prohibit officials from using their authority to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights and liberties.12 The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he very purpose of sec1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, `whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."'13

1983 makes no reference to damages or the form of relief available to the sec 1983 plaintiff; rather, it simply states that the person who deprives another of his constitutional rights will be liable to the one injured "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."15 "[A]coon at law" suggests that damages of some kind are available, but there is no explicit provision for damages in the statute itself. While "action at law" implies the availability of damages, the phrase alone is not a "term of art" that conveys rights to those suing under sec 1983.16 The Supreme Court established that common law principles, in addition to the text of sec 1983, should govern the award of damages under sec 1983,17 and general common law principles mandate that one who injures property or person is liable in damages.

defendant's breach of duty."20 Nominal damages, on the other hand, are a trivial sum given to recognize the violation of a substantive right in the absence of actual injury.21 "[N]ominal damages . . . are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury."22 An award of nominal damages simply "recognizes the importance to organized society that [a person's] rights be scrupulously observed."23 Even in the absence of injury, however, there is some immeasurable harm that justifies a substantial, as opposed to trivial, award due to the likelihood that the harm actually occurred but could not be proven.

In certain cases involving injuries such as discrimination, denial of voting rights, and defamation, damages will be presumed and substantial damages will be awarded despite the lack of any proof of injury.24

[Presumed damages] involve nothing more than an award . . . for a nonmonetary harm that cannot easily be quantified: `In the eyes of the law these] right[s are] so valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of [those rights] without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing, and the amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate for the determination of the jury, because each member of the jury has personal knowledge of the value of [those] right[s].'25

awarded in the jury's discretion 'to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.'"27

As the Supreme Court explained in Carey v. Piphus, these common law principles apply in sec 1983 claims.28 In Carey, a school principal suspended Piphus and another student when he found the students in possession of a marijuana cigarette.29 Claiming that they were suspended without procedural due process, the students sued under sec 1983 and sought compensatory and punitive damages.30 The issue before the Court was whether the students were required to meet certain prerequisites before they could recover any damages under sec 1983.31 The Court held that proof of actual injury was required before compensatory damages could be awarded and that, without proof of actual injury, the students were only entitled to nominal damages.32

The Court explained that, although Congress did not explicitly address the question of damages in enacting sec 1983, Congress was familiar with the common law principle that damages were meant to compensate those injured when deprived of their rights.33 The Court stated that damage awards in sec 1983 cases should follow such common law tort principles.34 While tort law principles would govern compensation when the constitutional harm mirrored a common law tort, the Court noted that some constitutional violations do not have a tort-law equivalent.35 In such cases, the Carey Court held that the award of damages should be governed by the nature of the interests protected by the constitutional right involved.36 The Supreme Court stated: