Federal Employment Discrimination-Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.: The Inadequacy of the Federal "Catchall" Statute of Limitations

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Winter 2008 by Day, Frank L Jr

Although Congress intended § 1981 to serve as a significant remedial tool that banned racial discrimination, it was not substantially relied upon by plaintiffs until after the Supreme Court's holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., which initially only applied to § 1982.17 The Court's holding in Alfred H. Mayer Co. expanded § 1982, a companion statute to § 1981, beyond the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment by holding that state action was not required because § 1982 had ties to the Thirteenth Amendment, which has no state action requirement.18

The Court ultimately applied the Alfred H. Mayer Co. analysis to § 1981 in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, which held that § 1981 applies to state and private actions.19 Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Railway Express Agency in Runyon v. McCrary.20 In Runyon, the plaintiffs claimed that § 1981 prohibited a commercially operated private school from denying admission to their children because they were AfricanAmericans.21 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, explaining, "It is now well established that [§ 1981] . . . prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts."22

The Court in Runyon reasoned that Congress enacted § 1981 and § 1982 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and found that the legislative history of the 1866 Act indicated that Congress wanted to prohibit both private and public discrimination.23 The Court, therefore, relied on its reasoning in Alfred H. Mayer Co. and explained that a refusal to enter a contract with another person because of that person's race is a violation of § 1981.24 It also cited its holding in Railway Express Agency as support for its decision.25 The Court noted that in Railway Express Agency it had held that § 1981 "relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts [and] . . . that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis ofrace."26

After it was clear that § 1981 applied to private action, the § 1981 remedy became very popular with plaintiffs.27 As a result, a body of case law developed that defined the scope of the language "to make and enforce contracts."28 For the most part, the courts construed this § 1981 language very broadly, extending its coverage to almost every aspect of the employment relationship.29 For example, the courts found hostile environment claims arising from racial discrimination actionable under § 1981 because the harassment affected the contractual relationship that existed between the employer and employee.30

The Supreme Court, however, did limit the reach of § 1981 to claims alleging intentional discrimination in General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania. Although this case imposed a limitation, it is "a logical limitation on § 1 of the 1866 Act [because it] limits the statute to the specific rights named therein."32 This limit, however, only barred § 1981 claims alleging disparate impact discrimination; therefore, courts continued to consider almost all claims alleging intentional racial discrimination in employment within the scope of § 1981.33 This broad reading of § 1981, however, came to an abrupt and unexpected end when the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union34 in 1989.35