Federal Employment Discrimination-Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.: The Inadequacy of the Federal "Catchall" Statute of Limitations

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Winter 2008 by Day, Frank L Jr

The Supreme Court in Goodman v. Lukens Steel,66 however, took a different approach by simplifying the selection process.67 Instead of instructing the lower courts to continue the practice of analogizing, the Supreme Court held that the most analogous state limitations period for all § 1981 claims was the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.68 It therefore appears that claims arising under § 1981 are now classified as personal injury suits for the purpose of determining the most analogous state statute of limitations.69

Congress's passage of a federal catchall statute of limitations soon after Goodman would seemingly simplify the process for the courts. Simplicity gave way to uncertainty, however, requiring eventual Supreme Court interpretation.

IV. THE FEDERAL CATCHALL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS & ITS PURPOSES

In 1988, Congress authorized Chief Justice Rehnquist to appoint members to serve on the Federal Courts Study Committee ("Study Committee"), which Congress instructed to study the "problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United States . . . [and to recommend] a long-range plan for the future of the Federal Judiciary . . . ."70 As one of its recommendations, the Study Committee advised Congress to "adopt limitations periods for ... congressionally created federal claims that . . . lack[ed] such periods ... ."71

Congress responded to this recommendation by enacting § 313 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.72 Section 313 provides a four-year catchall statute of limitations that is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658.73 Section 1658 reads as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than four (4) years after the cause of actions accrues."74

The limitations period adopted by Congress, however, only applies to claims arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, the effective date of § 1658.75 The federal catchall statute of limitations by its plain terms, therefore, does not apply to claims arising under statutes enacted before December 1, 1990.76 By making the catchall limitations period only prospective, Congress rejected the recommendation of the Study Committee, which asked Congress to supply a statute of limitations for all existing claims that lacked a specified period.77

The Study Committee recommended that Congress adopt and apply limitation periods to all claims that lacked them because the Committee wanted to end the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations.78 The House Report ("Report") appears to support this goal:

At present, the federal courts "borrow" the most analogous state or federal law limitations period for federal claims lacking limitations periods. This practice creates a number of practical problems. As pointed out by the Study Committee: It obligates judges and lawyers to determine the most analogous state law claim; it imposes uncertainty on litigants; reliance on varying state laws results in undesirable variance among the federal courts and disrupts the development of federal doctrine on the suspension of limitations periods.79