Federal Employment Discrimination-Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.: The Inadequacy of the Federal "Catchall" Statute of Limitations

University of Memphis Law Review, The, Winter 2008 by Day, Frank L Jr

Based on Zubi, it is clear that this approach seeks to maintain the "borrowing" status quo to avoid the uncertainty that would result if the courts had to apply § 1658 to claims arising under the amended version of § 1981 but not the claims arising under the original version of this statute.113 The distinction the "status quo interpretation" draws between an act of Congress and an amendment to a pre-existing act of Congress, however, unnecessarily confuses the issue because it serves to effectuate a goal set forth in the legislative history of § 1658 rather than the plain language.114 The "status quo interpretation," in fact, attempts to preserve the practice of borrowing 15 rather than applying § 1658 as it is written.116 This approach seems unjustified because it is not faithful to the plain language of § 1658, and it is hard to imagine how anyone could argue that a federal statute that creates a new cause of action does not count as an "Act of Congress" simply because one could technically classify the claim-creating statute as an "amendment."117

The Supreme Court in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.118 adopted the position taken by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, the third solution, which is the "Supreme Court interpretation" for the purposes of this article.119 The Court in Jones held that that the four-year catchall statute of limitations only applies to § 1981 claims made possible by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because such claims were not actionable under the 1870 version of § 1981.120 Accordingly, § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 amendment arise from a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990.121 The Supreme Court emphasized that § 1981 did not apply to post-contract formation activities until Congress overruled Patterson122 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.123 The 1991 amendment added § 1981(b), which expands the meaning of "make and enforce contracts" to include the "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."124

Under a statutory construction analysis, the Supreme Court reasoned that the word "arise" means to "come into being; originate" or "spring up" according to two dictionaries and common usage.125 Accordingly, the Court rejected the "study committee interpretation" because claims created by the 1870 version of § 1981 could not "arise" under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.126 The Supreme Court also rejected the "status quo interpretation" because a § 1981 claim originating in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly arises under a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990, meaning that § 1658 governs the claim.127 The Court, therefore, found that that the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations continues to apply to all § 1981 claims created by the original version of § 1981, while § 1658 applies to all § 1981 claims made possible by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.128

The Supreme Court in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. correctly interpreted and applied § 1658 as it was written by Congress.12 The language of § 1658 is actually unambiguous,130 and the Supreme Court opinion recognizes that all of the lower courts that misconstrued § 1658 did so by overemphasizing legislative history.131 The unanimous Supreme Court opinion makes it clear that according to the plain meaning of "arise," the federal catchall limitations period could not possibly apply to claims created by the 1866 version of the statute because § 1658 only governs claims '"aris[ing] under an Act of Congress enacted' after [December 1, 1990]."132