REFLECTIONS ON ACADEMIC BOYCOTTS

International Complexities

The issue of international academic boycotts does add complications beyond those that arise in the case of domestic academic boycotts. First, some argue that in the international setting the academic boycott is not only commendably nonviolent but the best tactic specifically available to faculty in circumstances where strong violations of rights oblige action. We think rather that the Lise of academic freedom to identify, publicize, and condemn violations of human rights is a better course. We believe that academic freedom is given us not so that we may deny it to some but so that we may encourage it for all.

But how are we to do so? The AAUP lacks the knowledge and resources requisite to the conduct of international investigations comparable to the careful inquiries that we require prior to approving censure resolutions affecting institutions (including some overseas universities and academic programs) accredited in the United States. Were we to have this capacity, however, we would still opt for censure rather than boycott as we do domestically. Moreover, although we cannot do so with the same authority we strive to bring to domestic matters, our staff and members do speak out from time to time regarding perceived violations of academic freedom abroad. Further, we vigorously encourage international academic exchange and oppose those domestic policies that impede it.

Second, the South African example persuades some that the academic boycott has been and can he used by the relatively empowered in some countries to assist those who are in need in other countries. This argument, and not the controversial contention that Israeli policies materially approximate apartheid, led us to include substantial discussion of South Africa in our report.4 Empirically, we find the case that the economic and cultural boycotts contributed to the end of apartheid more persuasive than the case for the academic boycott. We know of no one who would seriously argue that apartheid would have persisted absent the academic boycott. We are also mindful of the evidence presented to us that the academic boycott did do harm to some South African universities and students.

Third, some look beyond South Africa to propose the general principle that boycotts may be appropriate when a regime so affronts humankind that it creates a nearuniversal consensus in support of a boycott. This is a dangerous concept because, as I think is manifest in a few of the assertions in the papers here, it encourages boycott advocates to demonize their opponents, in order to try to create the consensus necessary to legitimize the boycott. Nor is there a clear and universal principle on which to base such a finding. The primary suggested principle, the breadth of international consensus, ignores the complex politics that shape votes in the UN General Assembly and other such bodies. Moreover, the most persuasive example, especially compelling for those who oppose a boycott of Israel but are unwilling to abandon the tactic entirely, is Nazi Germany. The difficulty with this example is its history. When the democratic powers had the opportunity to engage in an economic and cultural boycott of Nazi Germany. they chose instead to participate in Hitler's Olympic spectacle and simultaneously to impose an embargo on an elected Spanish government then under attack by military insurgents armed and assisted by Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. The point of this example is not simply that the Western poweix erred but rather that the geopolitical considerations of powerful political realists are more likely than academic principles to determine the effectiveness of international boycotts.