Japanese Shinkansen: Catalyst for the renaissance of rail, The

Journal of Transport History, The, Sep 2003 by Smith, Roderick A

Concerning the privatisation, despite the many excellent aspects of the service offered to passengers, and on the Shinkansen services in particular, over the JNR network as a whole the financial situation deteriorated sharply between 1964 and 1987 until it reached crisis proportions. For most of this period JNR suffered from overmanning and union disruption, whilst considerable investment had been made in new infrastructure. By 1987 the debt had reached Y37.1 trillion, some 10 per cent of Japan's GNP. Y25.4 trillion of this total was generated by JNR itself, another Y5.1 trillion was outstanding debt on large railway infrastructure projects, including Y1.1 trillion for the construction of the Seikan tunnel to Hokkaido and Y1.8 trillion for the Joetsu Shinkansen. As a consequence of this situation, from 1987 JNR was divided into six vertically integrated companies following the geographical divisions of Japan, that is, three major companies on the main island of Honshu, JRs Central, East and West, three island companies, JRs Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, together with a single national rail freight company. Of these new companies, JR East and JR Central are the giants, whilst the three island companies suffer from the consequences of low density and scattered population, leading to the problems of contraction familiar to railway companies in many parts of the world. It was envisaged that these companies would eventually become truly private companies, free from political interference. Whilst the larger companies have sold some shares, the smaller companies have not become profitable enough to start down the flotation road. Thus the government still has a strong presence, and the 'quasi-privatisation' is far from complete.

What of the debt? It was assumed that some 40 per cent of the Y37.1 trillion total could be taken over by the three major JR passenger companies, together with a Shinkansen holding company, and eventually be repaid through profits.12 The remaining 60 per cent was to be assumed by the JNR Settlement Corporation, a holding company for the three profitable main island companies. It was estimated that 20 per cent of the debt could be raised from the sale of former JNR land surplus to requirements, a sum that was in fact exceeded during the bull land market of the late 1980s. The part of the sum which was not paid off was, in the last resort, to be assumed by the government. The situation is complicated and, by Japanese standards, acrimonious. Given the present economic downturn, the government wants more back from the companies, which in turn have suffered from the recession and resent continuing government interference.

Returning now to the growth of the Shinkansen. To the present-day observer the most singular feature of the Tokaido Shinkansen is the frequency of service. At the 1964 inauguration two trains per hour and sixty trains per day operated in both directions between Tokyo and Osaka. By March 1999 this had increased to eleven trains an hour and 285 trains per day. Of this daily total, fifty-one Nozomi trains stop at only the main stations, offering a travel time of 2 hr 30 min. to Osaka, compared with 4 hr at the opening, 147 Hikari trains stop at selected stations, whilst eighty-seven Kodama trains stop at all stations. Thus a truly remarkable intensity of service is now offered, and this growth has been mirrored to a lesser extent on the other Shinkansen lines. A major constraint has proved to be the handling of the huge number of passengers at Tokyo station, a situation which will be relieved by the opening of a new secondary station at nearby Shinagawa in October 2003.