Turnin' and burnin' with the mighty Mig

Flight Journal, Jun 1999 by Hildebrandt, Erik

By the time of the tensely charged finale to the Cold War in the mid1980s, the Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum had come to symbolize the highly evolved Communist threat to NATO air supremacy over Western Europe. It was the Soviet aircraft that every U.S. fighter pilot had been trained to defeat. As such, the prospect of confronting one in the sky exemplified the ultimate aerial engagement. At home in America, within the aerial combat training curricula such as TOP GUN and RED FLAG, millions of dollars and endless hours were spent trying to simulate possible Soviet deployment strategies and the flight characteristics of the MiG-29. Global intelligence sources provided U.S. Adversary squadrons with detailed information about MiG-29s. Such data was used to develop ways to exploit the Fulcrum's design compromises and to devise tactics for countering its notorious Archer heat-seeking missile.

The air-to-air Archer uses a futuristic, helmet-mounted sighting system that has yet to be introduced into Western fighters. The threat of this new off-boresite launch capability, coupled with incomplete data on the efficacy of the MiG-29's Pulse Doppler radar system, served to amplify the myths surrounding its untested lethal capabilities. But the Fulcrum's menacing existence in prolonged obscurity behind the Iron Curtain came to an abrupt end in November of 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall. During its command of the Soviet Bloc nations of Eastern Europe, Russia had armed several Communist East German Air Force bases with well over 100 MiG-29s.

As democracy radiated outward from Berlin, eventually culminating in German reunification in 1990, the Russian MiG-29s, along with hundreds of MiG-21s and Su 27s, were assimilated by the newly reconsolidated Luftwaffe. For the first time, NATO air forces had official authority to study the Fulcrum at length and to quantify its performance envelope, which until that time had only been hypothesized by Western experts. With reunification complete, Luftwaffe MiG-29 squadrons now comprised LI.S.- and Soviettrained Germans who had faced one another in defense of their divided homeland only a year previously.

In the years since the NATO acquisition of these now friendly MiG-29 squadrons, most of the mystique surrounding the airplane has been dispelled, but much of what has been learned is simply raw technical data. Since data alone cannot fully acquaint combat pilots with the airborne characteristics of an adversary, NATO Luftwaffe MiG29 units have participated with increasing frequency in Dissimilar Air Combat Training exercises with United States air forces deployed overseas. During such training detachments, or "DErS," units fly against one another as if they are at war. For several weeks, various configurations of multi-ship intercept missions are launched and repulsed. The ensuing engagements provide invaluable firsthand combat experience during which only missiles and bullets are simulated.

The only U.S. Navy squadron to deploy on such a DET is VFA-82. In September of 1998, the "Marauders" set out for Laage, a former Communist interceptor base located two hours north of Berlin on the Baltic Sea.

Made possible only with the support of USAF aerial tankers based at Maguire AFB, VFA-82 made the nonstop "TRANSLANT" crossing from NAS Cecil Field in Jacksonville, Florida, requiring no fewer than 10 airborne refuelings. With one swift stroke of global military reach, nine of Boeing's latest F/A-18C Hornets and 98 sailors, along with thousands of pounds of spare parts, were safely transported 4,300 miles to Laage.

Welcomed on their arrival by Maj. Tom Hahn, the commander of First Squadron Luftwaffe Wing 73, the Marauders quickly set up base ops alongside their German hosts. Within 24 hours, flight briefings were under way and the first missions were soon airborne. Up to 10 flight events per day were divided into three waves, or "GOs." This nearly wartime sortie tempo continued for two weeks and stands as a bold testament to the dedication of the maintenance personnel on both sides.

"RED AIR" and "BLUE AIR" elements (offensive versus defensive designations), were alternated between Navy and Luftwaffe pilots to demonstrate the full range of tactical variation for each airplane. Pilots often returned from engagements having tempered the legendary assumptions each side held about the other's capabilities. However, on most occasions, U.S. pilots were amazed by the magnitude of the off-boresite launch authority demonstrated by the Archer with its helmetmounted sight; wherever the pilot looks is where the missile will go. A few direct comparative demonstration flights were conducted between Hornets and Fulcrums for literal side-by-side analyses. During most missions aloft, Luftwaffe pilots spoke with their radar ground controllers in Russian or German, and this prevented U.S. pilots from radio eavesdropping and attempting to gain an unfair countering advantage.

After two weeks of intense flight operations, volumes of knowledge had been gained by both sides; much of it was classified. Such significant training events are not planned simply for strategic and tactical purposes, however; an equally important cultural exchange takes place as well. By confronting their former foes, both the Germans and the Americans discovered a commonality shared by all fighter pilots: a love of flight and a deep sense of camaraderie.