I sank the AKAGI

Flight Journal, Apr 2004 by Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey

LCDR Richard H. Best Jr., USN (Ret.) Remembers The Battle of Midway

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, the truly crucial naval victories have been more decisive than they first appeared. At Salamis, the Athenians not only defeated the Persian invasion fleet of Xerxes but also determined that Western civilization would continue to exist and develop as a world force. Trafalgar didn't merely mean that Napoleon would not be able to invade Great Britain and would instead end his career in defeat; it meant that Britain would be the dominant world power for the next 125 years. So, too, the Battle of Midway, fought on June 4 through 6, 1942, did not merely mean that the United States would eventually win the Pacific War, but also that it would be the dominant Pacific power in all the years since.

In every great battle, there comes a moment when it truly seems that the gods of war have chosen the winner. At Midway, this came at approximately 10 a.m. on the morning of June 4, when the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers of Bombing-6 and Scouting-6 from the USS Enterprise, led by Air Group Commander Lt. Cmdr. Clarence Wade McClusky, arrived over the Japanese carrier force at its single most vulnerable moment.

At that time, the United States was losing. The U.S. air forces on Midway had launched small strikes at the Japanese but had not been successful in damaging the fleet. The Japanese, having sent their first strike against the island at dawn, prepared the second strike that was to knock out what was left of Midway's aircraft and ground defenses and allow the soldiers of the accompanying invasion fleet to take possession of the strategic mid-Pacific atoll. This would push the U.S. back to Hawaii and perhaps force a consideration of a retreat to the West Coast and grant the Japanese control of the Pacific.

But just as Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, the Japanese commander, had given the order to launch the second strike at Midway, a garbled message came from a scout plane that had been launched earlier that morning by the cruiser Chikuma; it indicated that at least one U.S. carrier was operating to the northeast of the fleet. The message was met with incredulity by the admiral and his staff. All the Japanese plans for the Midway battle and invasion had been based on the supposition that U.S. carriers would not arrive at Midway until after the island had been "neutralized." For Nagumo and his commanders, there should not be a carrier where the scout had reported it. Was the message accurate? Even Japanese airmen were fallible in their identification of ships at sea. But if it was true, the Battle of the Coral Sea the month before had shown that in carrier warfare, the first strike by either side would be decisive. Nagumo could not risk launching against Midway and thereby allow the enemy to strike his fleet first. He immediately decided that the Kido Butai (mobile task force) would prepare to fight a fleet action.

This meant unloading the high-explosive bombs from the Japanese strike aircraft and reloading them with armorpiercing bombs and torpedoes. In the midst of that reload, another strike by Midway-based U.S. aircraft seemed to demonstrate the need to neutralize the known enemy, but then a second garbled message from the scout seemed to negate the first. Nagumo, relieved, ordered a second reload for the Midway strike; halfway through that process, a third message from the Chikuma scout stated clearly that there were two U.S. aircraft carriers northeast of Midway.

When the orders came down for the third reload, the exhausted deck crews on the four carriers that formed the heart of the Japanese strike force left bombs lying on the decks next to fully fueled and armed aircraft. They rearmed during an attack by U.S. torpedo bombers from the Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet, and the Japanese Combat Air Patrol (CAP) shot down 37 of their 41 attackers. The torpedo bombers' sacrifice had drawn the Japanese CAP down to wave-top level at just the worst moment for the Japanese. With the last of the U.S. torpedo bombers shot down, Nagumo ordered his carriers to turn into the wind and launch the second Midway strike.

As the first Zero accelerated along the deck of Nagumo's flagship, the lookouts screamed their warnings. High above the fleet, sunlight flashed on the canopies of the American dive-bombers as they began the single most important attack of the Pacific War. There was no time for the Japanese to do anything other than brace themselves.

Even with this tactical advantage, the Enterprise bombers almost blew the opportunity because McClusky, who had been the fighter commander before being "fleeted up" to group commander in May and was flying his first strike mission ever, wasn't familiar with proper U.S. Navy dive-bomber procedures. Standard practice called for McClusky to take the lead squadron (VS-6) across the fleet to the far carrier of the two he had decided to attack and allow the second squadron (VB-6) simultaneously to strike the near carrier. Instead, McClusky dived on the first carrier he saw.