Alaska statute permitting suspension of delinquent child support obligors' driving licenses is constitutional

Law Reporter, Dec 1998

State v. Beans, _ P2d _, No. S-8322, 1998 WL 560223 (Alaska Sept. 4, 1998).

The Supreme Court of Alaska held that ALASKA STAT. sec. 25.27.246, which permits the state's Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) to suspend delinquent child support obligors' driver's licenses, is constitutional.

Here, a father who had his license suspended under the statute sued the state, arguing the statute violated his constitutional rights. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment.

Reversing in part, the state high court noted that substantive due process is denied when a statute has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Here, however, the CSED clearly articulated a legitimate public policy for targeting the driver's licenses of delinquent obligors: The state needs to collect child support from all obligors, and the threat of driver's license suspension is a particularly effective enforcement tool.

The court rejected plaintiff's argument that license revocation makes it more difficult for an obligor to earn the money to pay child support. An obligor who is willing to pay will not lose his or her license, the court said. As soon as an obligor enters into and begins to comply with a payment agreement, CSED must release the license.

The court also noted that the lack of relationship between the sanction and the underlying conduct does not make the statute arbitrary. Whether a direct relationship exists has little or nothing to do with whether the sanction is effective. It is this effectiveness that makes the sanction rational.

The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the sanction is criminal in nature, thus entitling him to a jury trial. The court distinguished case law holding that imprisonment to coerce payment triggers a right to a jury trial on ability to pay. Here, plaintiff does not face imprisonment, just loss of his license. Citing case law, the court also noted that unlike someone whose license a court is about to revoke as punishment for past misconduct, plaintiff here can still do something about his impending fate. Thus, judicial review is sufficient.

To satisfy due process, however, a delinquent obligor must have the opportunity for judicial review on the issue of ability to pay. Noting this is not explicitly included in the statute, the court said the statute cannot be applied to prevent a litigant from seeking judicial relief based on inability to pay. With that limitation, the statute passes constitutional muster. Accordingly, the court remanded. State's Counsel:

Bruce M. Botelho, Juneau, Alaska Diane L. Wendlandt, Anchorage, Alaska