Receipt of social security disability benefits does not bar ADA claim

Law Reporter, Aug 1999

Receipt of social security disability benefits does not bar ADA claim.

Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).

The U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee who receives social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits is not automatically estopped from pursuing a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 etseq. That act prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability." To be "qualified," a person must be able to perform all essential functions of his or her job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation for any disability.

Here, Cleveland suffered a stroke and lost her job with Policy Management Systems Corporation. She then obtained SSDI benefits under 223(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A), which provides benefits to persons with disabilities that prevent them from working. When her condition improved, Cleveland returned to work but was fired three months later.

Cleveland sued Policy Management, alleging ADA violations. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had represented she was totally disabled by applying for and receiving SSDI benefits. That fact, the court reasoned, estopped plaintiff from proving an essential element of her ADA claim-that she could "perform the essential functions of her job," at least with "reasonable accommodation." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Vacating, the U.S. Supreme Court noted there are many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim do not conflict. An individual may qualify for SSDI, the Court said, and yet remain capable of performing the essential functions of his or her job. Nonetheless, the Court held, the assertion that a plaintiff is disabled for SSDI purposes appears to negate an essential element of an ADA claimthat plaintiff can perform the essential functions of her job. Consequently, the Court held, an ADA plaintiff who has received SSDI benefits must offer a sufficient explanation for the claim that he or she was unable to work.

Here, the Court found, plaintiff had explained the discrepancies between her SSDI statements that she was totally disabled and her ADA claim that she could perform the essential functions of her job. Plaintiff said her SSDI statements were made in a forum that does not consider the effect of reasonable accommodations on the claimant's ability to work. Moreover, the Court said, plaintiff claimed that these statements were accurate at the time they were made.

Accordingly, the Court remanded.

Plaintiff's Counsel:

*John E. Wall Jr., Dallas, Tex.

[ Comment For other cases holding that an employee who receives disability benefits is not automatically barred from proceeding with an ADA claim against his or her employer, see Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999), Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998), 41 ATLA L. Rep. 255 (Sept. 1998), LaBonte v. Hutchins ef Wheeler, 678 N.E.2d 853 (Mass. 1997), 40 ATLA L. Rep. 253 (Sept. 1997), and Swanks v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 40 ATLA L. Rep. 368 (Dec. 1997). Darryl Parker, Fairfield, Cal., represented plaintiff in Fredenburg. *Michael Duane Brown, Salem, Or., represented plaintiff in Johnson. *David Rapaport, Boston, Mass., and Jerry E. Benezra, Melrose, Mass., represented plaintiff in LaBonte. *Karen E. McDonald, Flint, Mich., represented plaintiff in Swanks.]

[Documents in Johnson are available through the Court Documents section in the back section of this issue, courtesy of Mr. Brown.]