African American woman forced to leave store after being suspected of shoplifting established prima facie discrimination case under section 1981

Law Reporter, Dec 2001

Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an African American woman who was forced to leave a store after being suspected of shoplifting established a prima facie case of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. (sec) 1981.

Here, Christian, an African American, and her friend, a Caucasian, were shopping in a Wal-Mart store. An employee repeatedly asked Christian if she needed help, but did not approach her friend. After Christian unzipped her purse-reportedly to retrieve a personal item-the employee called a manager to report that Christian had shoplifted. The employee also called the police, who, at the manager's direction, escorted Christian and her friend out of the store. Christian sued Wal-Mart under (sec) 1981, alleging discrimination. The trial court granted defendant judgment as a matter of law, finding that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant had intended to discriminate against her.

Reversing and remanding, the Sixth Circuit noted that the trial court erred in focusing on whether defendant had intended to discriminate against plaintiff. To establish a prima facie case under (sec) 1981, the court explained, plaintiff must prove that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) sought to make or enforce a contract for services ordinarily provided by defendant, and (3) was denied the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits of a contractual relationship in that she was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not.

Applying these elements here, the court found that plaintiff easily meets the first two parts. As an African American, she is a member of a protected class. She also made herself available to enter into a contractual relationship for services ordinarily provided by defendant because she had selected merchandise to buy, had the means to complete the transaction, and would have completed it had she not been escorted out of the store, the court said. Turning to the third factor, the court noted plaintiff had testified she had been watched, followed, and repeatedly asked whether she needed assistance. A reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence presented, that the employee's suspicion of shoplifting was based on plaintiff's race and that plaintiff was denied the right to enter into a contractual relationship based on her race.

The court rejected defendant's argument that the third factor is not satisfied because the store manager, who made the final decision to have the police escort plaintiff out of the store, was unaware of plaintiff's race at the time he made the decision. The manager's decision, the court explained, was based on the employee's information. Thus, if the employee's actions were based on any racial animus, the court reasoned, that animus may be imputed to the manager. Consequently, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination, the court concluded.

Plaintiffs Counsel

John W. Mygrant, Akron, Ohio

Valarie J.R. Young, Akron, Ohio

Comment. In Hampton v. Dillard Dept Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001), 44 ATLA L. Rep. 297 (Oct. 2001), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a store violated a shopper's (sec) 1981 rights when, based on her race, it interfered with her right to redeem a coupon. *Arthur A. Benson II, Jamie Kathryn Lansford, *Jane McQueeny, Gregg Lombardi, and Aften P. McKinney, all of Kansas City, Mo., represented plaintiff