At-will employee could sue former employer under 42 U.S.C. section 1981

Law Reporter, Dec 2001

EMPLOYMENT LAW

At-will employee could sue former employer under 42 U.S.C. (sec)1981.

Skinner v. Maritz, Inc., 253 F.3d 337 (8th Cir. 2001).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an at-will employee-a worker employed without a written contract in an agreement terminable at will by either party-had sufficient contractual rights to sue her employer under 42 U.S.C. (sec)1981. That statute prohibits racial discrimination from the inception through the end of a contract.

Here, Skinner was an at-will employee of Maritz, Inc. After she was fired, Skinner sued Maritz under 1981, alleging racial discrimination. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that because at-will employment agreements are not contractual, plaintiff did not have a contract as required under (sec)1981.

Reversing, the Eighth Circuit noted that plaintiff's authority to maintain her claim depends on the meaning of the word "contract" as used in (sec)1981. Addressing an issue of first impression for the circuit, the court noted that federal courts must look to the state law definition of "contract" in adjudicating 1981 claims. Under Missouri law, the court observed, the essential elements of a contract are (1) offer, (2) acceptance, and (3) bargained-for consideration.

Here, the court found, plaintiff's at-will employment agreement with defendant had all three elements. First, the court said, defendant offered, either implicitly or explicitly, to pay plaintiff for performance of services. Second, plaintiff accepted that offer by performance. Finally, the court found, plaintiff's performance of services for defendant served as consideration for defendant's promise to pay her for her services, and defendant's promise to pay plaintiff for work completed served as adequate consideration for her performance of her job. Thus, the court concluded, plaintiff's agreement with defendant contains all the requirements of a valid contract for purposes of (sec)1981. Accordingly, the court remanded.

Plaintiff's Counsel

Clyde E. Craig, St. Louis, Mo. Karen J. Aroesty, St. Louis, Mo.

Comment. For another case holding that an at-will employment relationship can form the basis of a 1981 claim, see Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir. 1999), 42 ATLA L. Rep. 178 (June 1999). Alex T. Sliheet, Vickie I. Fang, and Herbert A. Dubin, all of Rockville, Md., represented plaintiffs.