"General acceptance" standard for novel scientific evidence applies in worker's comp cases

Law Reporter, Sep 2002

"General acceptance" standard for novel scientific evidence applies in worker's comp cases.

United States Sugar Corp. v. Henson, ___ So. 2d ___, No. SC01-1127, 2002 WL 1208720 (Fla. Junc 6, 2002).

The Florida Supreme Court held that the "general acceptance" standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), is applicable to worker's compensation cases.

The state high court found that while compensation proceedings may generally be more flexible and informal in nature than civil litigation, it is still important for the judge to serve as a gatekeeper with respect to scientific evidence. A statutory provision cited by claimant concerning the admissibility of "medical reports" only ensures the admission into evidence of the written records of a claimant's treating physicians, and does not address the content of expert opinion testimony, the court said. While the worker's comp statute compels a judge to rely on an expert medical advisor's opinion where possible, it does not preclude or conflict with use of the Frye criterion to test and ensure the reliability of novel scientific methods used by an expert witness.

Here, claimant had contended that imposing upon the proponent of the expert opinion the burden of establishing that the basis for the opinion is generally accepted in its scientific field is inconsistent with the legislature's stated intent that the workers' compensation system assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers. However, the court said, it is just as clear that the legislature intended that worker's compensation cases be decided on their merits. For this reason, the court said, it is only logical to explicitly extend the reasoning of our evidence decisions in the civil and criminal arenas to the area of workers' compensation claims.

Comment. The court also explicitly disapproved the idea that an expert's opinions themselves must be generally accepted in the scientific community to be admissible. Once the Frye test is satisfied with respect to the basis of an expert's opinions, the court explained, the opinions and deductions themselves must be evaluated by the finder of fact as a matter of weight, not admissibility.