Summary judgment was premature where entity's duties as shipowners and employer not yet separated under LHWCA

Law Reporter, Sep 2002

Kuentzel v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., No. 2:01CV414 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2002) (unpublished).

A U.S. district court held that a grant of summary judgment is premature where the duties of an entity as a shipowner and an employer have not been adequately separated in a personal injury suit brought under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. (secs)901 etseq. Under that statute, an employer is liable for strict liability damages, but a shipowner can be sued in tort.

Here, Kuentzel was injured while working aboard a merchant vessel. He filed suit against the employer and shipowner-which was one entity-under the LHWCA. Defendant moved for summary judgment.

Denying the motion, the court explained that under the LHWCA, an injured worker's employer must pay strict liability damages to the worker, but thereafter is shielded from further liability. A shipowner, however, can be sued in tort for its part in any negligent conduct that causes injury. Consequently, in this case, where defendant is both the shipowner and employer, defendant can be held liable for both strict liability and tort damages. In such cases, courts must separate the defendant's duties as a shipowner from those as an employer. Because the duties of defendant as a shipowner and employer have not been adequately separated here, a grant of summary judgment would be premature, the court concluded.

Plaintiff's Counsel

*Ralph Rabinowitz, Norfolk, Va.

Documents in this case are available through the Court Document Sets section in the back of this issue, courtesy of Mr. Rabinowitz.