Mere fact that harm was natural and probable effect of insured's actions is not enough to infer intent for intentional injury exclusion

Law Reporter, Dec 2003

Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ehmke, 664 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).

A Minnesota appellate court held that the mere fact that harm to another was the natural and probable consequence of an insured's actions is not sufficient to infer an intent to injure and thus trigger the intentional acts exclusion of a homeowner's policy.

Here, Ehmke was visiting the home of his daughter, age 17, and her mother. Ehmke got into an argument with his daughter and threw a beer can at her, whereupon she retaliated by throwing a refrigerator magnet at him. The magnet unexpectedly struck Ehmke in the eye, blinding him.

Ehmke sued his daughter and her mother, who owned a homeowner's insurance policy. The insurer defended under a reservation of rights, and brought a declaratory action asserting that the policy exclusions covering intentional and criminal acts precluded coverage. A trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The Ehmkes appealed.

Reversing, the appellate court noted that the home insurance policy stated that bodily injury resulting from the act of an insured would not be covered if a reasonable person would expect or intend bodily injury to result from the act. The purpose of such intentional act exclusions is to exclude coverage for wanton and malicious acts by the insured, the court noted. The court may, absent evidence of specific intent to injure, infer intent to injure as a matter of law, based on the circumstances and nature of the insured's actions.

The inference of intent to injure as a matter of law arises when the insured acted in a calculated manner and without remorse, or when the insured's conduct was such that the insured knew or should have known that harm was substantially certain to result. The mere fact that harm was a natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions in not sufficient to infer intent to injure, the court stated.

Here, the fact that the young woman acted out of anger is not determinative, the court stated. There is no evidence that the young woman expected or intended to injure her father.

Turning to the criminal act exclusion, the court noted that the exclusion applies where the insured undertakes a criminal act, or acts with the intent to cause loss. Here, the exclusion does not apply because the young woman was not charged with or convicted of any crime, the court said, and because the facts do not support an inference of intent to injure.

Accordingly, the court remanded.

Plaintiff's Counsel

* Charles A. Bird, Rochester, Minn.

* Charles James Suk, Rochester, Minn.