C-69: Elegance in camouflage

Air Classics, Mar 2003 by O'Leary, Michael

WITH THE ADVENT Of WORLD WAR TWO, LOCKHEED PS NEW CREATION WOULD NOT ENJOY COLORFUL AIRLINE MARKINGS, BUT RATHER DRAB CAMOUFLAGE HIGHLIGHTING A NATION BENT ON VICTORY

With the input of TWA's Jack Frye and Howard Hughes regarding the design and performance of the new airliner, things really began to heat up at Burbank. It must be remembered that the design staff of the aeronautical firm was still quite small, albeit very talented, and initially chief engineer Hall Hibbard and chief aerodynamicist Kelly Johnson started on the project but they were soon supplemented by a design team led by Don Palmer and by mid-summer 1939 were busily at work on creating a flying machine to meet TWA's rather exacting requirements.

The Lockheed team knew that to give Frye and Hughes the required economics to make operations possible with the new design, it was important to carry as many passengers as possible. Certain items were a given - for instance TWA wanted pressurization to go high above most weather. Accordingly, the fuselage had to have a round cross section. Also, since TWA specified range parameters, the design team knew that fuel tanks of certain capacity had to be fitted within wing spaces.

TWA and Hughes kept a very constant inspection of Lockheed progress - especially Hughes since the entire project was mainly his money. TWA executives Ralph Ellinger and Jack Franklin kept questioning the design team on certain items. In one instance, they claimed that a flat-sided fuselage would improve interior space. However, Lockheed illustrated that such a modification slightly decreased speed. Hughes, enamored over speed and having set several high-performance speed records, quickly eliminated any thought about slab-sides.

Across town, the single Douglas DC4E had proven too complex to make a profit for any airline and the TWA execs were worried about the complexity of the new design - citing the large amount of hydraulics, retractable tricycle landing gear, Fowler flaps, etc.

As 1939 progressed, the aircraft became more finalized. It would have a triple-tail so that it could fit into existing large hangars. The nose and cabin shape was refined from six different studies. The wing would basically be a greatly enlarged P-38 shape incorporating improved Fowler flaps. Controls boosted by the hydraulic system would decrease crew fatigue. Hughes and Frye initially argued for Wright R-2600 powerplants but Lockheed advocated the basically unproved Wright R-3350 while hedging their bet by also suggesting the Pratt & Whitney R-2800. Although in the developmental stage, it was obvious that an engine of the R-3350 size would be needed to provide the power for the design especially if it was to "grow" during its production life. And so it went.

Hughes, his paranoid demand for secrecy increasing, had the TWA contracts drawn up by the wife of TWA's Tommy Tomlinson. She had been a court reporter and since she was part of the "family," could be trusted. In the contract, Hughes stipulated that the new aircraft would be purchased by the Hughes Tool Company and then be leased to TWA. One demand was that the purchase price not be made public. Accordingly, on 10 July 1939, the papers were signed. For their new design, Lockheed assigned Model 04916-01 to the aircraft with proposed R-2800 powerplants and Model 049-99-01 was for the Wright-powered aircraft.

With either powerplant, the design team figured a top speed of 360 mph while at a cruising altitude of 20,000 feet. This was more than a quantum jump considering that the Douglas DC-3 was barely plowing along at 200 mph at 8000 feet.

During the first part of 1940, Hughes and TWA placed an order for nine of the new Constellations. Soon, the order was increased to 40. To keep everything within his ball park, Hughes stipulated that the aircraft could not be sold to other airlines until TWA had taken delivery of its 35th example. This agreement alienated American who never purchased another Lockheed product (until the four-engine Electra of the late 1950s) but did not seem to bother Pan American overly much since they placed an order for 40 Model 049s (Pan Am's president Juan Trippe argued that he wanted his aircraft delivered at the same time and Hughes, in one of his more expansive moods, agreed that Pan Am could take a quicker delivery on their planes provided they used them on overseas routes and did not compete with TWA). The size of these orders, and the anticipation of more, caused Lockheed to give the go-ahead for one of their most important projects.

This was an amazing time of expansion for Lockheed. Military orders were pouring in for their Lightnings, Hudsons, and Venturas. They would also soon begin building Boeing Flying Fortresses under license. To many high-ranking military and political officials it was becoming obvious that America would enter the war that was engulfing Europe and the Far East - just when was the question.

Accordingly, the military became very interested in the Constellation after viewing engineering, mockup, and airframe work at Burbank. The US Army Air Corps (to become Army Air Force in 1942) did not have a fast longrange transport. Even though the Constellation was being completed in strict secrecy, the military demanded that Lockheed show all work in progress and details of the Constellation were released to the press, a move that infuriated Hughes.