Douglas Commercial 3: With the introduction of the Douglas Commercial Three, transportation by air would never be the same

Air Classics, Jun 2003 by O'Leary, Michael

American's innovative president C.R. Smith and his chief engineer William Littlewood presented their company's need for a new aircraft to Donald Douglas for a plane that would have the excellent performance characteristics of the DC-2 combined with the passenger comforts and appeal of the Curtiss Condor. Oddly, Douglas was not overly enthused about this proposal for a "stretched" DC-2 fitted with upgraded Wright SGR-1820-G radiais because, after consulting with some of his financial advisors, Douglas felt that American would probably not be in business long enough to even make the initial payments on the new aircraft!

In this odd fit of short-sightedness, Douglas could not really conceptualize the importance of what Smith and Littlewood had requested. The airline wanted an aircraft with excellent payload to achieve a good passenger-seatper-mile cost even though it would be a more expensive aircraft to initially purchase. American also wanted, obviously, more internal cabin space in which to fit the sleepers. The airline also wanted a nonstop New York-to-Chicago range regardless of whether the aircraft was flying to the east or to the west, and they specified a maximum of four stops on the transcontinental route. After observing the DC-2 in operation, American's pilots also wanted a more directionally stable aircraft since the DC-2 was prone to "wander" in straight and level flight.

The requirements were supremely realistic and American reasoned that widening the fuselage of the DC-2 by 26-in would take care of the sleeper berth consideration (each American berth was actually the size of a twin bed and also six inches longer than a Pullman berth, so beloved of cross-country rail travelers). At the same time, the elimination of the sleeper berths would mean that a daylight passenger configuration of 21 to 24 seats could be planned. In order to keep costs down, American reasoned that approximately 85 percent DC-2 parts could be utilized in the new craft. The concept of a sleeper aircraft was not greeted all that enthusiastically by Douglas designer Arthur Raymond who is quoted as having said, "Who in the hell is going to buy a sleeper plane? Flying at night is about as popular as a silent movie."

Fortune magazine was keeping a close watch on Donald Douglas and his California company. "The Douglas story is in fact a success story in the good old familiar vein; in approaching its corporate affairs one should as it were take off one's shoes, and while the bush burns, reflect upon the wonderful ways of Jehovah. For while the Douglas figures are not big, as US industrial figures go, they are written in black, and they have stayed black throughout the entire Depression. Indeed, never since 1921 has the Douglas Aircraft Co., nor its parent, the Douglas Co., recorded a net loss." The magazine, devoted to capitalism during the most trying of times, viewed aeronautics as a bright and shining example of future American business. While they wrote these enthusiastic sentences, the DC-3 was still a dream and the DC-2 was starting to roll off the Santa Monica production lines. When describing Arthur Raymond and the company's engineers, the magazine wrote, "Today there is no more" significant figures (Donald Douglas) in industrial aviation - not merely the engineer, but a capitalist, Depression-born. And the young men who do most of the work in his research department are not merely engineers either. Out in Santa Monica, they are known with some accuracy as Douglas's brain trust, whose secrets are without price and whose moves are more or less dreaded by an industry that is at last on the make."

As Fortune noted, America was deep in the grips of the Great Depression and Douglas, satisfied with his DC-2's success, was willing to move forward only very slowly. However, American became more insistent with their proposal and C.R. Smith was finally able to wrest a commitment directly from Douglas to build up to 20 of the larger aircraft. Douglas felt that flying by night was a risky business and not popular with passengers, but he accepted the specifications sent by American and began to study the concept aircraft which the airline had proposed.

A telegram transmitted on 8 July 1935 by Smith read, "Enter our order ten Model DST (Douglas Sleeper Transport) airplanes - first ten airplanes this type be delivered American Airlines and with further understanding no sleeper airplanes of any type will be delivered by Douglas prior to full delivery sleeper planes covered by this order (the airline had, obviously, learned its lesson from Boeing, United, and the Model 247). American Airlines to have right to reject first airplane built if in its opinion airplane does not adequately conform to standards of other airplanes on this order or if in its opinion first airplane is materially depreciated account development testing or revisions. Price $79,500 each complete except for radio, automatic pilot, and engines."

The groundwork for aviation history was established on 9 July when Douglas wired, "Accept your order for ten DST airplanes in accordance with your telegram 8 July."