Letters to the editor

Military Medicine, Nov 2003

To the Editor:

The article in the August 2003 issue of Military Medicine [Milit Med 2003;168:600-605] concerning lung burdens of depleted uranium in Gulf War veterans deserves comment. The authors state that British, Canadian, and American Gulf War veterans had "verified inhalational exposure to dust containing DU during Operation Desert Storm." No Canadian units served on the battlefields of that conflict. In fact, most Canadian units were hundreds of kilometers away.

Canada has now tested 227 veterans (of the Gulf War and others) for total uranium using 24-hour urine collections. All results have been normal. Isotope ratios were measured on 108 of these veterans. All isotope ratios indicated exposure to natural uranium only.

I am unaware of any Canadian Gulf War veterans with a verified inhalational exposure to depleted uranium. It is incomprehensible how Canadian veterans with no exposures could be measuring positive for depleted uranium. Something is amiss.

COL Ken Scott, CD, MD, FRCPC

Canadian Forces Medical Group

To the Editor:

Colonel Scott's challenge is fundamental: Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC) reports finding Depleted Uranium (DU) in Canadian Gulf War veteran's urine; Colonel Scott's study doesn't. Colonel Scott questions the basic integrity of UMRC, its methodology and the veterans participating in our study. He implies UMRC's results are achieved through misrepresentation - that the Canadian Forces members in our study were not active in locations where they could be exposed to DU. If Colonel Scott would accurately repeat the UMRC methodology to find that Canadian veterans are in fact contaminated, how would he explain this bold statement that they were not exposed to DU in Operation Desert Storm?

Uranium can be distributed by air. In 1979, after a chance discovery of DU particles in the air filter at Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in Schenectady, New York air filters, it was discovered that the source of the DU particles was the National Lead plant 26 miles (42 km) away. National Lead was fabricating DU penetrators for 30 mm cannon rounds. Further experiments exposed filters at three different locations covering 25 weeks of exposure from May through October of 1979. The filters were analyzed and all contained trace amounts of DU. This is by no means the maximum fallout distance for DU aerosol particles. [L. A. Dietz, CHEM-434-LAD, "Investigation of Excess Alpha Activity Observed in Recent Air Filter Collections and Other Environmental Samples," Jan. 24, 1980; unclassified technical report, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Schenectady, NY 12301; obtained under Freedom of Information Act. Published in Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report DOE/OR/21950-1022]

In February 1980, a court order by New York State forced National Lead to cease production, because it exceeded the state's radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for airborne emissions in a given month. The plant closed in 1983 and is now being decontaminated and dismantled. The 150 microcuries corresponds to 387 g of DU metal. For comparison, one GAU-8/A penetrator in an aircraft 30 mm cannon round contains 272 g of DU metal.

I recommend that Military Medicine's audience read both Colonel Scott's paper and ours so that it may draw its own conclusions. Colonel Scott's paper, "An Examination of Uranium Levels in Canadian Forces Personnel Who Served in the Gulf War and Kosovo," [E.A. Ough et al., Health Physics Society Journal, 82(4): 527-532; 2002] was published April 2002.

COZ Asaf Durakovic, MC, USAR

Uranium Medical Research Center