Medical Support for Pershing's Punitive Expedition in Mexico, 1916-1917

Military Medicine, Mar 2008 by Marble, William Sanders

ABSTRACT Pershing's Punitive Expedition had adequate medical support despite deliberately limited in-theater resources. The few casualties did not strain the inadequate number of forward providers. Preventive medicine was highly successful due to significant medical and command emphasis. New technologies were useful and helped minimize the medical footprint. National Guard troops mobilized to support the Expedition had troublesome medical readiness rates.

INTRODUCTION

On March 15, 1916, U.S. troops crossed the Mexican border, chasing after Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Villa had attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico, on the night of March 8 to 9. We have no account from Villa why he attacked, but it was an outgrowth of a period of violent instability in Mexico. Order had broken down in Mexico in 1910 with the death of long-time strongman Porfirio Diaz, and Villa was a contender for the presidency. President Woodrow Wilson's policy was not to pick a new Mexican president, but he was willing to stack the deck against some and in favor of others. Wilson opposed Villa and had allowed Mexican government troops to cross U.S. territory to intercept some Villistas, possibly provoking Villa.

Under the command of Brigadier General John Pershing, two cavalry columns moved south; an infantry column followed with the main logistics units. The U.S. forces outnumbered Villa's bands and quickly drove deep into northern Mexico. They drove so fast that horses broke down and troops outran their supplies; Pershing accepted the logistical risk to press the enemy. After a month of hot pursuit, American troops were deep into Mexico, Villa's bands were dispersed, but Villa was in hiding instead of caught. Mexico had not authorized the Expedition and tensions with the Mexican federales increased; a skirmish at Parral (516 miles south of the U.S. border) marked the limit of Pershing's incursion. Pershing denied he was withdrawing due to Mexican pressure, but pulled back about halfway and established garrison/patrol areas. Pershing's men settled down to occupation routines. It was a true Mexican standoff: Pershing was too weak (and lacked orders) to go further into Mexico, while the Mexicans could not push him out. Meanwhile, a major National Guard mobilization in Texas provided ample forces to deter other significant incursions. Villa was never caught, but was politically finished, and as international tensions rose, Pershing's men were withdrawn in February 1917 (Fig. 1).

Medical provision for the Expedition was very lean but adequate. It was probably inadequate for substantial battle casualties, but thanks to effective lines of communications, it sufficed for what did develop. Preventive medicine played a crucial role in keeping the force healthy and effective and even potentially reducing friction with the local populace. New technologies played a key role in both preventive medicine and evacuation along the lines of communications and were promptly incorporated into medical forces. The mobilization of the Guard raised issues that the Army would see again in 1917 when mobilizing for a much larger war.

MEDICAL FORCE STRUCTURE

In 1916, the U.S. Army was still mainly organized on a regimental basis. Brigades and divisions existed on paper, but troops were scattered around the country in small garrisons, and larger formations hardly ever assembled or exercised. Medical personnel were assigned to regiments and divisions had few medical units. There were no nondivisional medical field units, nor a basis of allocation, and since the Punitive Expedition was organized as a Provisional Division, its medical support was ad hoc. Moreover, medical field units were neither fully manned or equipped in peacetime, leading to mobilization problems. For instance, doctors were scrambled from coast artillery units in the East and horses and mules were obtained from line units because peacetime medical units did not own their full transportation.1

An infantry regiment of 1,887 officers and enlisted men had 28 sanitary personnel attached: 24 enlisted men and four medical officers.2 These were enough to run aid stations, but not enough to collect wounded from the field; bandsmen or line troops would have to carry the wounded back to the aid stations on the nine litters the regiment was authorized.3 The infantry battalion had no medical personnel assigned, although some of the regiment's 28 men could be attached. There were also no medical personnel assigned to an infantry brigade: because the brigade was only a 15-man headquarters, it hardly needed any separate medical personnel. In garrison, the regiment's sanitary detachment had a wagon for the regimental infirmary; it would accompany the regiment on exercises or marches (picking up footsore soldiers), but in wartime most wagons were reassigned to field hospitals.4

The cavalry regiment of 1,287 personnel had even fewer medical personnel attached: 3 physicians and 16 enlisted men. (There were two veterinarians for the 1,414 horses and mules, and veterinarians were not officers until 1916.) As with the infantry, these were attached to the regiment and could be subassigned as needed; there were no medical personnel at cavalry brigade headquarters. If a cavalry regiment was subdivided beyond squadrons, there would not be enough physicians to go around and care would depend on the medical enlisted men (with first aid training) and the troopers' first aid packets. Two ambulances and six litters were authorized per regiment.