Accounting History: "Proper Trust of Liberty": economical reform, the English constitution and the protections of accounting during the American War of Independence, The

FindArticles > Accounting History > Feb 2008 > Article > Print friendly

"Proper Trust of Liberty": economical reform, the English constitution and the protections of accounting during the American War of Independence, The

Funnell, Warwick

Abstract

Prior to the nineteenth century the more lucrative public offices under the direct control of the Crown as part of the civil list were given as sinecures to favoured individuals. The use of these sinecures, pensions and other valuable appointments provided the Crown with the means by which it could buy influence and, thereby, undermine the constitutional authority and independence of parliament. In the main, civilian officers of the Crown were not accountable to parliament. Financial accountability for spending on the civil list was sporadic, without sufficient enforcement mechanisms and, therefore, a threat to the liberty of all "Englishmen". The financial and political strains that the American War of Independence placed upon England, combined with the abuse of patronage privileges by the Crown, provoked a movement for economical reform, most often associated with Edmund Burke, which sought the reform of both the civil list and executive accounts as protections for liberty. Crucial to convincing the government of the urgency of reform were reports from the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts.

Keywords: American War of Independence; commissioners for examining the public accounts; economical reform movement; Edmund Burke

1. Introduction

Ultimately all political power is dependent upon control over public finances for, at its most basic level, control over finances ensures the ability to marshal and use military force, either against external foes or to stifle internal discontent, to maintain political dominance. This nexus between political hegemony and public finances lay at the heart of the constitutional battles between parliament and the executive in the evolution of the English Constitution (Clode, 1869).1 John Morley (1879/1909, p.92), a prominent Liberal politician, noted that "(u)nder other governments a question of expense is only a question of economy, and it is nothing more; with us, in every question of expense, there is always a mixture of constitutional considerations". From the late seventeenth century until the late nineteenth century the constitutional intent of making the executive financially accountable to parliament for the expenditure of monies appropriated by parliament, while progressively less prominent, still continued to provide the core rationale for reforms to government accounting and executive accountability that relied upon the simple charge-discharge form of accounts long favoured by the Exchequer.

Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries significant reforms of English government accounting and auditing were most often responses to the political crises of war and revolution during which the executive had been presented with opportunities to jeopardize the liberty of all citizens (Funnell, 1996,2004). From the ferment of war and revolution came the impetus for constitutionally transformative accounting and audit reforms, for during times of great political peril the constitutional protections afforded by the executive giving an account to parliament became most obvious In the late eighteenth century the political and economic crisis engendered by the American War of Independence (1776-83) was especially significant in prompting government accounting and audit reforms that laid the foundations for British public sector audit reforms of the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the last decades of the eighteenth century constitute the crucible of modern Westminster constitutional audit.

Cobban (1960, p.ll) refers to the eighteenth century as "the seed-time of modern Europe": a time when understandings of the role and nature of modern government first appear in England, if not the Continent. Indeed, it was a period of great constitutional significance for it was in this century that the constitutional principles that were forged in the English Revolutionary Settlement of 1689 were developed in practice and enshrined in the conventions of Westminster accountability. In particular, O'Gorman (1973, p.60) refers to the years 1779 to 1785, which encompass most of the American War of Independence, as "a period of great interest, partly because of the swift flow of events and partly because of the political and constitutional implications which these revealed" (see also Marshall, 1963, p.481). Most importantly, during these years, as a result of the more certain threat of exposure afforded by reforms to executive accountability in response to the War of Independence, there was a marked diminution in the Crown's ability to engage surreptitiously in constitutionally inappropriate attempts to buy influence in parhament through the use of executive patronage to procure appointments to the civil list. The civil list included all civil departments of state and the offices within the royal household. With reforms to the civil list and executive accountability in the late eighteenth century, "executive government" was progressively replaced with "parliamentary government" when the financial supremacy of parliament was added to the legislative and constitutional supremacy it had gained in 1689 (Gunn, 1974, p.306). These reforms, while possibly the most consequential at the time, were but the more prominent reforms during a period of reformist zeal in which William Pitt's efforts were prominent, if not always successful. Particularly notable were Pitt's efforts in 1783 and later in 1785 to reform the electoral system in order to remove the worst abuses of rotten boroughs and to reform the East India Company with his Bill of 1784 (Rose, 1914, pp.131,160-3; Ehrman, 1969, p.64). For some time the East India Company, the activities of which left untouched few aspects of English life, had been poorly managed ensuring that its recent natural condition was to teeter on the brink of bankruptcy. Most worrying for reformists such as Pitt and Burke were the opportunities that the breadth of the company's activities and its semi-governmental nature provided for political patronage (Ehrman, 1969, pp.118-19).

The purposes of this article are to determine why a close association was believed to exist in England at the time of the American War of Independence between a rigorous, parliamentary-controlled accounting for executive spending on the civil list, in contra-distinction to military spending, and the preservation of liberties fundamental to the English Constitution and how this association provided the impetus for extensive reforms of executive accountability. Hence, the concerns of the article are the motives that precipitated reforms to executive financial accountability in the latter decades of the eighteenth century, most importantly the prompt accounting for civil list expenditures. Requiring the executive to account for civil list expenditure, like that of military spending, was foremost and overwhelmingly a means of strengthening the constitutional supremacy of parliament over the executive (for a history of the civil list see British Parliamentary Papers [BPP], 1868-9 (366), XXXV, part II, p.585ff). The concerns of this article were in part prompted by the recent study by Edwards et al. (2002), which sought to trace the appearance of double entry bookkeeping in English Government departments in the early nineteenth century. The present article also seeks to locate a point of emergence, that of constitutional audit or auditing which is primarily undertaken to give parliament the assurance that money appropriated to the executive is spent for the purposes as approved by parliament and that no more is spent than is approved. Although the technologies of executive accountability which resulted from the reforms of the late eighteenth century provided information to assist with financial management of the nation's finances, this was always a supplementary benefit. Constitutional apprehensions were the primary, immediate and enduring motivations for accounting and audit reform.

Despite the rising economic and social significance of government from the late eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century with the onset of the first industrial revolution and the historical resilience of the essentials of modern Westminster financial accountability, which had their origins at this time, the history of modern Westminster government accounting and accountability continues to attract relatively few accounting historians The vigorous endeavours of accounting historians engaged in debates over private sector cost and management accounting practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Fleischman & Parker, 1990,1991; Hoskin & Macve, 2000; Fleischman & Macve, 2002) have yet to transfer to the public sector during the same period, for which there are vast stores of rich evidentiary material available in the archives Recent work by Edwards et al. (2002) possibly suggests that this neglect may be waning. The present article seeks to reinforce this momentum.

The long history that has characterized the constitutional development of English government requires that details of historical context be accorded a significant presence in the article. Accordingly, in the section that follows immediately the main contours of late eighteenth century government and concerns about the unconstitutional exercise of patronage by the Crown, which were triggered by the financial and political turmoil of the War of Independence, are shown to have led to vigorous, widespread calls for reform of government finances and accounting. Those leading the "movement of economical reform" around which these demands crystallized understood that the efficacy of any financial reforms ultimately depended upon forcing government officers, but especially those enjoying the most profitable sinecures, to account punctually for the performance of their duties upon leaving office. Edmund Burke played a particularly prominent role,2 as did Charles James Fox, in firstly agitating for the reform of executive accountability and then drafting and shepherding through parliament the necessary reform legislation.3 Accordingly, his writings are central to the argument developed throughout this article. Burke believed that "(p)rudence and a calm review of the financial powers of a country were the first objects of a statesman" (Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 14 December 1778, col. 83). In the final sections of the article the success of the financial awakening compelled by the movement of economical reform is attributed to the, at times, shocking findings of the newly appointed Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts Their reports reverberated throughout with appeals to the sanctity of accounting as a bulwark against executive truculence and despotism. They also determined the appointment of the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts in 1785, which announced the beginning of the transformation of public sector audit from an inconsequentiality controlled by the executive to a parliamentary guarantee of liberty.

2. The civil list, patronage and the imperilled constitution

After the English Revolution in 1688 (hereafter the Revolution) parliament determined that the dignity and independence of the Crown demanded that the king be master in his own household,4 and that the then small number of people employed in the civil, as opposed to the military, departments of state be also the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. In law and in effect there was no clear constitutional distinction between the person of the monarch and the monarch as the executive government: the domestic affairs of the monarch and civil government were inextricably and, it was widely believed, properly mixed (Chester, 1981, p.8). The cost of the royal household and of departments of state was to be met primarily from the Crown's hereditary sources of income, that is from the monarch's own purse.5 In addition, each monarch was granted funding by parliament at the beginning of their reign according to 9 Will.III, c.23, passed a decade after the Revolution. While ever the Crown lived within its means and provided for its own needs, parliament was not to interfere. Only by "destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest" would the constitution be threatened (Bentham, 1776/ 2001, p.73).

From the early eighteenth century until 1783, when the financial independence of the Crown was removed with the assumption by parhament of the responsibility for the civil list, a balance was said to exist between the constitutional powers of the executive, the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the three mutually regarding components of English Government. To threaten the independence of each, Blackstone (1758/1803, pp.50,51) believed, would mean that the constitution would be 'at an end'. Thus, the independence of the Crown was essential, argued Lord North, to the 'balanced constitution' that England enjoyed. William Lambarde in the eighteenth century praised the balance of the constitution for "from such, and so well-tuned a base, mean and treble, there proceeds a most exquisite content, and delicious melody" (cited in Ward, 2004, p.184). If the Crown were to lose its independence there would be fewer checks and balances on the power of parliament. Therefore, until the financial crisis created by the War of Independence, parliament took no detailed and direct interest in the civil administration of the King's Executive, most notably accounts of expenditure (Chester, 1981, p.34).

Lord North, in 1760, reminded parhament that "the civil list being granted to His Majesty's use, it is not proper to require any account of the expenditure of it...' (Parliamentary History, VoLXVI, 1785, col. 927; Binney, 1958, p.2). This meant that accounting for civil list expenditures in most circumstances remained the personal affair of the monarch, never parliament. Only when the Crown sought additional financing to meet the needs of the royal household and the civil government, mainly during times of war, was the Crown forced to be answerable to parliament for the civil list.6 Only then was parliament able to force from the Crown an accounting for its expenditures Most importantly for the preservation of the powers and independence of parliament, this accounting at the time of the War of Independence allowed parliament the opportunity, for the first time in many years, to identify spending by the Crown that sought to provide valuable civil list sinecures to influential politicians and businessmen for the purpose of buying influence in parliament.

Each department of state on the civil list and the royal household operated as a separate entity which senior civil servants treated as their personal fiefdoms Accordingly, each department had its own set of regulations, salary scales, retirement provisions and appointment procedures (Wright, 1969, p.xxv). They were also financially accountable only to the Crown to whom the civil service most immediately owed its allegiance.7 Although some appointments in the royal household served a genuine practical purpose, by the late eighteenth century most of the senior officers in the king's household and many in other parts of the civil service no longer served any useful purpose beyond the political (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 23 February 1780, cols 111-2; Prior, 1839, p.206; Burke, speech in the House of Commons, 11 February 1780 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, pp.495,508). Instead, in many cases the posts were filled by individuals who did not carry out any functions yet may have been entitled by custom or law to considerable remuneration. These sinecure offices, many with names that betrayed their ancient origins and obsolescence, included the Treasurer and Comptroller of the Household, the Cofferer of the Household, the Master of the Household, the Groom of the Stole, Clerk of the Pells, Master of the Jewel Office and, most notoriously, the Paymaster-General of His Majesty's Forces Opponents of the continuance of these anachronistic sinecures believed that if they were abolished, not only would the state save money, the constitution would be strengthened by taking from the Crown the means by which it could extend its influence in parhament by the promiscuous use of patronage. David Hume (1711-76) referred to the way in which "(t)he Crown has so many offices at its disposal ... We may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence" (from Essays Moral, Political and Literary cited in Foord, 1947, p.484, emphasis in the original). Thus, although for constitutional purposes the Crown and parhament were meant to be separate entities, in reality the Crown had a substantive and seamless presence in parliament through the ministers it appointed in parliament and appointments it was able to make under patronage provisions This seeming constitutional contradiction created the tensions that are the subject of this article.

At a time when it was common for civil officials to receive only small salaries, many offices provided for substantial fees levied on the provision of services such as signing contracts, issuing warrants for payment and the declaration of contractor accounts (Baker, 1971, p.18). Hence, these offices were highly prized and sought after. Some offices, such as the Treasury, became especially attractive in times of war when fees might rise dramatically in direct proportion to the increase in the number of transactions necessitated by war. They came to particular prominence during the War of Independence. Many of those favoured with appointment to a lavishly paid sinecure never attended their place of work or carried out any of the duties associated with their position. Instead, they were permitted to employ a subordinate as deputy to carry out all the work. The Paymaster General of His Majesty's Forces and the Clerk of Pells were especially notorious in this regard,8 as were the two Auditors of the Imprest, neither of whom had attended their office for over 30 years but who in 1783 were each paid £16,565 ("Twelfth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 11 June 1784, col. 123; Parnell, 1830, pp.140-1; Cohen, 1965, pp.25-7). Some sinecures could be bequeathed as a form of personal property, the sanctity of which was confirmed by even the staunchest opponents of executive excesses (see Burke 15 December 1779 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.475; also "Eleventh Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 4-5 December 1783, col. 779; "Fourteenth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 26-27 January 1786, col. 23).

By allowing the Crown to use highly profitable government sinecures to buy loyalty to its causes, possibly without the knowledge and certainly without the permission of parliament as a body, patronage diminished the independence of public officers, thereby, argued Burke, weakening the vigilance of the constitution by threatening the separation of powers demanded by the constitution (see Burke cited in Cromwell, 1968, p.6; Ward, 2004, p.78). As the titular head of government, the King was advised by ministers who sat in parhament but it was constitutionally hazardous should the Crown seek to buy influence and favour in the parliament beyond the ministers. Parhament was meant to reflect the views of the people, not those of the Crown and those upon whom the Crown depended for influence. The ability to find lucrative positions for relatives and friends of parliamentarians, however, provided the certain means by which the Crown could procure support in parliament. Accordingly, throughout most of the eighteenth century the business of government was carried out on the basis of privileged access to the profitable benefice of the Crown. Influence through the use of patronage, argued Sir James Graham, secretary to the Navy in the 1830s, succeeded the royal prerogative after the Revolution as the means by which the Crown sought to maintain its supremacy in both Houses of Parliament (Graham to Gladstone, 4 January 1854, cited in Parker, 1907, Vol.2, p.212).

Although the abuse of patronage had long been a feature of English government, the extreme financial difficulties arising from the War of Independence exposed for the first time since the Revolution the full extent to which the Crown had been using the civil list to exercise patronage and, thereby, allow the Crown to deepen its influence in the House of Commons Without the requirement that all spending by the Crown was to be reported to parhament in regular, comprehensive accounts, the War of Independence revealed that parliament had been an impotent accomplice in the protection of a corrupt executive and in the diminution of its own standing.

3. The American war of Independence and threats to the liberty of the English

Morley (1879/1909, p.94) referred to the War of Independence as "the most disastrous war that our country has ever carried on". Indeed, so calamitous was the English Government's conduct of the war that it aroused sustained and public widespread opposition throughout England. Edmund Burke's prominent denunciations of executive incompetence were especially effective in antagonizing the government and in galvanizing support for reform (Burke, 1942). It was obvious to influential sections of the population that the War of Independence had brought humiliation and financial ruin upon England. The financial demands of a war conducted over 3,000 miles away, in a country in which the majority of the population was hostile to English control, greatly increased the indebtedness of the English Government. Between 1776 and 1783 the national debt had increased from the previously unprecedented level of £131.2 m to £231.8 m (Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.486 n.2). The War of Independence "presented to the people of England ... a mortgage of their lands, moveables, trade, and commerce, in perpetuity, of two millions a year, America lost and not a shilling to balance this unparalleled loss" (Burke, Parliamentary History, VoLXX, 20 June 1779, cols. 821-822, see also in the same volume Burke's warnings expressed on 14 December 1778, col. 83; Burke 31 May 1779 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, pp.438-40).

Outside the government of Lord North,9 it was not the imminent loss of the colonies or the cost of the war of itself that necessarily aroused the greatest opposition to the government but the opportunities that the extraordinary financial cost imposed on the nation had created for the Crown to increase its influence in parliament through the exercise of patronage (see Burke in Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 23 February 1780, col. Ul and Parliamentary History, VoLXX, 30 June 1779, col. 823; Prior, 1839, p.203; Parliamentary History, VoLXX, 14 December 1778, col. 76). Edmund Burke on the 11 February 1780 warned that:

during the present expensive and unfortunate war, the trade, manufactures, and land-rents of this kingdom have been greatly diminished; the Public Burdens grievously augmented by the annual imposition of new and additional taxes; the National Debt enormously increased; and the undue influence of the Crown extended to an alarming degree ... (cited in Maccoby, 1955, p.313, emphasis added; for similar concerns see also Lord Shelburne in Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 15 December 1779, col. 1291.)

The War of Independence permitted the Crown a level of influence in parhament that was widely criticized, with rising apprehension, as unconstitutional, illegal and possibly "fatal". In particular, the presence in parhament of a large number of very wealthy and powerful military contractors who owed their highly profitable contracts to the Crown was both evidence of the extent of the Crown's influence and of the possibilities for even greater degradation of parliament's authority. Contracting abuses had become so flagrant that "at no other period in our annals... did the abuses of the contract system flourish in such rank extravagance. At no other period were they so detrimental to the public service" (Observations made in the House of Commons, as cited in Porritt, 1903/1963, p.218).

Blackstone referred to the Crown's influence during the War of Independence as being "most amazingly extensive", in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords (cited in Foord, 1947, p.484) while Dunning's famous resolution in the Commons on 6 April 1780, that "the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished", drew popular attention to the extent to which patronage, especially sinecures, had reached in parliament during the duress of war (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 6 April 1780, cols 340-88; Christie, 1962, pp.97-8; Norris, 1963, p.129; Cannon, 1973, p.78).

Amidst the fears of financial ruin, invasion of England by France and the loss of the American colonies, unease expressed both within and outside parliament about the influence of the Crown recognized that there was widespread concern, most prominently displayed in the petition movement (see later), that Lord North as prime minister was allowing himself to be used by George III (1760-1820) to place in jeopardy the liberties of the English at home. Burke (1935, p.ix) and many others on the opposition benches rejected the Crown's proposition that the American colonies were the king's personal property to do with them as he pleased and, therefore, to take whatever actions he thought necessary. Rather, Burke, among many, could see in the government's ruthless determination to use whatever "barbaric" means were required to ensure that the colonies would not be lost and its refusal to negotiate with the Americans10 who were not infrequently warmly regarded by members of parliament and the nation at large as fellow Englishmen, as opportunities to threaten their own liberties in England (Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies, 22 March 1775, in Burke, 1942, p.91, see also p.96; Morley, 1879/1909, p.87; Baker, 1971, p.248; Thomas, 1976, p.2). Lord Rockingham,11 the leader of the Whig opposition, warned parhament of the "despotism [which]... seemed to pervade all the acts of the present reign ...". The government, he concluded, was using the war in America as:

the plan of extending the influence of the Crown ... blazed forth in all its odious colours; and here it was that that influence, under the impositous pretence of asserting the rights of parliament, was employed to vest the patronage or unlimited sovereignty of all America in the Crown. (Lord Rockingham, Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 8 February 1780, col. 1347)

The Crown, announced Burke, had been allowed by the greatly increased opportunities for corruption provided by the War of Independence to "insinuate itself into every creek and cranny in the kingdom"12 (Burke, Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 15 December 1779, col. 1297; O'Gorman, 1973, p.50; see Burke cited in Magnus, 1939, p.97; Burke 11 February 1776 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, pp.483, 546) and, thereby, threaten the constitution and the liberty of Englishmen (Burke 15 December 1779 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, pp.471,474). Meanwhile Pitt,13 soon to become in December 1783 the youngest prime minister in British history, warned that the country had fallen into "a state of humiliation" that threatened its liberty for there was:

something radically wrong with the constitution ... The house itself had discovered that a secret influence of the Crown was sapping the very foundation of liberty by corruption ... [wjhere if it once got footing ... liberty could no longer find asylum. The house of commons which, according to the true spirit of the constitution should be the guardian of the people's freedom, the constitutional check and control over the executive power, would through influence degenerate into a mere engine of tyranny and oppression to destroy the constitution in effect ... (Parliamentary History, Vol.XXIII, 1782, cols. 829-75, emphasis added)

For Burke the "distinguishing part" of the English constitution was its liberty. To "preserve that liberty inviolate", warned Burke, "seems the particular duty and proper trust of a member of the House of Commons" (Edmund Burke, Speech at Bristol 1774 in Burke, 1942, p.66, see also Burke, 1790 cited in Roberts, 1977, p.59; on the matter of liberty as the essence of the Constitution see also Macaulay, 1907/1966, p.31; John Telwall cited in Ward, 2004, p.186; Burke, A Letter to John Farr and John Harris on the Affairs of America 1777, in Burke, 1942, p.221; Dicey, 1926, p.xxxvii). Indeed, the Act of Settlement in 1701 had sought to reinforce the constitutional relationship between Crown and parliament that had been forged in the Declaration of Right (1689), and later the Bill of Rights, by affirming the need "for the further limitation of the Crown and better securing the rights and liberties of the subjects" (cited in Stephenson and Marcham, 1937, p.610). Protection of this liberty was the sacred, illimitable obligation of those who inherited the benefits of the Revolution and those who were their political representatives (see Lord Shelburne cited in Fitzmaurice, 1912, p.336; Burke, 1935, pp.29-30; Burke cited in Pocock, 1960, p.127).

According to Lord Shelburne, the only security for liberty was a strong, independent and vigilant parliament (Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, February 1780, cols. 1319-1320; also Sir J.P. Clerke in Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 12 February 1779, cols. 124). The constitution would endure only so long as parliamentary sovereignty remained its keystone, but especially in matters of finance (Dicey, 1926, pp.xvii, xviii). Parliament's exclusive authority to grant money was confirmed at regular intervals throughout the eighteenth century. It was never seen by parliament as anything other than:

the great and most important Right of this House ... It is a Right... that never ought to come into doubt; it is a Right which we cannot part with the sole Exercise of, without giving up our own power, with out betraying the Liberties of our constituents. (Speaker Onslow, House of Commons 11 February 1740, cited in Thomas, 1971, p.65)

It was widely believed by 1780 that only extensive economical reform of executive finances and the reform of executive accounts to strengthen accountability could restore the constitutional balance in favour of parliament and, thereby, help to guarantee the liberties of all Englishmen (see Burke 15 December 1779 cited in Elofson and Woods, 19%, pp.471,474). Accordingly, the War of Independence, which had brought to a climax the constitutional concerns emanating from the abuse of patronage associated with the civil list, propelled the country towards the economical reform of executive finances in which the transformation of executive accounting and audit were coincident and essential components.

4. Economical reform and executive accounts

The economical reform movement, popularized by Burke's speech in the House of Commons on the 11 February 1780 (Parliamentary History,Vol.XXl,co\s. 1-73) and that of Charles James Fox at Westminster earlier on 2 February (Derry, 1972, p.94), and the financial crisis precipitated by the loss of the American colonies were to cause parliament to rethink its traditional posture towards executive finances, but especially executive accounting. Burke referred to "people who are hungering and thirsting after substantial reformation ..." (Burke, January 1779 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.467). While maybe not the complete opportunist that his critics accused him of being, Burke was the most prominent petitioner for reform, which increasingly through the late 1770s attracted many passionate advocates Notable was the Duke of Richmond who in late 1779 placed before parliament a motion for 'An Economical Reform of the Civil List Establishment'. Supporting the motion, Burke observed how the rising expense of war resulting in a public expenditure,

was lavish and wasteful to a shameful degree. Oeconomy, the most rigid and exact oeconomy, was become absolutely necessary ... [A]midst the many and various matters that require reformation ... before this country can rise superior to its powerful enemies; the waste of public treasure requires instant remedy ... (Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 7 December 1779, cols. 1257)

Outside Westminster and London the landed gentry and wealthy, yet still disenfranchised, yeomen, upon whom fell the greatest financial burdens during the War of Independence, expressed their mounting displeasure at both the costs of the war and the abuse of the perquisites of public office with the formation of the Association Movement (Cone, 1957 pp.363-7; Guttridge, 1%3, p.116; Baker, 1971, p.248; Cannon, 1973, p.72; Torrance, 1978, p.72; Christie, 1982, pp.135-6,144). Their leader, Rev. Christopher Wyvill, a prominent Yorkshire landowner, referred to the way in which "the national substance is fast waning away by the profusion of expence in this rash and unfortunate war; and the influence of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increased in full proportion to it, is now swollen to a most alarming magnitude" (cited in Harling, 1996, p.34). Thus, the elimination of profligate spending by the Crown would at the same time also remove the means by which the Crown could undermine the authority of parliament. In a pamphlet of 29 November 1779, Wyvill pressed the urgency of preventing the further "enslavement of parhament" by the Crown (cited in Guttridge, 1963, p.116) and warned that "a free Parliament is now, as it has ever been in times of great distress, the only refuge of the Nation..." (cited in Norris, 1%3, p.112; Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 13 March 1780, col. 285). Influence, that is corruption and prodigality, demanded Lord Shelburne, had to be eliminated (Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 15 December 1779, col. 1297).

The success of the economical reforms most famously advocated by Burke in February 178014 was believed at the time by Burke, Pitt and other influential politicians, most notably Charles James Fox, to depend entirely upon a comprehensive, thorough and punctual accounting of all civil list offices to expose the full extent of the corrupting influence of patronage and the cost that this represented to the nation. Although Charles James Fox and Burke differed greatly in temperament and political allegiances, finding themselves on different sides in most matters except opposition to the war in America and the need for economical reform to address the corrupting influence of sinecures, as representatives of a wider change in attitudes towards the corrupting influence of sinecures they both found common ground in the means to secure economical reform (see Deny, 1972, pp.69-70,93-94; Hammond, 1903, pp.43,44 and 46). Should there have been any doubt about parliament's right to insist that the executive give an account of its spending, during debate in the House of Commons in late 1778 Charles James Fox had taken the opportunity to remind the House that "the privilege of this House was certainly to enquire into, and to censure, the conduct of those who were entrusted with the executive power" (cited in Thomas, 1971, p. 15). This had long been Burke's view also; a view expressed well before the outbreak of war with the Americans According to Burke, if the absence of accounts is "suffered to pass unnoticed ... [it] must establish such a fund of rewards and terrors as will make Parliament the best appendage and support for arbitrary power that ever was invented by wit of man" (Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents 1770).

So poor were all executive accounts that, according to Burke, it had never been possible for the Treasury to "make even a tolerable guess" of the government's expenditures in any one year (Burke cited in Cohen, 1%5, p.22; also see Reitan, 1966, p.331). Forcing the executive to account for its expenditures on a regular, yearly basis, urged Lord Shelburne, would encourage economy and help to prevent abuses of the civil list, which threatened the Constitution (Lord Shelburne cited in Fitzmaurice, 1912, p.226). Pulteney, a contemporary of Burke, described an unaccountable civil list as particularly dangerous, "a sharp instrument in the hands of a minister, which may sometime or other be employed in cutting the throat of our constitution" (Pulteney cited in Reitan, 1966, p.321). A healthy constitution would never be possible in the absence of a system of accounts that allowed actual civil list payments to be verified. Accordingly, liberty was seen in the late eighteenth century as substantially dependent upon prompt and regular accounting for all executive expenditures civil and military. Charles James Fox warned that if parhament did not have:

a right to interfere, to reform, arrange, and if necessary, to resume the grants they had made to the Crown for public purposes ... there was at once an end of the liberties of this country ... Give princes and their ministers the exclusive right of disposing of any considerable part of the treasures of the nation without controul or without account; and our liberties from that instant would be gone for ever, (cited in Reitan, 1966, p.333)

Dunning, in the second part of his famous resolution of the 6 April 1780 in support of Burke, was especially concerned about the threats to liberty caused by accounting deficiencies, for military and civil expenditures, when he called upon the House,

to examine into and to correct abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenue, as well as every other branch of the public revenue, whenever it shall appear expedient to the wisdom of this house to do ... [I]f the public money was faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would reduce the influence of the Crown; if, on the other hand, the influence of the Crown was restrained within its natural and constitutional limits, it would at once more restore that power which the constitution had rested in that house- the inquiring into and controlling the expenditure of public money. (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 6 April 1780, col. 367, also col. 691; see also Foord, 1947, p.491)

Ultimately in the case of military accounts it took the political, financial and constitutional perils arising out of four years of war with the Americans to finally convince many prominent members of His Majesty's Opposition that any protections for liberty that government accounts for military expenditures might provide had been substantially dissipated by the poor quality of military accounts15 Annual appropriations and accounts for the military, a major achievement of the settlement that followed the English Revolution, allowed parhament as the sole legal paymaster of the army to determine the funds that left the Exchequer,16 and which then passed into the hands of the executive. However, this provided only a very partial and deceptive constitutional protection, even though the Revolution had brought the army under parliamentary control. Immediately after the revolution, parliament had not appreciated sufficiently that the audit carried out on these accounts did not examine the actual expenditure by the army and navy. Rather, it was an audit of the imprests made from the Exchequer to the departments administering the army and navy (see especially 25 Geo.III. c.52, section XVII). Parliament had no information as to whether these imprests were fully expended and whether they had been used for the purposes approved by parliament. All that parliament knew from the annual audit reports of military expenditures was that issues from the Exchequer to the military departments had not exceeded the total amounts authorized by parliament. Even these faulty protections available for military expenditures were not available for civil list expenditures for, as noted earlier, the accounts of civil list expenditures were neither available on a regular basis nor could parhament compel their production other than when the Crown sought funding beyond the set annual appropriation by parliament. The ignorance of parliament was compounded by the impotence of the Exchequer in enforcing regular and timely accounting for money distributed to officers on the civil list, but especially sinecurists whose accounts were often many years in anears

Many government officials, civil and military, acting as bankers for the government received often very large amounts of money to make payments on behalf of the government (Parliamentary History, Vol.XIX, 22 March 1778, cols 977-8). From these monies they would take the payments due to them for their services and return to government any unused funds after their accounts had been audited and accepted by the Exchequer's auditors on behalf of the Crown and not parliament. Following an ancient statute of Henry III (1207-72) (51 Hen. Ill, c.5) accounts could not be submitted for acquittance, that is final settlement, until officials who had previously held the same position had their accounts settled and received their quietus (acquittance) ("Fourth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 6-9 April 1781, col. 382). Any delay in the settlement of these earlier accounts delayed all subsequent finalization of accounts, to the great financial advantage of many office holders Indeed, there was no incentive to encourage the prompt settlement of accounts or the return of unspent funds. Rather, while ever agents and officers acting as bankers on behalf of the government were entitled to retain any interest that accrued on funds remaining with them there was a significant incentive to avoid the early return of funds or to change the system. According to Burke, who was acknowledged as unusually expert in understanding the complexities of the system of accounting, it was in the interests of these "bankers" to unnecessarily complicate and "distract" the public accounts to delay settlement (see Burke's comments on 11 February 1780 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.497).

So significant were the unremitted balances of public funds remaining in the hands of Lord Holland, Paymaster-General of the Forces between 1757-65, that between 1765 and 1778, when his accounts were finally audited, he received as his right £250,000 in interest (Morley, 1879/1909, p.98; Chester, 1981, pp.170-1). Indeed, Paymasters-General of the Forces had never regarded the public monies with which they had been entrusted as anything other than their own monies An early acquittance would be possible only if the officers who held profitable sinecures, and who were held to be personally responsible while ever the transactions that they had commenced remained incomplete and open in the accounts, were required to surrender all public monies in their possession at the time that they left office rather than the finalization of their accounts remaining consequential upon the acquittance of their predecessors. The extent of these abuses of office and the cost to the nation which the deficiencies in the system of audit and accounting had permitted for generations were finally and fully revealed by the highly critical and detailed reports of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts between 1780 and 1787 (see later).

Delays in settling accounts, both military and civil, were particularly endemic to war when the documents upon which the settlement of accounts depended were too often destroyed or lost in the frenzy of battle many miles beyond England's shores and when accountants were scattered throughout the vastness of the British empire. These problems were to occur to an exaggerated degree during the War of Independence. In many cases, the accounts of the most recent office-holder would not be settled until long after not only their exit from office but also their death, at which time any documents relating to their time in office and monies that they held upon retirement were treated as private property and passed on to their heirs until such time that they were called upon to give an account on behalf of the deceased (for examples see Binney, 1958, p.140).

Crucially, extreme delays in accounting to the Exchequer for civil list expenditures had conveniently obfuscated or hidden abuses associated with patronage and the civil list, thereby allowing the Crown to extend its influence over parliament largely unchecked and unobserved by parhament. Removing most, if not all, of the opportunities for these abuses was to be the abiding significance of subsequent reforms to the public accounts prompted by the reports of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts appointed in 1780 (see Tonance, 1978, p.56).

5. The commissioners for examining the public accounts 1780-7

Lord North, recognizing the level of hostility in the parliament and in the counties towards the government's poor economic performance as it sought to prosecute an unpopular war in the American colonies and the persuasive influence of Burke both within and outside parliament, was eventually forced to appoint a commission of inquiry to examine the state of the public accounts and to recommend to parliament "a more easy mode of keeping the public accounts ..." (Parliamentary History, 2 March 1780, col. 146). North's decision to entrust the audit of executive accounts to seven, purportedly independent, commissioners was immediately criticized by Burke and many others in parliament (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 13 March 1780, col. 280; Letter from Lord Shelburne to County Meeting in Wiltshire, 2 March 1780 cited in Maccoby, 1955, p.305; for the debate over the appointment of Commissioners see Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 1 May 1780, cols 552-70). They saw Lord North's appointment of salaried commissioners, thereby taking the examination of accounts out of the direct hands of parliament, as clearly an attempt to thwart the demands of Burke and Lord Shelburne who in December 1779 had foreshadowed a motion,

That a Committee be appointed, consisting of members of both Houses, possessing neither emolument nor pension, to examine without delay into the public expenditure, and the mode of accounting for the same ... and to take into consideration what savings can be made consistent with public dignity, justice, and gratitude, by an abolition of old or new created offices ... (cited in Norris.1%3, pp.115-6)

By locating investigations of executive accounts outside parliament, North contrived to diffuse the pressure that had been building for constitutional reforms and, thereby, thwart the hopes of the Opposition by ensuring that the achievement of economy became a technical, and not a constitutional, matter of better accounting and improved administrative systems Lord North argued that a commission appointed by the executive, rather than a committee drawn from and answerable to parhament, would have far greater powers to call for papers and to take evidence under oath (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 2 March 1780, col. 146). Whereas a committee of the House would be composed of politicians representing the interests of parhament, a commission would be composed of knowledgeable individuals chosen by the government from outside parhament who would report to the government. In reply, Lord Irnham argued that the inspection of public accounts was the privilege and responsibility of parhament while Burke, during his economical reform speech to parhament, had irately demanded that "[pjarhamentary inquiry is the only mode of obtaining parliamentary information" (Burke 11 February 1780 cited in Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.535). Lord Shelburne also had sought a committee, similar to those convened annually by William III after the Revolution and operating until 1715, consisting of members drawn from both houses of parliament who would receive no payments for their duties, thereby providing some measure of protection of their independence from executive influence (Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 15 December 1779, col. 1293, also 8 February 1780, col. 1331; Foord, 1947, p.491).

Demands for the appointment of a body to monitor public expenditure, but especially the civil list, and the way in which it was accounted for had been gaining momentum since early 1778 when Colonel Barré placed before parliament a "Motion for a Committee to enquire into the Public Expenditure". Barré, like Burke, was convinced that in addition to the government's gross mismanagement of unprecedented levels of taxation to meet the expenses of war, financial difficulties were also a consequence of the poor accounting practices that allowed large amounts of money to remain in the hands of government officials and contractors for very long periods of time. Allowing vast sums of public money to remain in private hands had created a "ruined and distressed nation" that was forced to borrow funds to meet deficiencies that these monies might otherwise help alleviate (Parliamentary History, VoLXIX, 22 March 1778, cols 972-3).

The remit of the Commissioners appointed by Lord North was both financial and administrative; not yet constitutional. This was clearly established in the Act under which the Commissioners were appointed (20 Geo.III, c.54).17 It sought to:

introduce that System of strict Economy in the Administration of the Public Revenue, which the Legislature has ... determined to be necessary. By strict Economy we apprehend, is not meant such as either derogates from the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, or abridges the Servant of the Public of the due Reward of his Industry and Abilities; we mean an Economy that steers between extreme Parsimony on the one Hand, and Profusion on the other; that is confident with Justice as well as Prudence; that gives to all their full Due, and to none more; that supports every useful and necessary Establishment, but cuts off and reduces every superfluous and redundant Expence.

Subsequently, the Commissioners, who produced 15 reports between 1780 and 1787, confirmed in their Fourteenth Report that their aims had been to expose and redress poor economy,18 and to introduce greater regularity and system in government administration, but especially in the accounting for civil list expenditures (see also Tonance, 1978, p.57). Indeed, recognizing the circumstances that precipitated their appointment, the overwhelming preoccupation of the commissioners in their reports was the myriad defects in executive accounting. The Commissioners' Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Reports were especially important for their exposure for the first time of the reasons for the astonishing delays in the surrendering of public monies appropriated to both the civil list and to the military and in the auditing of the public accounts Public monies in the hands of former office holders, demanded the commissioners, must as soon as possible be made available to the public in their time of great financial distress ("Sixth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 11 February 1782, col. 702). This would not occur until the process of discharging the final responsibilities of office was transformed. In one particularly prominent case, disclosed in a later report, as a result of their investigations of the Exchequer, the Commissioners discovered that the accounts of the Pay Offices of the Navy and Army had been £75m in anears for more than 24 years ("Eleventh Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 4-5 December 1783, col. 45).

Despite the doubts expressed initially about the likely value of their work, it was widely agreed that the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts took their responsibilities very seriously, producing reports which,19 according to Binney (1958, p.56), determined the direction and course of subsequent comprehensive financial reform undertaken by Pitt (for similar comments see Cannon, 1973, p.86; Tonance, 1978, p.56). To some extent pre-empting the later findings of the Commissioners, in March 1780 the North Government had little choice but to legislate to remedy the problems that the Commissioners had very quickly confirmed and reported (see 22 Geo.III, c.48; 22 Geo.III, c.81; Keir, 1934, pp.382-3). Accordingly, on the 13 March 1780 Lord North introduced a Bill to compel payment of outstanding balances in the hands of government bankers and agents and, significantly, to inform the House and the pubhc as to "the real state of the accounts of the kingdom, that the nation might be informed how and in what manner the enormous sums which had been granted by parhament have been disposed of..." (Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 13 March 1780, col. 278). Less than a month earlier Burke similarly had called upon the government to legislate so as to deny government agents the ability to act as bankers or treasurers and to make them instead "mere offices of administration" and account (Burke cited in Elofson and Woods, 19%, p.521, emphasis in the original; for similar sentiments see also the "Fifth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Pubhc Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 28 November 1781, col. 577). North's subsequent 1781 Act (22 Geo.HI, c.48)20 precluded the worst excesses of the system of delayed acquittances by finally requiring any civilian or military official in possession of unspent balances of pubhc monies to surrender these to the Exchequer at the time they left office. In future, paymasters and others responsible for paying government monies would act as accountants on behalf of the Exchequer and not as bankers with private accounts with the Exchequer into which money appropriated by parhament had been paid.

The provisions noted earlier were later extended and strengthened in 1782, once Burke was in government, with 22 Geo.III, c.81,21 and the Civil Establishments Act (22 Geo.III, c.82),22 which Reitan (1966, p.335) describes as the Act that finally ended the struggle between parliament and the executive for control of finance. These initial reform Acts were replaced in 1783 by the more effective legislative requirements of 23 Geo.III, c.50,23 which required that all monies would be firstly paid into accounts at the Bank of England from which the paymasters would draw funds and which would be controlled by the Exchequer. Meanwhile, the reforms to the civil list allowed by Burke's 1782 Act saw the influence of the Crown appreciably weakened and that of parliament strengthened (Reitan, 1966, p.318). Burke's Civil Establishments Act,24 which saw the abolition of 134 offices in the royal household, was later followed in 1783 by Lord Shelburne's abolition of a further 144 sinecures (23 Geo.III, c.82). This process was greatly accelerated by Pitt's administrative reforms in 1789 and 1798, while sinecures were further progressively reduced throughout the nineteenth century by legislation such as 47 Geo.III. sessi, c.12,48 Geo.III. c.9 and 51 Geo.III. c.71.25

Of the sinecures that attracted the severest criticism by the Commissioners, the Auditors of the Imprest figured prominently. As part of their attack on the Auditors of the Imprests, in their Twelfth and Thirteenth Reports the Commissioners for Examining the Pubhc Accounts urged the reformation of these offices in which "the Service of the Presiding Officer bears no Proportion to the Magnitude of his Profits". They found that between 1745 and 1781 all work of the Auditors of the Imprests had been conducted by their deputies (Twelfth Report, Journals of the House of Commons, 11 June 1784, col. 123; Thirteenth Report, Journals of the House of Commons, 21 March 1785, col. 665). The Commissioners were not,

able to discover ... any solid Advantage derived to the Public from the Examination given to ... [the public accounts] by the Auditor of Imprests, and, for that Reason, we have suggested the Propriety of exempting them from his Jurisdiction, and the urgent Necessity of relieving the Nation from so heavy, and, to all Appearance, so unnecessary an Expence. (cited in Cohen, 1965, p.37)

The stinging rebuke of the Exchequer's Auditors of the Imprests by the Commissioners finally led in 1785 to the appointment of five permanent Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts to take over the duties and powers of the Auditors of the Imprests (see 25 Geo.III c.52, sections VIII, XI, XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXI). The Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts had given Pitt little choice but to reform audit. Together with their office, to be known as the Board of Audit,26 the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts were to implement a "more effectual method ... for examining the public accounts of the kingdom, and for preventing ... all delays, frauds, and abuses, in delivering in and passing" the accounts (Preamble to 25 Geo. Ill, c.52). Unlike the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts, whose tenure in office required confirmation each year with a new Act of parliament, the new Commissioners of Audit were established as a permanent office. Although the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts were appointed by the executive and the audits they performed were not carried out on behalf of parliament, the executive was now required to regularly declare accounts of all executive spending to which parliament had access The foundations were now in place for the nineteenth-century audit reforms of Sir James Graham and William Gladstone that marked the final consummation of the modern era of public sector audit (Funnell, 1994).

6. Conclusion

Accounting and audit on a charge-discharge basis, which was conducted by the executive for the purposes of the executive, has a very long history in England. In contrast, government audit and accounting that have a constitutional intent, that is a means by which a parliament jealous of its hard won constitutional supremacy could protect its position as the bulwark against the historical tendency of the executive to encroach upon the hberty of Englishmen, has been shown to be a much more recent phenomenon. Not until after the Revolution in 1688 was an annual accounting for mihtary expenditures accepted as fundamental to the preservation of the liberties that had been the object of both civil war and revolution.

It was not the original intention of the accounting reforms as part of the settlement in 1689 that executive accounts for military spending would be anything other than the means to provide constitutional protections for the nation, through its representatives in parhament, from monarchies intent on using executive powers to retrieve authority and freedoms lost to parhament. Any other purposes that accounts might serve must always be secondary to their immanent constitutional role. A similar level of parliamentary concern, however, did not extend to spending by the Crown on matters that constituted the civil list. The omission of the civil list from parliamentary surveillance after the Revolution perpetuated a constitutional tension between the Crown's executive powers and parliament's legislative supremacy, which reached its climax during the War of Independence (Reitan, 1966, p.318). The mihtary humiliations suffered by the English in the American War of Independence and the rapidly rising costs of its prolongation awoke parhament to serious flaws in government accounts, but especially the civil list accounts The opportunities that these defects in accounting allowed the Crown to exercise patronage unhindered by the intrusions of parliament threatened parliament's independence and authority and, therefore, the liberty of all. These deficiencies in executive accounts, which were finally catalogued by the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts, prompted reform of the civil list accounts and the management of the civil list, which overturned centuries of resilient, embedded practices that had nothing to commend them beyond their standing as custom and the powerful vested interests that they served. In particular, the gradual disappearance of the corrupting influence of the Crown in parliament, especially after Burke's reforms in 1782, created a fundamental change in the constitution whereby the last remnants of constitutional antagonism to parliament's sovereignty in financial matters were finally removed. This change was entirely dependent upon the regular, controlled declaration of accounts by the executive.

Notes

1. To reflect contemporary preferences in the eighteenth century, throughout the article "England" and "English" are used in preference to "Britain" and "British". Numerous examples are contained in the article where contemporaries at the time prefened to see themselves as English. Englishness was still the dominant identity, not being British.

2. Burke was a member of parliament between 1766 until 1794, firstly as MP for Wendover and then in 1774 the MP for Bristol, a seat that he lost in 1780 after which he was elected as MP for Malton. For a particularly acerbic opinion of Burke's qualities as a politician see Horace Walpole, a contemporary of Burke, cited in Hodgart (1963, pp.172-3).

3. It is probably wise to remember that Burke, while he may have had a reputation for honesty, selflessness and loyalty, was a seasoned politician who was not above using prominent political issues such as economical reform to further his own standing. Indeed, the way in which Burke and others successfully relocated the force of the Association Movement to London was seen at the time as a politically astute move to take full advantage of rising public support. Charles Fox was well known for his political opportunism. Ehrman (1969, p.64) refers to Fox's "hunger for office", an impatience that he was not prepared to hide. George III believed that Fox had no principles.

4. For a discussion of the 'dignified' and the 'efficient' parts of the English Constitution see Dicey (1926).

5. For a detailed list of the various officers who depended upon the King for their maintenance (de procurationibus) see Liber Niger Scoccarti (Bfock Book of the Exchequer) cited in Stephenson and Marcham (1937, pp.65-70).

6. After a request for additional funding in 1760, a consequence of the Seven Years War then in progress, this opportunity again arose in 1777 during the War of Independence.

7 Although the term "civil service" was used in the late eighteenth century, Wright argues it was only with the appearance of pubhc offices with uniform conditions of service and appointment from the mid-nineteenth century that the civil service began to assume its modern form (Wright, 1969, pp.xxiii-xxiv; Chester, 1981, Preface; Report from the Commissioners on Fees and Gratuities, BPP, 1806, VII, p.51). Cohen (1965, pp.47,51) suggests that it was the introduction of a system of audit in the late eighteenth century to provide regular information to parhament that was the 'necessary prelude' to the development of the modern civil service.

8. The Paymaster General, a senior government official first appointed in 1662, was the army's banker. He received from the Exchequer money voted by government for military purposes and used this to meet military expenditures.

9. Lord North was Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1775 and 1782.

10. Not until the sunender of General Cornwalhs and his army to the American forces in October 1781 did the government finally grasp that the war was effectively over for the English. On 27 February 1782, with the public alienated from Lord North's administration by their incompetent mihtary and financial management of war, a motion was passed in the House of Commons to end the war and to seek peace (Keir, 1934, p.368; Plumb, 1%3, p.137).

11. On the 20 March 1782 Lord North resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Lord Rockingham on 27 March, after 16 years in opposition. He held office very briefly until his death on 1 July 1782, when he was replaced until February 1783 by Lord Shelburne, a favourite of the king, who held government for three brief months before being replaced by the Fox-North coalition with the Duke of Portland as Prime Minister, whose grasp on government was to be similarly tenuous when it was dismissed in December 1783 in favour of William Pitt. He remained in office until 1804 (Lucas 1913, pp.143,154; Keir, 1934, p.374; Binney, 1958, pp.266-8).

12. Irrespective of Burke's dismissal of patronage as a constitutional evil, Foord (1947, p.484) and Harling (19%, p. 15) have suggested that at a time when governments were weak it may have been that the use of patronage to buy influence provided the only sure means available to governments to secure the majorities that they needed in parliament to implement their policies Unfortunately, complained Horace Walpole (1717-97), George III had used the patronage available to him to "buy dear the most worthless" (Hodgart, 1963, p.235). In the absence of strong political parties that could discipline their members to ensure that they supported government decisions, it was accepted by even the most radical critics of Lord North's Government and of George III that the use of patronage, whether the awarding of profitable offices, titles or contracts to supply the army and navy, provided the means by which some certainty could be injected into the business of government.

13. William Pitt, most often refened to as Pitt the younger to distinguish him from his equally famous prime minister father, became prime minister at the age of 24. He remained at 10 Downing Street for the next 19 years during which he was responsible for concluding peace with the Americans protecting England from the influences of the French Revolution and preparing England for the rising threat of an ascendant France under Napoleon (see Hague, 2004).

14. A highly detailed program of reform was found in Burke's "Bill for the better Regulation of His Majesty's Civil Establishments, and of certain Public Offices; for the limitation of Pensions and the Suppression of sundry useless expensive, and inconvenient Places; and for applying the saved Monies thereby to the Pubhc Service" (Parliamentary History,,VoIJCXI, 23 February 1780, col. Ill; for debate on the bill see Parliamentary History, VoLXXI, 18,23 and 25 June 1780, cols 115,121,134,714).

15. The Bill of Rights in 1689 provided that:

the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of parliament is illegal;... that levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative without grant of parliament, for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal;... that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against the law.

The prescription against maintaining a standing army without the consent of parliament is also repeated in the Mutiny Act 1689.

16. The Exchequer was composed of the Upper Exchequer, or the Exchequer of Account, which was responsible for ensuring the accountability of the executive, and the Lower Exchequer or the Exchequer of Receipt.

17. "An Act for appointing and enabling commissioners to examine, take, and state the public accounts of the kingdom; and to report what balances are in the hands of accountants which may be applied to the publick service; and what defects there are in the present mode of receiving, collecting, issuing, and accounting for publick money".

18. It was "no mark of wisdom", noted the Commissioners "even in an opulent Nation, to lavish the Public Treasure in Expences unprofitable to the State" ("Fourteenth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts", Journals of the House of Commons, 26-27 January 1786, col. 23). Proclaiming both the condition of the nation's finances and affirming the demands of the movement of economical reform, the Commissioners had earlier urged that "every Reason of Prudence demands the Reduction of ... Emoluments from an Excess to a reasonable limited standard" (Sixth Report, Journals of the House of Commons, 11 February 1782, cols 711,712).

19. Most of the reports from the Commissioners were written by Thomas Anguish who, prior to his appointment as a Commissioner, had been the AccountantGeneral of the Court of Chancery.

20. "An act to direct the payment into the exchequer of the respective balances remaining in the hands of the several persons therein named, for the use and benefit of the publick; and for indemnifying the said respective persons and their representatives in respect of such payments and against all future claims relating thereto; and for other purposes therein mentioned."

21. "An act for the better regulation of the office of paymaster general of his Majesty's forces"

22. An "act for enabling his Majesty to discharge the debt contracted upon his civil list revenues; and for preventing the same from being in anear for the future, by regulating the mode of payments out of the said revenues and by suppressing or regulating certain offices herein mentioned, which are now paid out of the revenues of the civil list."

23. "An Act for the better regulation of the office of the paymaster general of his Majesty's forces, and the more regular payment of the army; and to repeal an act made in the last session of parliament."

24. Burke, when Paymaster-General of the Forces in the Fox-North Government, was also responsible for stopping the corrupt abuse of this very profitable office even though he could have benefited greatly.

25. The Select Committee on Sinecure Offices in 1810 found 250 sinecures still in operation while in 1834 there remained only 108 to be removed (Chester, 1981, p.129; "Report from the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices", BPP, 1834, VI, p.347). Not until 1834 could ministries be said to enjoy substantive independence from the Crown.

26. The reform momentum was still evident a decade later when in 1797 parhament appointed a Select Committee on Finance which had produced 36 influential reports by the time it was disbanded in 1803. It was followed between 1807-12 by the Select Committee on Pubhc Expenditure which produced 13 reports and between 1817 and 1819 another Select Committee on Finance which produced 11 effective reports.

References

Baker, N. (1971), Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and War Supplies 1775-1783, London: The Athlone Press.

Bentham, J. (1776/2001), A Fragment on Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Binney, J. (1958), British Public Finance and Administration, 1774-92, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Blackstone, W (1758/1803), Blackstone's Commentaries, VoLI, PhUadelphia, PA: WilUam Young Birch.

Burke, E. (1780), Speech on presenting to the House of Commons a Plan for the Better security of the Independence of Parhament, and the Oeconomical Reformation of the Civil and Other Establishments House of Commons H February 1780.

Burke, E. (1935), Reflections on the French Revolution, London: J.M. Dent and Sons

Burke, E. (1942), Speeches and Letters on American Affairs, London: J.M. Dent and Sons

Burke, E. (19%), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: Volume III, Party, Parliament, and the American War 1774-1780, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Cannon, J. (1973), Parliamentary Reform 1640-1832, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chester, N. (1981), The English Administrative System 1780-1870, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Christie, I. (1962), Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform: The Parliamentary Reform Movement in British Politics 1760-1785, London: Macmillan and Co.

Christie, I. (1982), Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760-1815, London: Edward Arnold.

Clode, C. (1869), The Military Forces of the Crown; Their Administration and Government, VoIsI1II, London: John Munay.

Cobban, A. (1960), Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Cohen, E. (1965), The Growth of the British Civil Service 1780-1939, London: Frank Cass and Co.

Cone, C. (1957), Burke and the Nature of Politics: The Age of the American Revolution, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Cromwell, V (1968), "The Losing of the Initiative by the House of Commons", Royal Historical Society Transactions, Fifth Series, Vol.18, pp.1-25.

Derry, J. (1972), Charles James Fox, London: B.T. Batsford.

Dicey, A.V. (1926), Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London: Macmillan and Co.

Edwards J.R., Coombs H.M. and Greener, H.T. (2002), "British Central Government and 'The Mercantile System of Double Entry' Bookkeeping: A Study of Ideological Conflict", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.27, No.7, pp.637-58.

Ehrman, I (1%9), Cabinet Government and War 1890-1940, London: Archon Books

Elofson, W. and Woods, J. (eds) (19%), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume III, 1774-1780, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Fitzmaurice, Lord (1912), Life of William Earl of Shelburne: Volume II, 1776-1805, London: Macmillan and Co.

Fleischman, R. and Macve, R. (2002), "Coals from Newcastle: Alternative Histories of Cost and Management Accounting in Northeast Coal Mining during the British Industrial Revolution", Accounting and Business Research,Vo\.32, No.3, pp.133-52.

Fleischman, R. and Parker, L. (1990), "Managerial Accounting Early in the British Industrial Revolution:The Canon Company, a case Study", Accounting and Business Research, Vol.20, No.79, pp.211-21.

Fleischman, R. and Parker, L. (1991),"British Entrepreneurs and Pre-Industrial Revolution Evidence of Cost Management", The Accounting Review, Vol.66, No.8, pp.361-75.

Foord, A. (1947), "The Waning of The Influence of the Crown", The English Historical Review, Vol.62, No.245, pp.484-507.

Funnell, W (1994), "Independence and the State Auditor in Britain: Constitutional Keystone or A case of Reified Imagery", ABACUS, Vol.30, No.2, September, pp.175-95.

Funnell, W. (1996), "Why 1866?: Historical Notes on the Passage of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act", ABACUS, Vol.32, No.l, pp.102-10.

Funnell, W (2004), "Victorian Parsimony and the Early Champions of Modern Public Sector Audit", Accounting History, Vol.9, No.l, March, pp.25-60.

Gunn, J. (1974), "Influence, Parties and the Constitution: Changing Attitudes 1783-1832", The Historical Journal, VoLXVII, No.2, pp.301-28.

Guttridge, G. (1963), English Whiggism and the American Revolution, Berkeley: University of California Press

Hague, W. (2004), William Pitt the Younger, London: Harper Collins

Hammond, J. (1903), Charles James Fox: A Political Study, London: Methuen & Co.

Harling, P. (1996), The Waning of "Old Corruption": The Politics of Economic Reform in Britain 1779-1846, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Hodgart, M. (1%3), Horace Walpole: Memoirs and Portraits, London: B.T. Batsford Ltd.

Hoskin, K. and Macve, R. (2000), "Knowing More as Knowing Less?: Alternative Histories of Cost and Management Accounting in the U.S. and the U.K.", Accounting Historians Journal, Vol.27, No.l, pp.91-149.

House of Commons Journals of the House of Commons, Volumes xxxviii (1780-82), xxxix (1782-4), xl (1784-5), xli (1786), xlii (1787).

Johnson, H. and Kaplan, R. (1987), Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press

Keir, D. (1934), "Economical Reform 1779-1787", Law Quarterly Review, VoLL, pp.368-95.

Lucas R. (1913), Lord North 1732-1792, London: Arthur L. Humphreys

Macaulay.T.B. (1907/1966), Critical and Historical Essays, VoLI, London: Dent.

Maccoby, S. (1955), English Radicalism 1762-1785, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Magnus P- (1939), Edmund Burke: A Life, London: John Munay.

Marshall, D. (1963), Eighteenth Century England, London: Longmans.

Morley, J. (1879/1909) Burke, London: Macmillan and Co.

Norris, I (1963), Shelburne and Reform, London: Macmillan and Co.

O'Gorman, F. (1973), Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Parker, C. (1907), Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, London: John Munay.

Parnell, H. (1830), Financial Reform, London: John Munay.

Plumb, I (1%3), England in the Eighteenth Century 1714-1815, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Pocock, J. (1960), "Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas", The Historical Journal, VoLIII, No.2, pp.125-43.

Porritt, E. (1903/1963), The Unreformed House of Commons; Parliamentary Representation Before 1832, New York: Augustus M. Kelley.

Prior, J. (1839), Memoir of the Life and Character of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, London: H. and E. Sheffield.

Reitan, E. (1966), "The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown", The Historical Journal, Vol.YX, No.3, pp.318-37.

Roberts C. (1977), "The Constitutional Significance of the Financial Settlement of 1690", The Historical Journal, Vol.20, No.l, pp.59-76.

Rose, J. (1914), Pitt and the Great War, London: Bell.

Stephenson, C and Marcham, F. (1937), Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from A.D.600 to the Present, New York: Harper & Brothers

Thomas, P. (1971), The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Thomas, P. (1976), Lord North, London: Allen Lane.

Tonance, J. (1978), "Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation: The Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts 1780-1787", Past and Present, No.78, pp.56-81.

Ward, I. (2004), The English Constitution: Myths and Realities, Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Wright, M. (1%9), Treasury Control of the Civil Service 1854-1874, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments but especially for the additional insights they provided from their detailed knowledge of the period examined in the paper.

Warwick Funnell

University of Wollongong

Address for correspondence: Warwick Funnell, Kent University Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7PE, UK. E-mail: w.n.funnell@kent.ac.uk