prudent prosecutor, The

is important to note here that these claims were on their face quite implausible and that the great majority of management level prosecutors reject them. In most offices, the idea of supervisory review is accepted in principle, but only a few of our districts seriously implement it.162

The goal of training and supervision is to develop good individual judgment so that prosecutors will make fewer mistakes. It remains difficult to implement good training procedures absent a concept of individual judgment.

C. JUDGMENT

A discretionary system requires good judgment from individual prosecutors. Discretion has two components: accuracy and judgment. Accuracy is the ability to process information, decide what actually happened, and determine what can be proved in court. For example, if a prosecutor misinterprets a forensic report and charges a person for murder based on that mistake, it is an error in accuracy, not judgment. Judgment is the ability to prosecute the most important cases. In other words, assuming the prosecutor's view of the situation is correct, was the decision either to charge or not to charge the correct one?163

Good training and supervision may enhance accuracy, but can they form good judgment? "We have little real notion of what mix of backgrounds, credentials, advancement patterns, skills, and temperaments works well to produce effective prosecutors under the traditional adversarial model, and still less whether the same blend functions as well where the prosecutor increasingly serves a quasi-judicial role."164 If the discretion of the individual prosecutor plays such an enormous role in our criminal justice system, then we need a "real notion" of good judgment.

Authors who envision a "virtuous prosecutor" suggest a moral component to the prosecutor's task. Professor Fisher's virtuous prosecutor possesses "great discretionary power" that "demands a high level of individual moral responsibility."167 Fisher was skeptical about the ability of rules and guidelines to solve the problem of discretion.168 Instead, he thought that prosecutors' offices should hire individuals who are willing to learn how to do justice. "[I]f competent prosecution demands the integration of personal values and professional skills, then prosecution agencies must encourage prosecutors to reunite their personal and professional selves, which many learned to separate as students. The question is how to do this."169

In contrast, Professor Uviller's virtuous prosecutor does not emphasize his personal morality. Although the prosecutor must learn "[t]o refine the ethical ingredient in the use of discretion,"170 this ethical ingredient is not the personal morality of the prosecutor but the morality of the people he serves.

self-appointed custodian of community morality, impelled by personal distaste generated by his own values. I do not suggest that the honorable prosecutor be the slave of his electorate. Indeed, in many matters his duty clearly lies in the defiance of community pressures. But, within the confines of law, I would rather see his discretion guided by an honest effort to discern public needs and community concerns than by personal pique or moralistic impertinence.171