prudent prosecutor, The

CONCLUSION

person who shows discretion is one who manifests good, sound, careful, or wise judgment in practical, and particularly interpersonal, affairs."216

Everyone praises good judgment. Discussions of prosecutorial discretion, however, show much confusion about what it is, and what mix of moral and legal reasoning enhances it. In this Article I have argued that substantive moral judgment is not the core of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion requires public moral judgment, a judgment rooted in prosecutorial practice and experience. Prosecutorial discretion is not the same as moral discretion; prosecutors should not be moral entrepreneurs who make discretionary decisions according to their own substantive theories of justice. Their legal role does not permit unfettered moral discretion.

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN*

* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D. Yale University. I am grateful to Kathleen Clark, Adam Rosman, Gerard Lynch, Mark Strasser, Tom Grey, Bob Drinan, Mitt Regan, Bernadette Sargeant, Abbe Smith, and Jerry Uelmen for their help in developing the argument presented in this Article, and to the organizers of the conference, including Brian Buescher, Dennis Taylor, and John Phillips. Nadine Matta provided excellent research assistance.

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