When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale

Journal of Law and Education, Apr 2001 by Johnston, Bill J, Pepper, Kaye

WHEN SCHOOLS COMPLETE: A CAUTIONARY TALE. Edward B. Fiske and Helen F. Ladd. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2000. 342 pages.

Reviewed by Bill J. Johnston* and Kaye Pepper***

Educators in the United States, as in other countries, are constantly searching for the most effective means of educating our nation's children. Many states have begun to experiment with site-based management, voucher systems, charter schools, and even corporate run schools. These approaches to improving education are primarily based on the presumed benefits of market-based competition. To date, there has been little concrete evidence about the effectiveness of these types of competitive approaches. When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale by American authors Edward B. Fiske and HelenFLadd, becomes one of the first national studies on market based school reform. This book provides a detailed data-based analysis of New Zealand's nationwide change from a state run education system to locally run schools using market principles in the delivery of public education. Moreover, because of the cultural similarities with the U.S. and other English speaking countries, the experience of New Zealand is particularly important for providing U.S. policymakers with insights and lessons to consider as they gauge the merits of market-based education reforms.

Following extensive review of existing literature on school reform, Fiske and Ladd spent five months in New Zealand studying the effects of Tomorrow's Schools. The Ministry of Education, as well as other sources, supplied documents for collection of data in the New Zealand study. These documents included analysis of data on annual school enrollments, funding for schools, the socioeconomic characteristics of students by school as well as censuses of population and housing, and test results by school on school-leaving exams. Visits to primary and secondary schools were made to observe classes, attend board of trustee meetings and open houses for prospective students, and talk with principals, teachers, parents, board members, and others about how they were affected with regard to the reforms. Finally, interviews with senior officials of the Ministry of Education, legislators, and leaders of unions and other professional educational associations were conducted to broaden the understanding of the nature of the reform and of the reform process.

Results of the Tomorrow's School reform initiative are instructive and reveal both positive and negative outcomes. The Ministry of Education's initiative in outlining the intended mission for the schools and clearly outlining expected curricular standards was generally perceived as positive. In addition, most educators appreciate their increased flexibility and autonomy to establish their own managerial, operational, and instructional programs. If the intention of this study is to inform the debate over market based educational reform strategies, these findings are noteworthy but not particularly instructive. There is well-established research literature to indicate that when educators are provided a clear indication of what is intended of them, and are then provided the flexibility and autonomy to determine the means of goal attainment that they wish to employ, they are likely to report higher levels of job satisfaction. In addition, student performance outcomes are likely to rise. Likewise when students and parents are allowed to participate in selection of a school and program then they tend to report higher levels of satisfaction with the school. What tends to be forgotten in the debate about choice, hover, is that these findings were originally associated with public school magnet programs of the 1970s. Moreover, the degree of parent, student, and teacher satisfaction typically associated with magnet vs. charter school vs. voucher based arrangements is not substantially different. The issue is not whether there are benefits associated with flexibility, autonomy and choice; that has been clearly established. The issue is whether there are unintended negative consequences associated with one or another of these choice strategies. And it is upon this point that the Fiske and Ladd study is very instructive.

When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale reveals that New Zealand's schools have become more stratified on the basis of ethnic minority status and SES. A unique feature of the New Zealand data set is that it allowed division of schools into deciles on the basis of minority ethnic status and various indicators of SES (household crowding, education, occupation, income). "High" decile schools are associated with student populations of the majority ethnic group and more privileged SES background. These schools also tend to score higher on most assessment indicators used by the ERO. Indeed Fiske and Ladd report that parents appear to be using such indicators as a proxy for academic quality, especially in the absence of test data. Following publication of annual ERO school reports there was increased competition among students to gain admission to high decile schools. In a perversion of the original intention of the market mechanism, however, the competition shifts to students for entry to high decile schools, not competition among schools to attract students. Schools serving more privileged student populations are able to preserve their privilege by selective admissions. One ranking educational official is reported to have said, we are not serving as many as 30% of our (less privileged) students. Moreover, as the level of school stratification increases so too it appears does the performance gap. The market-based choice strategy as revealed in New Zealand is contributing to the concentration and separation of privilege and peril.