Changing Media in a Changing Society

Demokratizatsiya, Fall 2003 by Vihalemm, Peeter

Changes in Estonian society have been very fast and radical, compared to other post-Communist countries. The political climate of the 1990s in Estonia was formed by expectations of success. Even the growing disappointment and dissatisfaction with the outcomes of some reforms among many social groups could not deflate the general atmosphere of optimism (Rose 2000).

Changes in society soon influenced changes in the media. Along with the rapid shift towards an open-market economy, Estonia's media was overwhelmed by farreaching liberalization that started in the early 1990s. But what was the role of media in societal changes?

This article examines the development of the Estonian media during the last fifteen years from within the context of societal changes. We can assume that the role of the media during historical ruptures, deep changes in the whole social order, had to be different compared to the media in "normal," stable societies. On the other hand, changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and after could not have been the same without direct involvement of the media. The present article observes changes in the media during four stages of Estonia's post-Communist development: 1. political breakthrough (1987-91); 2. radical political and economic reforms (1991-94); 3. stabilization (1995-99); and 4. social crisis and search for a new consensus (2000-02) (a detailed analysis of these periods appears in Lauristin and Vihalemin 1997 and 2002).

The First Stage: Media as a Tool for Mass Mobilization

At the start of Gorbachev's reform policy, Estonian society as a whole and the media in particular were comparatively slow in beginning change. For example, media coverage of the first mass protest meeting against the Soviet regime in Tallinn in August 1987, on the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was consistent with the style of Soviet propaganda. The media declared that the Estonian people did not support the meeting; it was labeled as a provocation inspired by the Voice of America and Western secret services. The speed of changes during the following years was striking, in contrast to the slow start. Two years later on the same occasion, the Baltic popular fronts organized a six-hundred-kilometer human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius. This event not only was broadcasted directly by all radio and TV channels in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but it also was managed with the assistance of the media.

During the first period of transition, the Estonian media played an important, even decisive, role in the formation and performance of the national mass movements. The media was the most important social mechanism used for the political breakthrough. Ironically, the Leninist concept of the media as a "collective propagandist and organizer of masses" was implemented in full against the regime created by the Communist Party. During the period of glasnost, when a multi-party system did not yet exist and the underground centers were weak, the media was the main mechanism of social legitimization and mass mobilization (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1993; Paasilinna 1995; Lauristin 1998; Tapinas 1998). The structures of the public sphere that emerged in connection with the massive popular movements in 1988 and 1989 in the Baltic countries were created with the help of the media and functioned through the media. This was facilitated by journalists who felt themselves involved in revolutionary changes. National media became a network supporting the growing political activity of people. In a two-or three-month period from April to June 1988, rapidly emerging liberation movements used the media for coverage of meetings, publication of manifestos and declarations, and disclosure of the atrocities committed by the Communist regime. The changed nature of the media encouraged people to openly express their views and aspirations, overcoming the "double-thinking." Although the institution of censorship was not formally abolished until September 1990, the policy of glasnost prevented direct interference with the media's activities.

Surveys from these years show an astonishing level of media exposure. According to a survey conducted by the Department of Journalism at Tartu University, an average Estonian in 1990 read twelve newspapers and magazines regularly. The 1989-90 period was the peak of press exposure for Estonians. Three national dailies with circulations of 150,000-200,000 each, a cultural weekly with a circulation of 90,000, a women's magazine with a circulation of 225,000, and so on were published for a market of less than one million Estonians (Hoyer, Lauk, and Vihalemm 1993: 343-347). In the years 1988-1990, the total number of periodicals increased by 3.7 times and their total circulation doubled. Most of the new periodicals were irregular, however-small publications published by different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities.

The "movements' press" replaced the old Soviet model of the "Party press," but both presumed the active involvement of journalists as advocates of politically dominating forces. At the beginning of 1990, the political plurality of the media grew remarkably. On the Estonian political scene, the Estonian Citizens committees, the second most powerful nationalist movement at the time, emerged on the Estonian political scene. It competed with the Popular Front for popular support. The Estonian media was no longer influenced and controlled by a single oppositional political force, the Popular Front, as it was during the Singing Revolution in 1988-89. Competition between the two models of liberation movements created a space for political distinctions not only between "the red" and "the white" or for and against the Soviets. People acquired an opportunity for more rational choices between more radical and more moderate political options. The availability of choice between equally popular and legitimate alternatives also gave more freedom to the media. This was the main reason why the emancipation of journalists from direct political partisanship in Estonia succeeded earlier than in many other post-Communist countries. To avoid direct political engagement by the competing movements, the major newspapers declared their political autonomy in 1990.