Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism under Putin

Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2005 by Ross, Cameron

Although Putin has been able to influence the selection of new delegates in some federal districts, we have witnessed the unforeseen selection of outgoing governors or deputy governors. Legislative chairs have also selected former high-ranking members of their assemblies as their representatives. Thus, by the end of January 2002, twenty-three former governors and fifteen former regional speakers had been appointed to the council.38 And in other cases, regions have chosen Moscow insiders or high-ranking entrepreneurs. Indeed, Muscovites now make up more than 70 percent of the membership of the upper chamber.

The Federation Council has also witnessed a very high turnover of members, with 131 of the 178 members changing hands since January 2002. Such developments have undermined one of the basic prerequisites for a federation, namely what Preston King calls "the legislative entrenchment" of federal subjects in central decision-making.39 The formation of a powerful pro-Putin group, Federatsiya, in the council, and the election on Decembers, 2001, of Putin's choice of speaker (Sergei Mironov), have also seriously weakened the independence of the upper chamber.

Putin has now created a much more compliant and passive council that is now there primarily to do the president's bidding. As Corwin notes, the upper chamber has become "a kind of legislative conveyor belt. All bills, even bills that directly infringe upon regional interests, are quickly considered and approved."40 For example, in the summer of 2002, deputies supported changes to the law on the police, which rescinded the governor's powers of appointment of top regional law-enforcement officials.

3. The State Council

To sweeten the pill, and to partially compensate the regional elite for their loss of membership in the Federation Council, on September 1, 2000, Putin created a new presidential advisory body-the State Council.41 The new body, which is made up of all of the chief executives from the regions, meets once every three months and is chaired by the president. There is also an inner presidium made up of seven governors (one from each of the federal districts), whose membership rotates each six months. The members of the presidium meet with the president once every month.

However, neither the State Council nor its presidium is likely to have real powers. The new body is purely consultative and has no law-making functions. Moreover, as it was drawn up by presidential decree, the president may similarly dissolve it. Its main aim at present is to give the regional leaders a direct channel to the president and some limited input into policymaking.

4. Dismissal of Governors and Dissolution of Regional Legislatures

The fourth major reform struck at the very heart of the regions' power structures-a new law giving Putin powers to dismiss popularly elected governors and to dissolve regional assemblies.42 As Putin explained, this legislation makes it possible for federal intervention "in situations in which government bodies at the local level [have flouted] the Russian Constitution and federal laws, violating the uniform rights and freedoms of Russian citizens."43 The new law gives both chambers of the legislature, the general procurator, and the regional legislatures the right to recommend that a governor be removed. However, as Corwin notes, the process is so long and involved that regional leaders would have to demonstrate "unprecedented obstinacy, audacity, and even stupidity" before they could be fired. For a regional head to be dismissed,