Victim of a "War of Ideologies": Azerbaijan after the Russia-Georgia War

Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2009 by Valiyev, Anar

Abstract: The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia affected many of the Commonwealth of Independent States' domestic politics, including Azerbaijan's. The war significantly changed Azerbaijanis' perceptions of the democratic West and negatively impacted their perceptions of the United States and the European Union. Meanwhile, the war forced Azerbaijan to strengthen its security measures, for fear political instability. More important, the crisis was portrayed as a "war of ideologies" between the Moscow-backed sovereign democracy and the U.S.-backed unmanaged democracy in Azerbaijan. Georgia's defeat and the subsequent political turmoil demonstrated the viability and stability of the sovereign democracy and made the Russian model of governance more attractive to the people of Azerbaijan.

Keywords: Abu-Bakr mosque, Azerbaijan, Five-Day War, Karabakh conflict, military doctrine, public perception

The five-day war between Russia and Georgia dramatically changed the political situation in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan was not directly involved in the conflict, the war nevertheless forced Baku to reevaluate its foreign and domestic policies. Moscow's successful military intervention in Georgia forced Azerbaijan to distance itself from the United States to avoid antagonizing a belligerent Russia. Meanwhile, the inability of the Western countries-the United States in particular-to adequately respond to Russia led to large-scale public disappointment among Azerbaijanis. The crisis also "generated new sources of instability for the entire post-Soviet space, not only because it highlighted a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the fore the limits of Western policies in what Kremlin views as its sphere of influence."1 Moscow clearly showed its claims over the South Caucasus and demonstrated its readiness to embark on military confrontation to achieve its goals. The postwar situation indicated that Azerbaijan could become the next site where U.S.-Russian rivalry will arise. The Russian government's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led Azerbaijan to fear that Moscow would try to give similar support to the ethnic Armenian population in the region of Karabakh if Azerbaijan aligns itself too closely to the West.

Much has been written about the Russia-Georgia War's impact on foreign policy, energy projects, and the clash of geopolitical interests. However, scholars and researchers have generally overlooked the influence of the war on domestic policy, political development, and changes in public perception. One of the assumptions of realist theory, which shapes the paradigm that underlies much of the theoretical understanding of political science, is that "states are unitary actors and that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy."2 Unfortunately, the complexity of the problem in Azerbaijan has made it difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign politics. The absence of any visible developments in domestic politics, the silence of political scientists and public figures, and an inactive and docile public have coalesced to limit research on the problem.

In this article, I aim to analyze the domestic development in Azerbaijan and establish causality between certain events and the Russia-Georgia crisis. I look at the Azerbaijani public's changes in perception to see whether any changes occurred because of the conflict. I then examine the domestic security issues facing Azerbaijan and the government's reaction to these events. Finally, I examine political development in Azerbaijan after the war.

Public Opinions, Changing Perceptions, and Expectations

The war put Baku in a very delicate position. Refusing to support an important ally would have negatively affected Azerbaijan's image both abroad and in the eyes of a public that was clearly on the side of neighboring Georgia. The Azerbaijani government, however, tread lightly, not wanting to say or do anything that might provoke Russia or lead to a deterioration of relations with Moscow. Azerbaijan instead chose a strategy of soft support for Georgia while refraining from making harsh statements against Russia. On the day following the Georgian operation in South Ossetia, Khazar Ibrahim, the press secretary for Azerbaijan's foreign ministry, stated only that Azerbaijan favored a solution to the South Ossetia conflict based on the territorial integrity of Georgia and Georgian adherence to international law.3 Azerbaijan's support for Georgia in this conflict is understandable. After the Soviet Union's demise, the relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia have been consistently cordial. Both countries shared similar problems, such as ethnic separatism, an aggressive Russian policy in the southern Caucasus, and a common goal of integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The presence of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline prompted the strengthening and deepening of economic, political, and cultural ties. Furthermore, Georgia is a very important transportation hub, linking Azerbaijan to the rest of the world; all major projects implemented by Azerbaijan or multinational companies (including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Baku-Supsa Pipeline, and the Baku-Erzurum Pipeline) pass through Georgia. Meanwhile, an ambitious U.S.$600 million project to construct a Baku-Akhalkalaki railroad, connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey and then to Europe, also crosses Georgia. For Azerbaijan, it is vital to have a pro- Western (rather than pro-Russian) government in Georgia that could endorse and support the projects implemented by Azerbaijan and oil companies. If Georgia had a pro-Russian government, Azerbaijan would lose the opportunity to freely export its energy resources to the West and be surrounded by Russia and Russian-backed regimes in Armenia and Georgia. The Kremlin was especially displeased with Azerbaijan and Georgia's strategic partnership. In fact, the supply of Azerbaijani energy resources to Georgia is the one of the important factors keeping Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in power. Without Azerbaijani support, Russia would have strangled Georgia with an energy boycott and forced Saakashvili to resign.