Democracy at the Point of Bayonets

Latin American Politics and Society, Winter 2001 by Shifter, Michael

Peceny, Mark. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. Tables, bibliography, index, 254 pp.; hardcover $55, paperback $18.95.

One of the more contentious debates in Washington, DC, concerns what has, over the past several decades, become a central objective of U.S. foreign policy: the promotion of democracy. Policymakers and analysts argue about the motivations that animate such efforts, the efficacy of the instruments employed, and the impact or outcome in the target country. The spectrum of opinion ranges from thoroughgoing zealots to hardcore skeptics. In such a politicized and often charged context, however, it is seldom possible to sort through the methodological thicket that a serious discussion requires.

In that sense, Mark Peceny's book is a welcome contribution to a rather muddy and inconclusive field of inquiry. Peceny's undertaking is enormously ambitious and wide ranging. His study covers the globe, including more than 90 instances in the twentieth century when the United States sought to promote democracy through military intervention. He thus restricts the method of democracy promotion to the use of force, and is not concerned with other, "softer," commonly employed techniques, such as assistance programs or even economic sanctions. Limiting the universe in such a way permits rigorous statistical analysis, which, combined with carefully selected, in-depth case studies, sheds considerable light on the dynamics of such interventions.

Given such a focus, it is hardly surprising that Peceny's volume devotes substantial attention to Latin America. Apart from cases that figure prominently in the quantitative analysis, such as Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala, the book specifically examines the Spanish-American War, the early years of the Reagan administration's policy in El Salvador, and President Clinton's use of force to "restore democracy" in Haiti in 1994. Given the weight of history and geography, the exercise of U.S. power in the name of high ideals takes on greater significance in the Western Hemisphere than in other parts of the world.

Two crucial, parallel distinctions figure in Peceny's analysis. He distinguishes, first, between what he terms "proliberalization" and "nonliberalization" approaches. For Peceny, in roughly a third of the cases under review, the United States has pursued measures aimed at liberalizing or opening up the political system in another country; whereas in the remainder, the U.S. role has been to bolster authoritarian rule. Similarly, he contrasts the "realist" school, which attaches most weight to questions of power and security, to the "liberal" approach, which highlights ideals of freedom. To explain the variations in the dominance of one particular approach or another at a given time, Peceny relies chiefly on partisan, bureaucratic, and ideological factors and pressures, thus yielding important insights about the functioning of the U.S. political system.

One of the book's principal strengths is its serious and thoughtful treatment of the effects of internal political party concerns on presidential positions regarding democracy promotion. Peceny accounts for Kennedy's proliberalization stance in 1960, for example, by referring to his moderate image within the Democratic Party and the need to appeal to the liberal internationalist sector of his party. in contrast, Clinton's articulation of a liberal intenationalist, democracy-promotion agenda in the 1992 campaign had considerably less to do with internal party politics. In that campaign, the U.S. economy was unquestionably the overriding issue. Still, Peceny is appropriately sensitive to such constraints and pressures, often neglected or belittled in similar analyses.

At the same time, however, he argues persuasively that in many instances-McKinley on Cuba policy and Reagan on El Salvador-the "realist" impulses of the U.S. president encounter pressure from Congress, as the "domestic liberal argument" eventually takes hold. He maintains that "realist arguments do an excellent job of explaining initial choices, while the domestic liberal argument about congressional pressure provides a better explanation of presidents' final choices" (p. 37). Reflecting the "democratic peace" thesis, furthermore, Peceny rightly points out the coincidence between a "realist" mindset and a proliberalization policy; he accepts the notion that, over time, liberal reforms tend to contribute to greater security.

One of the problems with Peceny's work is that the conceptual categories he employs, though analytically distinct, are empirically blurred. In many complicated circumstances, it is hard to discern precisely where a proliberalization approach ends and a nonliberalization approach begins. It is curious, for example, to characterize President Kennedy's decision to overthrow President Diem of South Vietnam in 1963 as representing a proliberalization position, given that it was in violation of international legal norms (p. 102). Even though President Reagan pragmatically changed his tactics in response to constraints set by Congress in 1983 regarding El Salvador, it is at least debatable whether his administration actually embraced a proliberalization policy until some years later. Recognizing that compromises were essential on such questions as the level of military assistance and the human rights conditions attached to such aid did not necessarily signify a change of mind (pp. 128-30).