Policy issues: The reelection debate in Latin America

Latin American Politics and Society, Spring 2003 by Carey, John M

ABSTRACT

The debate over presidential reelection reappeared in Latin America in the last decade, and promises to continue in the years ahead. Arguments in favor contend that the possibility of immediate reelection increases politicians' responsiveness to citizen demands and allows voters the freedom to retain popular incumbents. Arguments against emphasize the danger of abuse of power by incumbents who seek to prolong their tenure. This article illustrates the parallels between these arguments and those made historically regarding the issue. It also suggests that the means by which provisions to allow reelection are adopted can provide valuable signals of their consequences.

In each of three recent years, Latin America witnessed a political upheaval prominently involving presidential reelection. In 1999, newly elected Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez convoked a constituent assembly that declared itself sovereign, displaced the sitting congress, and drafted a new charter of government that extended the presidential term from five to six years and allowed for consecutive reelection. In July 2000, President Chavez stood for reelection and renewed his mandate, opening the possibility that he could govern for almost 14 consecutive years if he is able to win again in 2006. In 2000, Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori stood for a third consecutive term and won a disputed contest, only to be subsequently unseated by a corruption scandal sufficiently fantastic as to defy brief description, but sufficiently compelling and familiar that a summary here is unnecessary.

The question of reelection also played a small but significant part in Argentina in December 2001. The Argentine Congress appointed San Luis Province governor Adolfo Rodriguez Saa as temporary replacement for President Fernando de la Rua, who was resigning, on the understanding that interim elections for a successor would be held in a few months. Rodriguez, however, immediately began to alienate supporters and skeptics alike with a series of announcements-of cabinet appointments to figures widely regarded as corrupt, of dubious monetary policy devices, and of his intention to stand as a candidate in the planned presidential elections. This last step helped induce Peronist copartisans to abandon Rodriguez; they had selected him on the understanding that he would not use the office as a platform from which to launch a presidential candidacy. Bereft of political and popular support, Rodriguez resigned a week later.

Reelection was a footnote to the Argentine fiasco, but it was absolutely central to the regime crises in both Peru and Venezuela. Fujimori's bid for a third term was widely denounced inside and outside Peru as a blatant usurpation of authority. Chavez's actions have raised similar concerns about concentration of power and personalization of the presidency.

Is presidential reelection a problem? These nearly simultaneous events lend urgency to the question. Constitutional reforms just a few years earlier allowing reelection in Argentina (under standard, constitutional procedures for presidential succession) and Brazil suggest its broader relevance. This essay reviews the historical context in which restrictions on presidential reelection were first widely adopted, along with the recent wave of changes in these rules, and concludes by evaluating the arguments both for and against reelection.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF "NO REFLECTION"

Concerns about presidential perpetuation in office are as old as presidentialism itself; they followed naturally from the preoccupation among the founders of America's many republics with maintaining political stability in the absence of monarchy.

In Philadelphia in 1787, delegates to the U.S. constitutional convention considered limiting presidents to a single six- or seven-year term (Madison 1787 [1966], 322-29, 356-61). The idea attracted substantial support but criticism as well, most thoroughly articulated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 72 with a series of arguments still echoing through present-day debates over presidential term limits. Hamilton elaborates the rationale behind the combination of a four-year presidential term and reelegibility for election.

The first is necessary to give the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him in the station in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues. (Hamilton 1789 [1961], 436)

Hamilton argued, in addition, against enshrining in the Constitution a prohibition on returning successful and popular presidents to office, on the grounds both that this would impinge on voters' freedom and that it would prevent stability in the executive branch. Given Hamilton's initial support for a monarchy-the most stable executive imaginable, in his mind-his appeals to democratic principles with regard to presidential selection may have been somewhat disingenuous. They did, at any rate, carry the day.